FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE

Daily Report

Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-90-094
Tuesday
15 May 1990

Daily Report
Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-90-094 CONTENTS *15 May 1990*

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

WORLDWIDE ISSUES

- Session of Vienna Arms Talks Resumes 1
  - Possible Future Treaty *[Solton on Moscow International]* 1
  - 'Critical Phase' of Talks *[TASS]* 1
- SDI Test Flight Seen as ABM Treaty 'Violation' *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 13 May]* 1

COMMUNIST RELATIONS

- Warsaw Pact Celebrates 35th Anniversary 3
  - Future Role Assessed *[TASS]* 3
  - Past, Present, Future Viewed *[Moscow TV]* 3
- Budapest 'Mulling Over' Continued Pact Membership *[Moscow TV]* 4
- Views Diverge on Scope of CEMA Reform *[PRAVDA 12 May]* 4

WORLDWIDE ISSUES

- First Session of Soviet-EC Commission Held 6
  - Details of Meeting Cited *[TASS]* 6
  - Environment Official Received *[TASS]* 6
  - Adamishin Confers With Representatives *[TASS]* 6
  - Session Completes Work *[TASS]* 7
  - Cooperation Assessed *[Moscow International]* 7
- Andreyev Comments on Dialogue Between Iran, EC *[Moscow International]* 8
- North Atlantic Assembly Session Ends *[TASS]* 9
- NATO Moves From Confrontation to Cooperation *[Moscow Radio]* 9
- Soviets Participate in International Air-Space Show *[TASS]* 10

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

United States & Canada

- Reportage on Run-up to Baker's Visit to Moscow 11
  - Baker Notes 'Common Interests' *[TASS]* 11
  - Talks 'Will Not Be Easy' *[TASS]* 11
  - Negotiations 'Crucial' for Summit *[Moscow Radio]* 12
- Trade Agreement Expected at USSR-U.S. Summit *[PRAVDA 13 May]* 12
- Motives for U.S. Wepons Siting in Europe Viewed *[IZVESTIYA 13 May]* 13
- Anti-Soviet Tenor of Western Broadcasts Noted *[PRAVDA 13 May]* 14
- Colonel Recounts Visit to U.S. Army Installations 14
  - Part I of Article *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 10 May]* 14
  - Part II of Article *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 11 May]* 16
- U.S. Forecasts Record Grain Harvest in USSR *[IZVESTIYA 12 May]* 18

China

- Soviet Response to Tiananman 'Incident' Cited *[Moscow International]* 18
- Gorbachev Receives Greeting From Yang Shangkun *[Moscow TV]* 19
- CPSU's Frolov Receives Newspaper Delegation *[PRAVDA 11 May]* 19

Northeast Asia

- Coverage of MPR's Delegation Visit to Moscow 20
  - Gorbachev Expresses 'Optimism' *[Moscow TV]* 20

Gorbachev Receives Delegation *[TASS]* 20
Gorbachev, P. Ochirbat Meet *[Ulaanbaatar MONTSAME]* 21
Shevardnadze, Gombosuren Discuss Ties *[TASS]* 21
Yakovlev Receives G. Ochirbat *[Moscow TV]* 21
P. Ochirbat Meets People's Deputies *[Moscow TV]* 22
DPRK To Return Remains of 5 U.S. Soldiers *[Moscow International]* 22

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Sihanouk Meets With Foreign Diplomats in Beijing *[Moscow International]* 22
Saw Maung Cited on Intent To Retain Power *[Moscow Radio]* 22
Air Services Agreement Signed With Indonesia *[TASS]* 23

Near East & South Asia

Egyptian President Mubarak Begins Visit 14 May 23
Visit Previewed *[TASS]* 23
Meets Gorbachev *[TASS]* 23
Economic Ties Increase *[TASS]* 23
Envoy to Egypt Views Topics *[London AL-HAWADITH 11 May]* 24
Laverov, Iranian Official Discuss Cooperation *[TASS]* 26
Petrovskiy Receives Iranian Envoy *[TASS]* 26

Sub-Saharan Africa

Vorontsov Receives Zambian Envoy 10 May *[IZVESTIYA 12 May]* 26
Dialogue, Polarization in South Africa Examined *[Moscow International]* 26

East Europe

Effect of East Europe Changes Pondered *[PRAVDA 14 May]* 27
Proposed Changes in Albania Surveyed *[IZVESTIYA 11 May]* 30
Bulgarian Group Visits, Studies Election Work *[PRAVDA 12 May]* 31
Protests by GDR Workers Reported *[IZVESTIYA 12 May]* 31
Hungary's Antal Cited on New Government, Program *[IZVESTIYA 5 May]* 31
Leader of Polish Social Democrats Interviewed *[TASS]* 32
Polish Sejm Bodies Discuss USSR Troop Pullout *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 13 May]* 32
Anti-Submarine Warship Sails From SFRY Port *[TASS]* 33

West Europe

Gorbachev Receives Apostolic Nuncio *[TASS]* 33
UK Defense Secretary King Arrives 14 May 33
Meets Yazov *[TASS]* 33
Talks 'Successful' *[TASS]* 33
Radio Views Visit *[Moscow Radio]* 34
Tanker Collides With West German Freighter 34
Details Viewed *[TASS]* 34
More on Collision Revealed *[TASS]* 34
Kopteltsev Speaks at German Unification Meeting 35
Suggests NATO Membership for Moscow *[Hamburg DIE WELT 14 May]* 35
Views German Sovereignty *[East Berlin ADN]* 35
FRG Paper Notes Work on Draft Peace Treaty *[Hamburg DPA]* 36
Genscher Receives Outgoing Envoy to FRG *[TASS]* 36
Gorbachev Hails Austria Treaty Anniversary *[Moscow Radio]* 36
Gorbachev, Queen of Netherlands Exchange Greetings *[TASS]* 36
Outgoing USSR Envoy Feted at Reception *[Hamburg DPA]* 36

Latin American & Caribbean

30 Years of Soviet-Cuban Ties Hailed *[PRAVDA 8 May]* 37
Ambassador Notes Relations *[Moscow Television]* 37
Correspondent Reviews Relations *[Moscow Radio]* 38

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Supreme Soviet Session

- Moscow TV Carries 14 May Supreme Soviet Session 39
  - Gritsenko Reports on Pensions 39
  - Amendments Offered, Voted On 40
  - Aviation Pensions Debated 40
  - Debates, Votes Continue 41
- Lukyanov Stresses Pension Bill 14 May *[TASS]* 42
  - Debate Progressing Slowly *[Moscow Radio]* 42
  - Bill Fails to Pass *[TASS]* 43
- Nationalities Council Passes Presidential Law *[Moscow Radio]* 43
- Pension Bill Debate Resumes 15 May *[TASS]* 44

Political & Social

- Shevardnadze Receives Four Countries' Ambassadors *[Moscow TV]* 44
- Yeltsin's Hospitalization in Spain Reviewed *[Moscow TV]* 44
  - Interviewed at Documentary Premiere *[Moscow TV]* 44
- Constitutional Oversight Committee Named *[IZVESTIYA 29 Apr]* 45
- Dangers of Alternatives to Perestroyka Cited *[IZVESTIYA 11 May]* 46
- Deputy Views Draft Law on USSR Languages *[VETERAN NO 17]* 47
- AIDS Prevention Law Effective 1 Jan 1991 *[IZVESTIYA 11 May]* 48
  - Law Published *[IZVESTIYA 11 May]* 48
- AUCCTU Plenum Reopens in Moscow *[Moscow Radio]* 49
  - Backs Draft for Trade Union Body *[TASS]* 49
- Consequences of Loss of Empire Cited *[EKHO LITVY 26 Apr]* 50
- Moscow Police Chief on Crime, Drugs, KGB *[Vienna NEUE KRONEN-ZEITUNG 13 May]* 52
- Five Kg of Heroin Seized at Moscow Airport *[PRAVDA 12 May]* 53
- Shortage of Medicine Examined *[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 18]* 53
- Industrial Reorganization Conference Opens *[Moscow Radio]* 55
- Baltic Fleet Employee Stole Guns for Crime Gang *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 11 May]* 56
- Former Politburo Member Kirilenko Dies 12 May *[TASS]* 56
- Correction to Gorbachev Congratulates Award Winners 56

Economic

- Ryzhkov Visits Plants; Discusses Economy *[PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK No 18]* 56
- Abalkin, Shatalin on Market Economy Transition *[Moscow International]* 57
- Abalkin Cited on Economic Reforms, Perestroyka *[London MORNING STAR 11 May]* 58
- Silayev Appears on 'Topical Interview' Program *[Moscow TV]* 60
- April Economic Figures Indicate Marking Time *[IZVESTIYA 11 May]* 63
- Editor Proposes Way Out of Economic Crisis *[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 19]* 64
- Economic Conference Opens in Leningrad *[TASS]* 65
- Ob River Grain Transport Opens *[Moscow Radio]* 65

Military

- Tashkent Military, Muslim Leaders Discuss Call-Up *[Moscow TV]* 65

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Baltic Republics

- 'Compromises' Necessary on Baltic Independence *[Moscow International]* 67
- Baltic Deputies Urged To Join Economic Debate *[Vilnius Radio]* 67
- Tensions Remain High in Baltic Republics *[Moscow International]* 67
- Lithuanian Antiblockade Commission Meets *[Vilnius Radio]* 67
- Prunskiene Holds News Conference, Discusses Visit *[Vilnius Radio]* 67
  - Interviewed on Talks in Paris *[Paris LE MONDE 12 May]* 68
- Brazauskas Sends Open Letter to Union Communists *[Vatican City International]* 69
- Troops at History Institute 'To Introduce Order' *[Vilnius Radio]* 69

Report on Lithuanian Economic Situation *[SELSKAYA ZHIZN 12 May]* 69
Lithuanian Supreme Council Proceedings Viewed *[EKHO LITVY 18 Apr]* 70
Lithuanian Foreign Minister on Foreign Policy *[Vilnius International]* 72
Paper Reveals Soviet Army Food Consumption *[Vilnius International]* 72
Pro-CPSU Klaipeda Committee Activity Reported *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 11 May]* 72
Article on Union-Lithuanian Economic Ties *[EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN No 16]* 73
Presidential Decrees on Latvia, Estonia Issued *[PRAVDA 15 May]* 75
Report on Estonian Supreme Soviet Session *[Tallinn Radio]* 75
Estonia's Ryuytel Terms Gorbachev 'Progressive' *[Bratislava Radio]* 76
Savisaar Interviewed on Road to Inependence *[Hamburg DER SPIEGEL 14 May]* 76
Estonian Name Change Evokes Protests *[PRAVDA 12 May]* 79
Estonians Polled on Politicians' Popularity *[Tallinn Radio]* 79
Riga Radio Carries 14 May Latvian Supreme Soviet 79
    Procedural Matters Discussed 79
    Quorum Matters Viewed 80
    Alternative Service Debated 81
    More on Debate 81
    Minister of Finance Approved 82
    Article 61 Adopted 82
Report of 'Scuffles' Outside Latvian Assembly *[Riga Radio]* 82
Latvian Parliament Elects Cabinet Ministers *[TASS]* 83
Labor Collectives Council Calls 15 May Strike *[Moscow TV]* 83
Work of Latvian Party Congress Assessed *[SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA 10 Apr]* 84

RSFSR

PRAVDA on Gorbachev Frunzenskiy Rayon Speech *[14 May]* 85
Congress of Russian Deputies To Open 16 May *[TASS]* 95
Deputies on Procedure for RSFSR Congress *[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 19]* 96
Formation of Russian People's Party Viewed *[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 19]* 97
Draft CPSU Rules, Regulations Critiqued *[LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA 11 Apr]* 98
'All Moscow' Reference Year Book Published *[IZVESTIYA 13 May]* 99
Nationalists Pickets Kabardino-Balkar Soviet *[IZVESTIYA 11 May]* 100

Western Republics

Separation of Belorussian Leading Posts Supported *[PRAVDA 13 May]* 100
Belorussian-Lithuanian Border Change Viewed *[TRUD 4 May]* 100
Moldavian Supreme Soviet Continues Work *[Moscow TV]* 102

Caucasus

Protesters Demand Dissolution of Georgian Komsomol *[Moscow TV]* 102
'View' Program on Georgian Independence *[Moscow TV]* 102
State, Stance of Georgian Party Overviewed *[PRAVDA 14 May]* 103

Central Asia

Report on Kazakh Supreme Soviet Proceedings *[Moscow Radio]* 106
    Discusses Nuclear Tests *[Moscow TV]* 106
    Committee Chairmen Elected *[KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA 2 May]* 106
Oblast Party Conference Held in Kazakhstan *[Alma-Ata Radio]* 107
Kazakh Oblasts Elect First Secretaries *[PRAVDA 13 May]* 107
Earthquake in Kazakhstan; No Destruction Reported *[TASS]* 107

Session of Vienna Arms Talks Resumes

Possible Future Treaty

LD1405141290 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 14 May 90

[Yuriy Solton commentary]

[Text] The 23-nation talks on conventional arms and troop reductions in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization have resumed in Vienna. At the previous round important compromise proposals were put forward and some observers believe that the negotiators have come close to finalizing the key sections of a future treaty. Just how justified are these hopes? Yuriy Solton comments:

So far the talks have not been as dynamic as they should. Their pace has clearly fallen behind the developments in Europe, in the first place the unification of Germany and its future military and political status. In Germany today there are, apart from its own troops, contingents of seven other nations including the four great powers. The German territory is overburdend by sophisticated military hardware including nuclear and chemical weapons. This power keg cannot be defused without an agreement on cuts in conventional armed forces in Europe. Moscow believes that the Vienna talks are an important element of efforts to synchronize the German settlement with pan-European interests.

The Soviet military expert at the negotiations, Major General Viktor Tatarnikov, says the situation in the East European countries and in the West and the problem of the unification of the two German states has left a certain imprint on the talks. Our partners have been claiming that this is an internal affair of the German people and that it doesn't concern us. This is not so. It does concern each European nation. NATO continues strengthening itself. That alliance has tough discipline. Regrettably there is no such unanimity in the Warsaw Treaty Organization today, and yet we must complete the talks proceeding from the fact that there are two alliances. All ceilings on arms being discussed have been computed on this basis.

I would add, says Yuriy Solton, that the talks can lose all sense if an agreement fails to be achieved this year. Can one hope for success? I believe yes. However, for that there must be additional and powerful impetuses. The foreign ministers of the German Democratic Republic, Federal Germany and also the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain and France, who have set the schedule for the whole series of "Two Plus Four" conferences, can give the talks a boost. They should coordinate efforts in German and pan-European affairs to foster security and confidence-building measures and reduce troops.

'Critical Phase' of Talks

LD1405150590 Moscow TASS in English 1417 GMT 14 May 90

[By TASS military analyst Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow May 14 TASS—A regular round of talks on conventional armed forces in Europe has opened in Vienna. Taking part in it are 23 states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO. I believe the importance of this forum has grown substantially of late in connection with the problem of German and all-European unification. In this connection I share the view of West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who believes that the Vienna talks could help to lay the military-political foundation for arms control, so important for the elimination of confrontation and development of joint security structures in Europe.

I should also like to stress another point, which is important to my mind: The talks have now entered a critical phase. There is very little time left, if the parties to the talks really wish to draw up the first agreement on conventional armed forces in Europe by this autumn. Therefore persistence, flexibility and compromises are expected from them all. Of course, extensive work has already been carried out at the forum, but several problems remain unresolved. I wish to note in this context an alarming tendency that appeared in the closing weeks of the previous round: Progress in the talks had slowed down noticeably. The Western side is obviously to blame, since it holds back the political urge for an agreement.

Definitions for such categories of arms and hardware as tanks, armoured carriers and helicopters have still not been agreed. There is no accord on the reduction of combat aircraft due to NATO's unflexible stand. The East has tried different compromises. Thus, it has agreed to fix corresponding ceilings for the types of combat aircraft that previously were not subject to limitation, and to cover a wider range of such weapons by the prepared agreement.

However the West's approach is designed essentially to ensure more favourable conditions for itself by exploiting the differences in the existing structures of air forces, as well as the geographic factor. Of course, this stand can hardly be regarded as conducive to the earliest possible conclusion of an agreement.

It should be hoped that the interval between rounds will be used to analyse seriously the state of affairs in Vienna and to draw up corresponding constructive proposals to overcome the existing disagreements. At the same time, I would not rule out the possibility of some disputed issues being postponed to the next stage of the negotiations, which is to be started immediately after the signing of the first agreement in Vienna. Maybe such an approach will facilitate work on the first document.

SDI Test Flight Seen as ABM Treaty 'Violation'

PM1505092190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 13 May 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report under the rubric "Cable For This Issue": "'Star Wars' Tests Have Begun in the United States"]

[Text] An airliner with an unusual silhouette took off from the runway at the U.S. Boeing Corporation's airfield in Seattle (Washington State) on Friday at 1110 hours U.S. Pacific time. Thus began a series of tests in the "Star Wars" program during which the Pentagon, according to certain U.S specialists, will come closer than ever to breaching the 1972 Soviet-U.S. treaty limiting ABM defense systems.

The 26-meter bell-shaped superstructure on the Boeing-767 fuselage conceals a gigantic system of 38,400 sensors designed to track missile warheads. According to the U.S. Army Strategic Defense Command, satellite and star surveillance will be used during the first six-hour flight and several subsequent tests to test the sensors. However, flights to track dummy warheads that will be launched from Vandenberg Air Base in California toward Kwajalein atoll in the Pacific are planned to later this year and early next year.

One of the key questions which the Pentagon hopes to answer by means of the coming tests is whether the apparatus installed on the Boeing can distinguish between real and fake warheads and lock interceptors onto real targets.

Critics of the Pentagon's military preparations note that the tests now under way create a serious threat of a violation of the ABM Treaty, which is one of the main foundations of military-strategic stability in the world. Specialists have weighty reasons for suspecting that the Boeing's apparatus can perform the functions of an ABM radar. The creation of mobile radars is prohibited under Article 5 of the treaty.

Commenting on the news of the first test flight at the request of THE NEW YORK TIMES, Spurgeon Keeny, president of the Arms Control Association, who was involved in the ABM Treaty's elaboration in the past, pointed out that the Pentagon "is advancing in a direction which—in the event of the tests being successful—would be regarded by very many people as a violation" of treaty commitments.

The Pentagon does, of course, deny the charges against it. It claims that the system being tested is, first, purely experimental and, second, is not in any case anything more than a "supplement" to ground-based radar. To add cogency, the U.S. Department of Defense has even dubbed its development an "onboard optical auxiliary system." However, independent specialists refuse to take such explanations on trust.

Warsaw Pact Celebrates 35th Anniversary

Future Role Assessed

LD1405151890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0933 GMT 14 May 90

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 14 May—Today it is 35 years since the signing of the Warsaw Pact—a treaty on friendship, cooperation and mutual help, which played and continues to play an important role in maintaining stability on the continent.

The fast-changing international situation and the complex internal processes taking place in East European countries are naturally influencing the state of affairs in the Warsaw Pact. Nevertheless, in conditions of military opposition still being preserved, the alliance remains an integral element of equilibrium and balance of forces. It was the achievement of this equilibrium which made it possible to start relaxation, an all-European process, to whose formation and development the Warsaw Pact states are making a weighty contribution.

In an interview with the Bulgarian VECHERNI NOVINI paper, Eduard Shevardnadze, the USSR minister of foreign affairs, noted that "The Warsaw Pact Organization can be proud of the fact that it introduced a number of most important initiatives in the political and military sphere." This, the Soviet minister stressed, is both the proposal on the beginning of talks on arms reduction from the Atlantic to the Urals, the announcement of the defensive character of military doctrine, and the large unilateral reductions in the armed forces and armaments, and their restructuring in accordance with defense doctrine. Moscow diplomatic circles think that these steps have positively played a substantial role in the considerable thawing of the European climate.

As a consequence, the question of reduction of armed forces and military expenditure is being raised at a practical level in some NATO countries. The west's answer could perhaps be more decisive. Nevertheless, East European countries express hope that the last word still remains to be said. The establishing of a direct dialogue between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, which the Warsaw Pact states advocate, could play an important role in lowering the level of military confrontation and strengthening trust on the continent.

Despite recent assumptions about the Pact's "decline", all its members continue to believe this organization to be necessary from the point of view of their national interests. This position of the allies was confirmed at the meeting of the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact states which took place in March this year in Prague and was dedicated to the problem of the unification of the two German states. In particular they spoke about the necessity of perfecting the Warsaw Pact, meaning a stage-by-stage, gradual transformation of the main military and political alliances into political and military ones.

The Warsaw Pact sees its future in further—until its simultaneous with abolition NATO—helping the demilitarization of Europe, overcoming confrontation and forming a new, nonbloc, security system on an all-European basis.

Past, Present, Future Viewed

LD1405165390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 14 May 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Thirty-five years ago, on 14 May 1955, the Soviet Union and a number of East European countries concluded the multilateral Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance which went down in history as the Warsaw Pact. Today Army General Lushev, commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member-states, is participating in our program:

[Begin Lushev recording] The past, present, and especially the future of the Warsaw Treaty Organization has recently been attracting particular attention from a wide world public. This is the result of the processes of change taking place in East European states. There are a great many interpretations on this count. For this reason I deem it necessary to emphasize that all the obligations undertaken by the allied East European states remain in force.

At the same time it is impossible not to see that the old structures of interrelationships between the allies, structures which develop over the years, are in need of qualitative changes.

Major transformations are also taking place in the military sphere of activity of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. They include the adoption by the Treaty's member-states of a document on military doctrine with a strictly defensive orientation in May 1987; the withdrawal of Soviet troop units from the territory of a number of allied states; as well as the conclusion of agreements with Czechoslovakia and Hungary on the complete withdrawal of the Soviet military contingents from their territory.

Life itself is posing the question of the alliance's transformation from a military-political alliance to a political-military one. This is perhaps the main link in the perestroyka of its activity and structure today.

I think that our defensive alliance will continue to serve as an effective factor for peace and security in Europe. [Video shows Lushev in uniform, speaking as he sits at a desk] [end recording]

Budapest 'Mulling Over' Continued Pact Membership

LD1405224390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2019 GMT 14 May 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] [Announcer] 14 May saw the 35th anniversary of the signing of the Warsaw Pact, the pact of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance between the socialist states of Europe. The changes which are taking place in the countries of East Europe—which in the treaty are called socialist—could not have failed to affect this military-political alliance. From certain East European capitals calls have come to withdraw from the Pact. The other day the parliamentary faction of the Union of Free Democrats of Hungary made such a proposal. Several hours ago we were on the phone to our correspondent in Budapest, Yevgeniy Shirokov, asking him to tell us in what direction Hungary is moving in resolving this question.

[Shirokov] Hungary is mulling over the significance of the 35 years of validity of the Warsaw Pact amid the intoxication at the intensive withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country. The gist of many arguments runs like this: If we've come as far as the withdrawal of troops, then there is no point in delaying Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. Today's MAGYAR HIRLAP said that if the Pact disappears there will be no point in the existence of NATO either. Here there has been pointed, even taunting criticism of the position of those representatives of NATO who cautiously advise against haste in dismantling the Warsaw pact. A special commission of the Hungarian parliament is to examine the question of the future of Hungary in the framework of the Warsaw Pact more seriously and profoundly. This is what has been decided by the republic's state assembly.

Views Diverge on Scope of CEMA Reform

PM1405161390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 May 90 Second Edition p 6

[Andrey Sharyy "Viewpoint" article: "CEMA: Quest for a New Look"]

[Text] "Reconstruction or Disintegration?" This headline from Czechoslovakia's LIDOVE NOVINY may be debatable but it nevertheless gives a graphic indication of the situation in which CEMA now finds itself. I think that the time of sham unanimity has gone forever. Now there are opposing opinions among the members of the "ten" on almost every fundamental issue of cooperation. Although, notwithstanding the occasionally drastically dissimilar approaches to the question of the pace and scope of the transformations, all the participants agreed with the idea voiced by the head of the Soviet Government that to quit CEMA is tantamount to "economic suicide" for any of its participants. The economic ties that have taken shape over the decades are too durable and the economic interdependence is too strong.

Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, which are better prepared than the others for the transition to a market economy, hold "revolutionary" positions. These countries are pressing for the virtually immediate introduction of market relations and the renunciation of the model of multilateral cooperation in favor of bilateral ties. However, economics counsel against undue haste. While advocating an immediate "transition to the market," Czechoslovakia at the same time reacted with extreme restraint to the USSR's proposal to pay for raw material shipments in convertible currency in 1991. Without doubt, the transition to transactions in hard currency means considerable losses for our East European partners but—as has been frequently stated at the highest level—these losses are inevitable for the sake of future advantage.

Proposals are coming in from Warsaw, Budapest, and Prague for new principles of regional integration. In particular, there is talk of implementing the idea of setting up a "little CEMA," which was first put forward in the late 1960s with a view to strengthening Polish-Czechoslovak-Hungarian integration. This project is based on the idea that truly mutually advantageous, close economic cooperation is only feasible for countries whose geographical dimensions and level of development are comparable or similar.

Do the attempts to form a "little" grouping mean that a number of countries are moving away from "CEMA" cooperation or does it, on the contrary, attest to a desire to create "market experience laboratories," a kind of "testing ground" for progressive ideas within the Council framework? This question cannot be answered unequivocally. However, it is clear that under current conditions most East European countries' membership of CEMA can no longer be regarded as a political choice, but is a reality which should only be assessed on the basis of economic principles.

Bulgaria and Romania have a somewhat calmer attitude than their neighbors to the prospects of an accelerated transition to a market economy, although these countries' governments are in principle moving along the same road. People in both Sofia and Bucharest advocate the gradual replacement of the administrative integrated system with a market economy, the gearing of cooperation to the interests of each country, and the opening up of the Council to the world economy. Western observers believe that the fact that "Bulgaria and Romania, which are experiencing the most serious economic crisis among the East European countries, will obviously suffer more than the others in the event of CEMA's hasty transformation into a grouping founded on market principles" affects these countries' position.

While not reducing the participation of its country's representatives in the work of "CEMA" bodies, the new GDR Government is obviously counting on a fundamentally different path of integration into the world economy: German unification, which is becoming increasingly real, gives it hope of "riding into the EC aboard the West German locomotive."

At the January CEMA session in Sofia, Mongolia and Vietnam stated their support in principle for the policy aimed at a transition to market prices, placing the emphasis on the need to preserve the system of mutual preferences, which envisages markups on the prices of these countries' exports in order to balance foreign trade. Cuba, whose leadership, as is well known, conducts a centralized economic policy, also supported the idea of the need for a radical reform of the existing model of cooperation. However, Cuban partners believe that there is no need to waive the principles on which the organization is founded.

And what about the Soviet Union? I think that the program proposed by the Soviet delegation at the January CEMA session even convinced skeptics that the Soviet Union firmly retains its role as the Council's leader. "We are not changing our principled attitude to CEMA," N.I. Ryzhov said, "regarding it as a mutually useful collective body for economic cooperation."

In my view, there is one main problem behind the talks and consultations that are currently actively under way within CEMA—namely, how to correctly link the change in the system of cooperation with the dynamics of the economic reforms being implemented within individual countries. The work of the special commission which is elaborating a draft for the radical reform of CEMA and is preparing new statutes for the organization is geared toward this. The "changed" CEMA is conceived as an organization open to argument and debate where a "dissenting position" on the part of any of its members would not impede the development of cooperation. "Revolutionaries" and "outsiders" are now seeking a compromise, without which the very idea of the Council's survival is problematic.

First Session of Soviet-EC Commission Held

Details of Meeting Cited

LD0705180990 Moscow TASS in English 1640 GMT 7 May 90

[By TASS correspondent George Mikhailin]

[Text] Moscow May 7 TASS—The mixed USSR-EC commission is due to meet for the first time in Moscow on May 10 and 11 to discuss what specific measures the sides can take to begin the implementation in practice of the agreement between the Soviet Union and the European Community on trade and economic cooperation, the commission's Soviet chairman Ernst Obminskiy told TASS today.

The agreement, put in effect on April 1, attests to the importance the Soviet Union and the European Communities attach to the development of mutual relations. This is importance will [as received] further be stressed by the fact that the first session will be opened by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and deputy chairman of the EC Commission for Foreign Affairs, Trade Policy and Cooperation With Other European countries Frans Andriessen, Obminskiy said.

Under mutual agreement each side is represented on the commission by an equal number of members—16. High-ranking officials of ministries and departments involved in the realisation of the agreement represent the Soviet side. Leading staffers of the EC Commission (EEC) represent the European twelve. In addition, sessions wil be attended by representatives of the EC member- countries. EEC Director-General for International Relations Horst Krenzler will co-chair the mixed commission.

The mixed commission's principal tasks are to control the frame agreement implementation and to facilitate the conclusion, on its basis, of sectoral (branch) agreements. One such sectoral agreement—on textile trade—has been in effect since May 1, others—on fishing and trade in coal and metallurgical industrial goods are nearing completion. An agreement on cooperation in nuclear power engineering, including safety measures, is being planned. Both the Soviet Union and the European Conmmunity are interested in interaction in environmental protection, including keeping the Baltic clean. All these issues wil be discussed at the first mixed commission session, Obminskiy said.

The Soviet side plans to discuss prospects for signing an USSR-EC agreement on scientific and technical cooperation. Of the many difficulties blocking the way towards such an agreement, Cocom [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] lists are the main. Other hindrances are connected with the lack of adequate patent right and legislation on protection of intellectual property rights in the Soviet Union and the European Communities, Obminskiy says.

For their part, EEC representatives are concerned about opening an EC office in Moscow. The Soviet office is already functioning in Brussels.

During the mixed commission session, a seminar wil be held by representatives of the EEC and the Soviet Chamber of Commerce and Industry to familiarize Soviet managers with conditions for business activity on the Common Market.

Environment Official Received

LD1105221290 Moscow TASS in English 2113 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 11 TASS—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy today received Laurens Jan Brinkhorst, director-general of the Main Department of the Commission of the European Communities (CEC) for the Environment, Consumer Protection and Nuclear Safety, who is currently in Moscow in connection with the first session of the Soviet-EC joint commission for trade, commercial and economic cooperation.

They had a detailed exchange of views on cooperation between the Soviet Union and the European communities in the fields of environmental protection, safe development of the power industry. Particularly the nuclear power industry, and exchanges of advanced resource-saving technologies.

Mutual interest in a consistent expansion of cooperation in these priority fields was expressed and the readiness of the sides to deepen contacts at all levels with this end in view was reaffirmed.

Adamishin Confers With Representatives

LD1105221890 Moscow TASS in English 2137 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 12 TASS—Consultations with representatives of the foreign ministries of three member countries of the European Communities—Ireland, which is the EC chairman in the current half year, France, former chairman of the EC in the second half of last year, and Italy which will be the chairman of the EC from July 1, this year—took place in the Soviet Foreign Ministry on Friday.

During the discussion of the central subject—the state of affairs in Europe—it was pointed out that the processes taking place on the continent create favourable favourable prerequisites for overcoming the division of Europe and building a future all-European community.

The sides recognised the importance of securing that these processes fit into the all-European process and lead to the formation of a new system of relations between the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) participating states, based on the goals and principles of the final act of the Helsinki Conference.

Recognising a considerable contribution which was already made at the CSCE to the positive evolution of affairs on the continent, they expressed conviction that the CSCE process should remain the basis for ensuring stability and security on the continent.

The importance of spreading the positive experience of the CSCE process over to the Mediterranean was pointed out.

In this connection the sides emphasised their determination to promote the development of the Helsinki process in all its aspects in every way and to do everything necessary for a success of this year's forthcoming CSCE summit.

They regard the CSCE summit as a point of departure for taking the Helsinki process to a qualitatively new level that would meet the imperatives of the present period.

It was pointed out that the CSCE summit will make it possible in particular to thoroughly discuss the institutionalisation of the CSCE process and the establishment of new structures of European security and cooperation within its framework.

The consultations revealed the identity of the sides' positions on the need to decide on a date and venue of the summit and the start of preparatory work.

Within the context of discussion of CSCE problems, the sides had a frank exchange of views on the external aspects of German unification.

The Soviet side reaffirmed an urgent necessity to synchronise German unification with the development of the Helsinki process and the formation of a basically new system of European security on a nonbloc basis.

From the viewpoint of the search for ways for practical partnership between the Soviet Union and "the Twelve" in promoting a settlement of regional problems, the sides considered the situation in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Africa's south, the Horn of Africa, and Cyprus. The sides also discussed possibilities for cooperation in the fight against the trafficking of narcotics on an international scale.

The consultations again reaffirmed the promising nature of political dialogue between the Soviet Union and the European Communities as an effective instrument for consolidating positive changes in Europe and in East-West relations as a whole.

The delegation of the three EC member-states was represented by Mr. Murphy, director of the Political Department of the Irish Foreign Ministry, Mr. Dufourcq, director of the Political Department of the French Foreign Ministry, and Mr. Perlo, director of the Political Department of the Italian Foreign Ministry.

The consultations also involved Mr. Yanuzzi, the EC general secretary for European Political Cooperation, and Mr. Burghardt, head of the European Political Cooperation Department of the Commission of the European Communities.

Consultations from the Soviet side were conducted by Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoliy Adamishin. Taking part in the consultations were also members of the collegium and heads of directorates and departments of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

Session Completes Work

LD1205125990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1956 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Moscow, 11 May (TASS)--TASS correspondent Georg Mikhaylin reports:

The first session of the USSR-EC (European Communities) joint commission, set up in accordance with the agreement signed on 18 December between the Soviet Union and the Communities on trade and commercial and economic cooperation, completed its work today.

The session was chaired by Ernest Obminskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister. Attending it, on the Soviet side, were 34 senior officials from the ministries and departments taking part in implementing the agreement, as well as the USSR's permanent representative to the EC. A delegation of 18 leading officials and experts from the Commission of the European Communities was led by Horst Krenzler, CEC director-general of external relations. Representatives of the Communities' member countries attended the session.

For two days, in an atmosphere of mutual understanding, the sides examined the general economic position in the Soviet Union and the Communities, discussed a wide range of bilateral and international trade-policy problems, and analyzed the fulfillment of the agreement, which has been operative since 1 April this year. The USSR and EC delegations tabled, and expressed their readiness to consider, proposals to give concrete effect to cooperation in such areas as the environment, power engineering—including nuclear power and its safety—science and technology, management, and the training of personnel.

The sides decided to set up subcommissions on questions of trade policy and environmental protection issues, and also to intensify contacts between experts in fields of mutual interest.

The next session of the joint commission will be held next year in Brussels. The actual dates of its work will be specified later.

Cooperation Assessed

LD1205130990 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 1900 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] [Announcer] The Soviet Union and the Common Market have made an important step towards each other on the road that may lead Europe to a more prosperous and secure future. The first working session of a joint committee on cooperation between the two communities, just held in Moscow, appeared to be a true meeting of minds, at least that was the impression of Nikolay Gorshkov of our staff, who discussed the results of the session with Ernest Obminskiy, Soviet deputy foreign minister, and Horst Krenzler, director-general of the European Community's commission [title as heard]. Deputy Foreign Minister Obminskiy described the session as the first practical step in cooperation between the Soviet Union and the European Community, so Nikolay Gorshkov asked him if this cooperation could offer practical help to the ailing Soviet economy.

[Begin recording] [Obminskiy] First of all, I think that we will have tangible results in such spheres as mutual trade because, as it's well known, the bilateral trade relations are now subject to control of European Communities and that's why we (?can't) now have same conditions on markets of country-members of the Community without European Economic Commission [sentence as heard]. So all of those are practical questions of tariffs and of money which would be involved into this process and besides we will have the regime of most favored nation. Then we will have a better cooperation, improved cooperation in many economic fields and scientific and technological fields. That's also very heartening. Then we'll have cooperation in preparing managers and discussions and expertise of our economic reform, banking and other fields of activities.

[Gorshkov] We have less than two years now before 1992, when most of Western Europe will be hopefully a single economic market. How many more steps does this commission need to make to render itself capable of meeting the new challenges after 1992, Mr. Krenzler?

[Krenzler] I think the market '92 brings about new business opportunities for all outside countries and of the Community and also for the Soviet Union, because the internal market exercise and the abolition of frontiers inside the Community lead to greater—to an increased growth, economic growth within the Community, and this increased growth attracts more imports. But, on the other side, the competitive climate in the Community will be rather tough and who will benefit from the outside from the import growth in the Community, that depends on the economic conditions in the exporting countries. And therefore one of—(?an) important part of the agreement which we have discussed in detail, the implementation of the agreement we have discussed today, is how can we support by this agreement the move to a market economy in the Soviet Union, in other words the process of perestroyka, because a more market-orientated Soviet economy will in our view make better use of the opportunities of the greater market of the Community of '92.

[Gorshkov] Unfortunately, in the process of switching to the market economy, the Soviet economy right now seems to be in a mess. It looks like it is disintegrating. With all the nationalist and separatist sentiment in the Baltic republics, the Soviet market may not be as single as it used to be. Aren't the European Communities afraid to a certain extent to deal with the Soviet market, with the Soviet economy?

[Krenzler] We think that the Soviet market has a very big potential. It is clear, quite clear, that from the moment the country, as far as we can really judge from the outside, is living in a period of transition from a system of command economy to a market—to a system of market economy, and this will take inevitably time. And this process will not be an easy one. And therefore it—we think, we will support as much as we can this process of reform, but we can only be of some support, and the main task is on the Soviet Government and in particular on the Soviet people.

[Gorshkov] Do you think that closer cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Economic Community may help us in improving things here in the Soviet economic market, Mr. Obminskiy?

[Obminskiy] I think that the interdependence which is growing from year to year and the connections between various branches of industry and between various countries are inevitable and will lead to a strengthening of ties between all countries. The disintegration of our internal market was inevitable, a result of the situation which has been created by so many years of being cut off our natural ties with many countries, and it has led to the fact that our internal parts were not so connected as we thought of them. I think that our integration into the world economy will have a chain reaction. Our dealings with the highest technology, our dealings with the representatives of other businesses, would help us to create a favourable climate for development inside the country, and that will mean that the participants of other local regions or republics will see the favorable economic (?sight) of their being inside the integrated Soviet market. [end recording]

Andreyev Comments on Dialogue Between Iran, EC

NC1305154590 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 12 May 90

[Yuriy Andreyev commentary]

[Text] Dear listeners: The representatives of Iran and the EC countries will meet next week in Dublin. As the Irish Government's press secretary announced, the Iranian officials will hold talks with high-level Irish, French, and Italian diplomats.

In the past two years, diplomatic relations between Iran and the EC member countries have been dramatically reduced. A small spell of dialogue and restrained talks metamorphosed into an uproar of activity, an exchange of recriminations, and a violent verbal and propaganda battle. Several times, Iran and Europe reached the brink of a complete severance of diplomatic ties, but each time they refrained from taking this fateful step.

The reciprocal irreconcilability between the two sides reached its height in February 1989. At that time Imam Khomeyni issued a decree declaring Salman Rushdie, the author of the book "The Satanic Verses," condemned to execution. Europe displayed an immediate and completely (?just) reaction. The heads of the European countries took the practical step of recalling their envoys from Tehran for consultations. They categorically condemned the decree of the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

As a result the relations between Iran and West Europe lapsed into a state of diplomatic paralysis. In order to regain the former level of political relations, a period of six months was necessary. However, some months ago, the fate of Iranian-West European relations once again seemed to teeter on the brink of danger. The European Parliament unexpectedly issued a resolution endorsed by a large number of countries calling for the expulsion of Iran from the United Nations and saying that all economic ties with it should be severed.

The European members of parliament accused Iran of large-scale violations of human rights and extensive executions of political prisoners. In this resolution approved by the European Parliament it was claimed that the Iranian officials had eliminated scores of their political opponents and that the Iranian leadership's terroristic tactics had endangered international security.

It is worth noting that Tehran displayed unusual restraint in this regard. The Islamic Government did not take any step in protest against Europe. In Iran, it appeared as if the adoption of the resolution by the European Parliament had not been noticed. It seemed that in the European capitals the official stance of Tehran was given (?much) attention.

It is no mere coincidence that Gerard Collins, foreign minister of Ireland, the current president of the EC, assumed the role of convener of the scheduled meeting in Dublin. It is anticipated that during the course of the talks the situation arising from the Salman Rushdie affair, as well as the issue of Western hostages in Lebanon, will be discussed.

Of course it is difficult to say whether the two sides will be able to reach a consensus on all the issues involved. An ideological chasm separates them and the burden of past eras is still on their shoulders today. Even so, it is apparent that Iran may submit to the resumption of diplomatic relations with the West. It appears that the slogan of Neither East Nor West will gradually be relegated to secondary importance, and an open-door policy toward the outside world and dialogue and negotiations with the East as well as the West may gain in strength.

North Atlantic Assembly Session Ends

LD1405205190 Moscow TASS in English 1957 GMT 14 May 90

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Batyrev]

[Text] Paris May 14 TASS—Having adopted a resolution on the future of European security, a spring session of the North Atlantic Assembly—an organisation uniting parliamentarians from the NATO member-countries—concluded its work here today.

The assembly supported the idea of creating a European confederation, comprising all democratic nations with the political union of twelve European Economic Community member-countries as the nucleus, the resolution said.

The resolution also voiced support for the idea of building a genuine European bulwark of security. According to the resolution, NATO should turn into an organisation in which the United States and West Europe would be equitable partners. This aim is expected to be achieved in the near future, and the subject is due to become central at the forthcoming meeting of the leaders of the NATO member-countries.

At the moment when the European political landscape continues to change, NATO should contribute to the process. This urgent task must include prompt preparations for the next stage of talks on conventional armed forces in Europe, the resolution urges.

The future of Germany is the pivotal issue for European security. The viability of NATO will only be ensured if Germany joins it as a fully-fledged member, the resolution says. It envisages the possibility of granting the territory of the former German Democratic Republic a special military status.

The North Atlantic Alliance, the resolution says, retains its full significance in the epoch when events are occurring which can pose a threat to stability in Europe. For a long time in the foreseeable future, nothing will be able to replace NATO as an organisation of political and defence cooperation of democratic nations.

As regards the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the NATO parliamentarians believe that although the CSCE remains a necessary negotiation mechanism for 35 countries of Europe and North America, it must nevertheless acquire a more specific form.

NATO Moves From Confrontation to Cooperation

LD1105212290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] As we have already reported, the latest session of NATO's nuclear planning group has ended in Canada. I have asked Political Observer Aleksandr Zholkver to comment on its results.

[Zholkver] Let me admit that the latest decisions of NATO's top military leadership have made a two-fold impression on me. On the one hand, Woerner, the NATO secretary-general, said on the eve of the present meeting a great deal about the fact that the Western alliance is now at the most important stage of its historical development, that it is adapting to the changing circumstances, and is moving from confrontation to cooperation. Prior to the meeting itself of NATO defense ministers, Washington loudly announced the renunciation of plans to modernize the short-range U.S. Lance nuclear missiles located in the FRG. Indeed THE WASHINGTON POST has begun in general to write about the need to restructure U.S. foreign policy, noting that in connection with the cardinal changes in the Soviet Union and East Europe, military strength will not in the future be of such great significance.

The final communique following the Canadian meeting also warmly welcomes the process of reforms and the efforts to establish democratic values in the USSR and the countries of East Europe. However, this makes it the more strange that after saying A, NATO's military leadership did not risk going on to say B also. On the contrary, the same communique reaffirms NATO's adherence to a strategy of making first use of nuclear weapons, and puts forward the demand that both strategic nuclear forces and nuclear forces in Europe be maintained. Specifically it is a matter of transferring to West Europe—first and foremost to the FRG and Britain—new U.S. air-launched nuclear missiles for their installation on aircraft capable, it is emphasized, of deeply penetrating into the territory of the Soviet Union.

How does all this tie up with the assurances about a review of NATO's strategy and its transition from confrontation to cooperation? Besides everything else, how can all this be compatible with the proposal by the Western powers to include the whole of Germany in NATO? True, it should be noted that by no means have all Western capitals been adopting this position. There have been many reports from Canada that the defense ministers of Belgium, the Netherlands, and even the FRG have been advocating the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. This, however, was resisted by representatives of the United States and Britain. A decision on this matter has now been postponed until the top-level NATO meeting scheduled for the beginning of July in London.

Well, as they say, we shall see what we shall see. However, as yet following the Canadian meeting, I personally find it hard to believe that the long due restructuring in NATO has really begun.

Soviets Participate in International Air-Space Show

LD1505084590 Moscow TASS in English 0834 GMT 15 May 90

[Text] Bonn May 15 TASS—The international air space show ILA-90 opened at Hannover Airport today.

The exhibition drew about 400 firms and enterprises from 21 countries.

The Soviet Union has resumed its participation in the show for the first time since 1976. The Soviet display includes the Il-96-300 and Tu-204 plane, the MiG-29 combat plane and the Ka-29 helicopter. The highlight of the Soviet exposition will be the Tu-155 aircraft, the worlds first cryogenic hydrogen-engined plane.

The air show in Hannover is held once every two years to exhibit the latest achievements and advanced technologies of the leading producers of aviation and space equipment.

United States & Canada

Reportage on Run-up to Baker's Visit to Moscow

Baker Notes 'Common Interests'

LD1505082790 Moscow TASS in English 0806 GMT 15 May 90

[Text] New York May 15 TASS—Before departure to Moscow, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker spoke to the National Committee on American Foreign Policy in New York.

Baker formulated the basic principles of the United States' approach to European problems in the 1990s.

Emphasising the importance of changes occurring in the world under the impact of "perestroyka in the Soviet Union and democratic revolutions of Central and Eastern Europe," Baker noted that all this "creates a new opportunity for America to cast our vision beyond the prevention of war...to the actual building of peace."

"To prevent war, we must continue to deter aggression and contain the residual threat," Baker noted.

"To build the peace, however, America's role must go beyond balancing itself against remaining Soviet military power.

"Fostering the European common interest can be one of our key national interests," Baker stressed.

Proceeding from this premise, Baker outlined three areas of U.S. and European common interest, in which the Bush administration intends to act vigorously "to help achieve these interests."

The first common interest, from Baker's point of view, is fostering "political legitimacy," which is based on the holding of "free and fair elections" in Eastern and central Europe and will enable the United States to expand bilateral ties with countries in the region.

Baker said this process would result in opening new U.S. cultural centers across Eastern Europe, founding a fund for independent broadcasting and a free press. It would also entail starting, as proposed by President Bush, a citizens' democracy corps to involve both private citizens and various public organisations in the United States and Europe, including the Soviet Union.

The second common interest, behind which all Europeans can unite, in the opinion of the U.S. Administration, is "economic liberty and prosperity."

"Europe, politically and economically, needs to be made an inclusive and integrated whole, open to the world," Baker said. Relaying on this view, the United States will, first, provide "desperately needed emergency aid" to states in crisis situation. Second, actively support efforts "aimed to facilitate the transition from Stalinist command economies to private sector-driven free markets." Third, work "to integrate the new market democracies into the international economic system."

Baker singled out efforts to ensure military security as the third U.S.-European common interest, which need to develop a new European strategy.

"As Soviet troops leave central and Eastern Europe and Moscow proceeds with further reductions in its forces, we will be able to change NATO's strategy and forces significantly from those we have relied upon in the past," Baker emphasised. However, he ruled out any possibility to withdraw American troops from the European continent or disband NATO.

"Yet even if all Soviet armed forces return to the USSR and conventional arms control moves forward, the Soviet Army will retain forces many times larger that those maintained by any other single state," Baker said. "American troops will, therefore, need to remain in Europe as long as they are wanted," Baker contended.

At the same time, Baker underlined the urgent need not only to sign a treaty on conventional forces in Europe already this year, but also to "accelerate its follow-on negotiations to address those residual security concerns states may have even after the conclusion of this treaty."

Baker put emphasis on the earlier formulated principle of strategic predictability, under which openness in military issues allows states to dispel fears about aggressive intentions, on confidence-building measures in the field of security, and also on the need to expand contacts between military men.

On German unification, Baker favoured continued cooperation of the four victor powers—France, Britain, the USSR and the United States—in handling the German problem.

"The Two-Plus-Four process for German unification is a prime example of how mechanisms, even temporary ones, may need to be invented to assist in articulating the common interest while complementing the ongoing work of existing institutions," Baker said.

Talks 'Will Not Be Easy'

LD1505053390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0430 GMT 15 May 90

[Report by TASS diplomatic correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 15 May (TASS)—U.S. Secretary of State James Baker is arriving in Moscow today on a working visit just a few days before USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to the United States. This time his stay in the Soviet capital could turn out to be more prolonged than usual: As is expected, the official Soviet-U.S. talks will be held from 16 to 19 May. The agenda is exceptionally full—contacts between the great powers are ever more intensive on a wide range of issues, which can justly be evaluated as one of the factors in the stability of Soviet-U.S. cooperation, as grounds for sensible optimism.

It may be supposed that the upcoming talks here will not be easy for either side. The diplomatic time limit is both a stimulus to speeding up work and a complicating factor. Moreover, the lack of time for resolving the remaining fundamental issues of the future treaty on strategic offensive weapons is just one stroke of the brush in the complex picture of interaction between the USSR and the United States. In situations like the present one it is important to see the main point, not to lose sight of what should determine the nature of relations between the two powers.

The comments of certain U.S. politicians could give the impression that the main issue of bilateral relations today is the "Baltic problem" and, in particular, Lithuania. Moscow is not evading a conversation on this subject. Its line on this issue is balance, a constitutional approach. And, judging by the reaction of President George Bush, the U.S. Administration recognizes this.

An understanding by both sides of the exceptional importance of Soviet-U.S. relations should, it seems, establish a correct scale of priorities, the highest point on which is, as before, held by security problems, matters of cutting and limiting armaments. It is no secret that in recent weeks certain difficulties have arisen in the preparation of a treaty on a 50 percent cut in strategic offensive weapons. But in the concluding stages of work on such documents, this can be considered entirely normal. Neither the Soviet foreign minister nor the U.S. secretary of state have dramatized the problems that have arisen. There is reason to hope that the main difficulties will be overcome with time. A compromise is essential and possible.

A compromise solution also has to be sought in the very complex issue of the military and political status of the future united German state. Purely one-sided variants, taking into account only the interests of NATO, will hardly meet with understanding on the Soviet side. The secretary of state will have an opportunity to continue the conversation on this subject in Moscow. One need have no doubt that any constructive idea will receive just as constructive a response.

Negotiations 'Crucial' for Summit

LD1405170990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] U.S. Secretary of State James Baker arrives in Moscow tomorrow for an official visit at the invitation of the Soviet Government. A wide range of topics will be examined: arms control, regional issues, human rights, transnational issues, bilateral ties. The upcoming negotiations in Moscow with the secretary of state are a crucial stage in preparation for the USSR president's visit to the United States of America.

Trade Agreement Expected at USSR-U.S. Summit

PM1405135790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 May 90 Second Edition p 5

[Observer Gennadiy Vasilyev comment on reader's letter: "Should the Summit Be Held?"]

[Text] **Reader's Viewpoint**

"I learned from an item in PRAVDA that U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker will be visiting our country very soon to settle the agenda for the upcoming meeting between the Soviet and U.S. presidents. I believe that the question of the United States' lifting the economic blockade against the USSR, which has lasted almost since the end of World War II, should be the main item in the talks. If not, there is no point discussing all the other questions—disarmament, regional conflicts, chemical weapons, and so on. In my opinion, the summit should be postponed until the question of free trade between our two countries is settled.

[Signed] "Stavitskiy, Dnepropetrovsk."

Observer's Reply

I believe that Comrade Stavitskiy is wrong to pose the question point-blank—either all or nothing. Aside from bilateral trade, other important questions of great importance for our two countries and for the whole world have been elaborated and successfully resolved at Soviet-American summits: disarmament, regional issues, human rights and humanitarian cooperation, and transnational questions. As a result of all this, achievements have already been made, such as the Treaty on Eliminating Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, which is being successfully implemented. And the future holds even bigger steps on the path to a safe world—agreements that are being elaborated on a 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive armaments and on radical reductions of armed forces and armaments in Europe. It would be exceedingly unwise to talk about "linkage" and thus refuse to move forward in those areas where progress can be achieved.

As for Soviet-American trade, I would like to clear one thing up right away. The economic isolation of one country by another country or group of countries is an economic blockade. This does not exist in our relations with the United States. Discrimination, exercised on the initiative of the U.S. political leadership, does exist; and here I share the writer's indignation. It is discrimination basically of two types: against U.S. imports of Soviet goods (the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which places high customs duties on our goods and therefore undermines their competitiveness), and against exports of Western high-technology products to the Soviet Union (the Cocom [Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Control] rules, prohibiting U.S. and other Western firms from selling certain categories of computers and other advanced technology to the USSR).

There have been positive changes in both spheres. The other day it was reported from Washington that, under pressure from the U.S. Congress and the European allies, the G. Bush administration had decided to suggest to Cocom that it relax the restrictions on deliveries of modern computers, electrical communications equipment, and machine tools. The suggestion is that restrictions should be lifted in the case of 30 types of equipment and technology and considerably eased in the case of deliveries of another 13 types of goods. This looks like a wise step, although many businessmen and politicians criticize the planned measures as inadequate.

Almost simultaneously a report came from Paris to the effect that at the Soviet-American talks there it had been agreed in principle to normalize bilateral trade relations. This agreement, which requires congressional approval, will give the Soviet Union most-favored-nation status, which means that Soviet goods imported into the United States will attract minimum customs tariffs. According to the press, as a result of these changes the volume of U.S.-Soviet trade, which has stood at $1-3 billion in recent years, could reach $10-15 billion per year.

Of course, it is a draft agreement and has yet to be ratified. Although it has broad support among U.S. business and political circles, it is already encountering resistance from those who still think in cold war terms. But there has been progress. Last December on Malta M.S. Gorbachev and G. Bush announced a decision to normalize Soviet-American trade and economic links. The impression is that these instructions are being carried out and that at the Washington meeting at the end of May and beginning of June the two countries' presidents will be able to put their signatures to a new agreement.

Motives for U.S. Wepons Siting in Europe Viewed

PM1405161190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 May 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Dispatch by IZVESTIYA correspondent A. Shalnev: "SRAM Instead of Lance?"]

[Text] New York—The Americans are still great masters of propaganda! With what style they informed the world that Washington is abandoning its plans to modernize the tactical nuclear weapons destined to be sited on German soil. But, having imparted this information and obtained many enthusiastic responses, they added in a half-whisper: However, our decision has no bearing on our other plans—to create [sozdat] and deploy air-launched nuclear missiles.

Deploy them where? Again in West Europe.

I turned to the Pentagon for an explanation. I was faxed a two-page document from which it follows that the nuclear missile which the Pentagon calls SRAM-T, but which the majority of newspapers call TASM, is "capable of making a hole in the air defense of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact" and that it "can hit defended hardened targets in situations where a carrier aircraft will certainly not be obliged to directly overfly this target."

As the Pentagon document states, this missile—a "first-generation missile"—will ensure a "significant deterrent potential even in the 21st century."

Captain Betsy Well, an Air Force Department employee, told me that the concrete development [razrabotka] of SRAM-T began this year, and next year the administration plans to allocate something on the order of $118 million for the missile's development. The first missile of this type will be built in 1994, and deployment is planned for 1995—first on F-15E aircraft, a little later on F-111 and F-16 aircraft, and then also on British Tornadoes.

Some technical specifications: speed—supersonic; length—4.2 meters; diameter—0.44 meters; weight—approximately 900 kg. The Boeing Corporation is engaged in developing it.

To judge from the very few materials published in the U.S. press in this regard, Washington is proposing to secure Bonn's consent to the deployment of SRAM-T on German territory in exchange for the removal of ground-launched nuclear missiles. The administration believes, THE NEW YORK TIMES writes, that this option will be acceptable to Bonn. Hopes are built on the fact that, unlike the Lance missiles, let us say, which were able to hit the territory of the GDR or Czechoslovakia alone, the SRAM-T is capable of inflicting strikes on targets on the Soviet Union's territory and so, as THE NEW YORK TIMES emphasizes, this missile "will give rise to less political argument." And the second "virtue": It will be sited not only in the FRG but also in other West European countries allied with the United States.

In that case the following question is perfectly natural: What, in fact, do Europe and the world gain from the decision announced by the White House to abandon the Lance modernization, if a still more formidable and powerful nuclear weapon will appear in Europe in a few years' time?

Maybe SRAM-T is just a counter for future bargaining with the Soviet Union: You do this and this, they will say, and in return we will not deploy SRAM? I do not entirely rule out such an option. And yet I am forced to take into account a quite unambiguous statement made recently by Defense Secretary Richard Cheney: "We can halt the modernization of tactical nuclear forces, whose usefulness is diminishing all the time in light of the changing military and political situation in Europe. This does not mean, however, that we must abandon the role of nuclear arms in the overall defense of Europe."

Anti-Soviet Tenor of Western Broadcasts Noted

PM1405143790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 May 90 Second Edition p 5

[L. Strzhizhovskiy reply to reader's letter: "Spirit Of 'Liberty'"]

[Text] "You know about Radio Liberty, of course. Its broadcasts are directed against the Soviet Union. Why does this radio station only cover negative aspects of our life? What is your, the editorial office's, appraisal of this Liberty?

[Signed] "M.T. Chumak, Izmail."

First of all, some information. Radio Liberty (formerly Liberation) and Radio Free Europe were founded in the early fifties. Originally they were a single editorial operation, then they separated. Both radio stations are independent organizations financed by U.S. Congress, but controlled by the Board for International Broadcasting. Their upkeep will cost the U.S. taxpayer $234.8 million in fiscal 1990. Some $207 million of this is earmarked for completing the construction of a powerful new station in Israel.

Until recently Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe broadcasts were jammed. Today they openly broadcast in 22 languages of the East European and Soviet peoples. According to them, the Soviet audience comprises approximately 21 million listeners.

I believe, Mikhail Trofimovich, that you have correctly identified the anti-Soviet spirit of the foreign broadcasts. I believe that many of the 21 million other (Soviet) listeners would endorse that view. I too endorse it, in fact my radio is tuned to Radio Liberty. So there is an anti-Soviet spirit, but we still listen to the broadcasts. What, then, is the matter?

The answer is clear: Human beings' desire for information knows no bounds. The desire to learn something new, particularly when it relates to topical issues, is natural. This is Radio Liberty's hobbyhorse: a careful, wide-ranging selection of news, primarily from Soviet sources. The basic law of propaganda—to anticipate—is religiously observed. Soviet radio has yet to report something, whereas Radio Liberty has already reported and arranged the political accents in the way that suits it. When jamming stopped the broadcasts became even more uninhibited: many live broadcasts appeared, the range of Soviet authors became wider, and the materials becme more diverse. But the anti-Soviet spirit remained, although there was more camouflage. PRAVDA has written in detail about this (see 16 January and 20 February 1989). It is important to add the following.

Journalists on Radio Liberty see themselves as "supporters of perestroyka," and they say this in all the interviews and broadcasts. However, they have their own view of perestroyka which is different from ours, Mikhail Trofimovich. To Radio Liberty it means the "disintegration of the Soviet empire." Hence the selection of news, the nature of the broadcasts, the topics addressed, and much else. All the broadcasts have a single end: to influence the course of events in the Soviet Union through the audience, to shape a particular way of thinking, to undermine internal security and stability in our country. The careful listener is bound to sense this "spirit." I would call it patently "antisocialist." After all, it is socialism and everything connected with it that Radio Liberty rejects wholesale in its broadcasts.

The radio twins have often been found guilty of publicly carrying out sabotage work against the Soviet Union and other countries—and found guilty primarily by people who once worked there. For example, Oleg Tumanov, erstwhile chief editor of the Radio Liberty Russian service.

Has anything changed in the past year or two? I will not try to answer this question. One thing is clear, though: As the cold war abates, Radio Liberty is like an ever-shining beacon, sending out call sign after call sign. Sending them although the storm has abated, the sky has cleared, and the peoples want to live in peace and quiet.

Colonel Recounts Visit to U.S. Army Installations

Part I of Article

PM1005122190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 May 90 First Edition p 3

[First part of article by Colonel V. Markushin under the rubric "From Travel Notebook"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction: "In Purely American Style"]

[Text] At the invitation of the weekly ARMY TIMES three Soviet military journalists, including a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, toured the United States.

"The Army Needs You"

"I want you for the U.S. Army"—to Americans this appeal from the poster means an invitation to devote part or all of their lives to military service. Times are peaceful right now and such posters are not to be seen on the streets of U.S. cities. But they can be encountered where Army recruitment organs operate.

What prevails in the motives of those in whom this appeal finds a response—patriotism or material considerations? Frankly, I was trying to confirm my former idea that the motive centripetal force gathering young American men and women under the Army banners was dollars. But it didn't all turn out to be as simple as that. You could write a long treatise about the forms and methods of the education of civic and military-patriotic feelings in the younger U.S. generation even on the basis of what we saw in two weeks. But I shall limit myself to a brief general comment: This work is being conducted in an inspired manner, with the American sweep and inventiveness. A corresponding result is achieved :

respect for the Army as the defender of the American way of life and as the keeper of national traditions.

"Irrespective of Threat"

At West Point, the main forge of officer cadres for the ground forces which the Americans call an academy, we attended a Russian language lesson in a group of 10 cadets. Actually, our presence rapidly turned into participation in the class. A lively talk developed in which now Russian, now English were used. What do the U.S. cadets know about Soviet reality? Quite a lot. From the general political situation down to workaday details like the procedure for acquiring tickets for a steamboat cruise of the Volga cities.

Do they see a likely enemy in the Soviet Union? Not at present, our interlocutors said. The threat from the USSR has ceased to be direct; but it still has very great military strength, like several other powers, China, for instance. The international situation has improved, the U.S. Army could be reduced, but it should remain strong and modern.

In general the Americans perhaps invest a rather less negative meaning in the concept of "threat" than we do. I formed this impression during discussions and talks at various levels, with various people. By "threat" people in America understand military potential to a greater extent and malicious intention to a lesser extent. Both could change, the Americans say. But these changes should not instantly affect the progress and scale of military building. After all, problems on the economic and social plane stand behind any reforms and reductions.

For instance, what would the closure of the armored troops training center at Fort Knox mean? It would mean that thousands of servicemen's families will have to radically alter their way of life. Many will encounter difficulties in finding work, primarily the "pure" commanders. But that is not the only point. The public in Kentucky views Fort Knox as a very big employer—the base is serviced by 8,000 civilians. If it were closed they would all lose their means of subsistence and there would be a drastic decline in the influx of money into the state. That is why the local authorities display no particular enthusiasm when the press touches on questions of reciprocal reductions of armed forces. For them it is more convenient that everything should proceed as usual, regardless of Soviet perestroyka and the disappearance of the "military threat."

All this was told to us frankly by the journalists with whom we had a meeting, at their request, on our arrival in Kentucky. The next day we read the following headline on the front page of the newspaper THE NEWS ENTERPRISE: "Soviets Destroy Myths," under which the content of our conversation was published.

"Boys of Steel"

Fort Knox is striking in terms of its size, the well-tended nature of everything there, and the degree of equipment of the material and technical base. New recruits and those who have considerable professional experience—officers and sergeants—undergo training at the center. We visited the first training brigade, which bears the name "Boys of Steel." The training and retraining program here is very full. Three to five times more time is allocated to driving and shooting exercises than in 1977. According to our escorts, the effectiveness of the training process increased drastically after the installation of computerized training simulator halls. The cost of one system is $2 million. But the expense is recouped within a year—after all, fuel for driving practice and every live shell also cost a considerable amount.

Great attention is paid to physical training. In a few weeks new recruits master the basic methods of hand-to-hand fighting. We watched a class under the leadership of Drill Sergeant Mason. Demonstration, a rehearsal of the elements, and the drill itself—that was how Mason explained his simple method to us. He was delighted when I gave him a literal translation of the Russian saying "Repetition is the mother of learning."

The atmosphere was different at the classes in the sergeants' group. Sitting before us were professionals who had served eight to 12 years. The geography of their service varied: the FRG, South Korea, the Near East... Each had his own experience. The theme of the class was organizing a smokescreen. On the class blackboard someone had already written: Disorient the adversary, put psychological pressure on him, make him advance in an inconvenient direction... It was as though it came from our statute.

The officer training group we visited was listening to a paper by Pakistani Major Qaddus on the organization of defense. In addition to the Pakistani the students included a representative of the Bundeswehr. This is usual for U.S. military training establishments and centers.

We asked whether those present knew of the defensive nature of Soviet military doctrine. Yes, of course we know, the officers said, becoming animated; and they started to explain to us that the defensive nature of strategy does not rule out offensive actions on a tactical level. The commander should know how to organize both defense and an offensive equally.

What do the armored troop officers think about the possible reductions to U.S. troops? In general it is normal, they say. But there should be some long-term plan here. It is easier for a military engineer to find work than it is for an armored battalion commander. But in what way is the latter worse?

"I Wasn't Thinking, Sir, I Was Obeying Orders"

At Fort Bragg, where the formations and units of the 18th airborne corps, including its "guard of honor"—the 82d Airborne Division—and the special operations command are stationed, we arrived on the eve of an event of "historic importance." That was how the newspaper PARAGLIDE assessed the arrival here of Army Chief of Staff General C. Vuono to attach ribbons of honor to the banners of the units which took part in operation "Just Cause" to seize Panama. For many of these units the Panama ribbon is now placed next to badges of excellence "for services in combat" in the campaigns of the period from World War I through Grenada. The award recipients included the Fourth Psychological Operations Group. It is said that General Noriega once studied the organization of such operations during his time here.

Incidentally, there is a very large number of Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking Americans in the seventh special operations group. That is no accident. The proposed region of operation is Latin America. During the demonstration of the technical facilities used during special operations we made the acquaintance of Sergeant R. Rodriguez. He left Cuba six years ago with his parents.

"What were you thinking when you flew to Panama?" one of us asked.

"I wasn't thinking anything, sir, I was obeying orders," Raul replied.

In general we sought to mix with the soldiers and officers as much as possible, despite our full protocol program. Naturally, we were interested in the level of discipline, material provision, and morale. As regards the discipline of the rank and file, Captain M. Edrington from the public relations department, who accompanied us, said this: "I do not know a soldier who would say to himself in the morning: Today I shall commit a breach of discipline. As a rule, breaches are unpredictable. But as a whole, the level of discipline is high enough; after all, young people come to us with serious intentions and voluntarily."

That is indeed so. At helicopter landing exercises I talked with Private K. Ramirez. The boy from Texas has served for two years and joined the airborne troops "to lay a good foundation for future service." His basic pay is $893 a month plus $110 extra for parachute jumping, plus $180 married allowance, plus $300 "government money" for apartment rent.

The material factor helps the command to select developed, strong young men for the airborne troops. In the morning, during physical training, a communications company ran past us in formation, looking more like a sports company. All the men were in light sports uniform. The subunit flag was in the front.

Army advertising also works in the interests of recruitment. One of its attributes is the "Golden Knights," a team of paratroopers created back in 1959 to popularize the paratroop forces among young Americans. It has about 80 men and women. The average "knight" is 26 years old and has made 1,200 jumps. We entered the premises earmarked for the leisure of the team members. It was like a museum: fine photographs, a large number of sports trophies of the highest caliber, a room devoted to the memory of the dead. And this, it should be noted, also works in favor of Fort Bragg because the words courage, romance, and risk are printed on its symbolic banners.

Part II of Article

PM1105124390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 May 90 First Edition p 3

[Second part of report by Colonel V. Markushin under the rubric "From Travel Notebook"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction: "In Purely American Style"]

[Text] At the invitation of the weekly ARMY TIMES three Soviet military journalists, including a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, have toured the United States.

'Early Bird'

The interior of the U.S. military department contrasts with the gloomy external appearance of this squat, grey, and excessively large building. Thousands of pictures and museum exhibits being viewed by excursion groups; gleaming store windows; members of defense department staffers' families coming in to have lunch at the staff restaurant or to see a doctor; a small buggy, driven by a large black, trundling down the corridors—all this somehow does not conform to the picture of the Pentagon which most of us have formed.

We visited the Pentagon in order to gain an insight into one question—the mechanism of the defense department's interaction with the press.

And so, what is "Early Bird?" It is a brief morning summmary of the key news items published in the press. Or rather, a relatively brief summary, since it runs into some 15-20 pages. It is compiled by the information services and is submitted to the leadership and to the people who hold the twice-weekly briefings for journalists with access to the Pentagon. Having received this information digest, the person who is giving the briefing is able to prepare quickly for his meeting with the representatives of the press.

However, this does not exhaust the preparations for the routine briefing. On the basis of the concentrated information a list of questions which, in the opinion of the service's specialists, may be raised by journalists at the briefing is compiled and carefully thought through. These questions are distributed among a large group of staffers working in a computer room and specializing in numerous aspects of world and domestic policy. When the briefing takes place the staffers are at their work stations and can, via a relay system, hear everything that is going on in the briefing hall. They promptly compile answers to the questions raised by journalists. Printouts of the answers, specifying sources, are immediately pasted up in the briefing hall to provide additional information to what the Pentagon spokesman conducting the briefing has said.

This whole "kitchen" is managed by Colonel M. Monteverdi, who gave us an account of the essence of the work carried out by the information service. The service seeks to control the dissemination of information with Defense Department interests in mind, he observed. It also coordinates its activities with similar services at the State Department.

What is meant by "information leaks," and how is it possible for them to occur at the Pentagon? Replying to this question, M. Monteverdi said that the Defense Department has thousands of staffers who in one way or another come into contact with classified information. As a result of this a certain proportion of this information "leaks" out. Although, he added, serious matters do not get out, of course.

Could it be that journalists deliberately cover their materials with a veil of secrecy in order to attract the attention of the reading public? This can happen, M. Monteverdi replied. And he added that he and his colleagues prefer to deal with reporters who have been vetted and with whom confidential relations can be maintained.

It goes without saying that the Pentagon does not deal only with the civilian news media. It issues recommendations to the editorial offices of military newspapers and magazines. We were told by Colonel B. Malvi [name as transliterated] from the army public relations department that the content of SOLDIERS magazine, for instance, is assessed by the department's experts prior to publication.

But let us return to the briefing. Our visit to the Pentagon coincided with one such event, so we attended it. In the briefing hall, in addition to a dozen journalists, there was also a group of students. An object lesson? Perhaps. The briefing passed quickly and quietly, since no sensational story concerning the Pentagon and the military had broken the day before.

Where Strategy Is Taught

Americans compare the Army War College in Pennsylvania with our General Staff Military Academy. It is a whole century younger than West Point, having opened its doors to the first batch of students in 1904. The creation of the college is linked with the name of E. Root, then secretary for war. His are the words which make up the moral creed of the college, as it were: "Do not work toward war, but ensure peace by means of reasonable and adequate preparations enabling you to rebut aggression." We came to hear and read this quotation more than once during the few hours which we spent at the college.

We were briefed in greater detail about the main task of this educational establishment by Major General P. Cerjan, its 41st director, whom we met over lunch given in honor of the military journalists from the USSR. "We must teach officers to think in strategic terms," he underscored the main thought.

Strategic terms may change under the impact of shifts in international relations. Is this taken into account in the course of the training process? Replying to my question R. Serzhan noted that the connection between politics and strategy does, of course, exist. However, as he put it, the training process is not designed to respond to what may happen tomorrow morning, only established trends are taken into account. The themes of the lectures with which we were subsequently acquainted confirmed the general's words. Apart from what is described as fundamental themes there were also the following topics: "Europe after the troop withdrawals," "The role of the army in combating drug addiction," and "Military strategy and arms control."

The Army College course runs for 10 months in all. The study days are not overloaded, classroom studies total 18-20 hours per week. Stress is placed on independent study, reading, broadening of the general horizon, and development of verbal communication and discussion skills. These abilities are taken into account already during the selection of candidates. Only six in 100 U.S. officers manage to secure a place at the college. Representatives of other countries—the FRG, India, Yugoslavia, Israel, and Saudi Arabia—are also studying here...

Although Different Opinions Are Not Sacrosanct

Our guide in Washington was Maria Gracheva, a 26-year old staffer from the Institute of Spectral Analysis of Technologies. I cannot predict what heights she may reach in science, but as regards driving, she could compete with the best cab drivers in Moscow.

Maria took us to her institute and introduced us to Daniel Gure [name as transliterated], the director. Our conversation was brief, but Gure spoke fast and to the point. What was the director's view of SDI? The former projects have become meaningless, he said. The reason is the radical improvement in the overall political situation. This is why expenditure on SDI is not being increased, nor is it likely to be increased in the future. Who has the edge in military space programs? According to Gure there is no clear-cut answer to this question: The United States leads in the utilization of kinetic energy for the destruction of targets, for instance; whereas the Soviet Union leads as regards the capacity of laser installations.

The range of the institute headed by D. Gure is broad. In any event, this is borne out by a study drawn up at the end of March under the general title "Progress of Change in the Soviet Union." It is a big work as regards scope, embracing all the key spheres of Soviet society. The section devoted to the military sphere examines the following problems, for instance: Transition to numerically small ground forces capable of operating effectively in short-term military conflicts; convergence of defensive and offensive concepts; transition to a professional army in combination with regional reserve components.

In general, the Americans are very interested in how the Soviet perestroyka is affecting our army and how radical our military reform may become. The ARMY TIMES editorial office organized a meeting with a group of Sovietologists for us, including H. Scott, D. Isbi [as transliterated], R. Bers [as transliterated], and others . These are very well-informed people, although it seemed to me that they tend to slightly exaggerate the pressure under which the formulation of military policy takes place in our country. This is probably the effect of the polemics on military issues which have developed in the Soviet press and on television. The specialists' views on Soviet military matters are marked by pragmatism. They take the view, for instance, that the material and financial side of the military reform should be based on a more rational distribution of the means allocated for military needs, funded by cuts in arms expenditure, for instance.

Some people reject such opinions out of hand, sometimes for the sole reason that they come from transatlantic specialists. But some take the view that it should perhaps be looked at more closely, recalling that the Americans are not just our rivals but also people who are good at doing their sums. Many people in our country regard this skill as topping the list of the advantages of the U.S. way of life. Perhaps because it is precisely the quality which we lack.

...Once our Airbus had taken off for Moscow the passengers livened up. They were heading homeward into the May Day morning. We made the acquaintance of fellow passengers in the cabin—a professor of medicine, a young woman political analyst, and an economist. Living proof that Soviet-U.S. contacts are developing in the most varied spheres. A positive feature of the new times which we have already entered.

U.S. Forecasts Record Grain Harvest in USSR

PM1505092990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 May 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "They Predict Record Harvest"]

[Text] Washington, 11 May—The U.S. Department of Agriculture stated Thursday that weather conditions this year favor a record grain harvest in the Soviet Union.

According to the department's prediction, the grain harvest in the Soviet Union in 1990 will exceed last year's and will be 215 million metric tons. It will also be the biggest harvest in the Soviet Union since 1978, the document asserts.

At the same time the forecast points out that despite the prospects of a record harvest Moscow will still be a major purchaser of foreign grain.

China

Soviet Response to Tiananman 'Incident' Cited

OW1405221490 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 14 May 90

[(Shedelov) commentary from the "World Today" program]

[Text] Dear listeners, 15 May marks the first anniversary of Soviet leader Gorbachev's visit to China. As is well-known, an announcement on the normalization of relations between the two countries was made during the visit. What has the past year been like? Our station commentator (Shedelov) writes the following commentary:

A new chapter has emerged in the history of relations between Moscow and Beijing. It seems that both sides want to accelerate the course of history because many long-standing knotty problems, including the military-political problem, have begun to be resolved. The two countries have delineated 90 percent of their boundary and discussions are underway on measures for military relaxation. Trade has increased, and the two sides have decided to expand the areas of economic cooperation. A series of important documents signed during State Council Premier Li Peng's recent visit to the Soviet Union show convincingly that bilateral relations in various fields have grown steadily. Of course, such growth by no means signifies a smooth development in bilateral ties. During Li Peng's stay in Moscow, some influential civil organizations in the Soviet Union protested the so-called suppression of the democracy movement in China, that is, the incident at Beijing's Tiananmen Square a year ago. At that time, the Chinese Government used troops to quell the student unrest. In response students in Moscow staged a symbolic hunger strike on Saturday and Sunday. Organizers of the hunger strike supported a similar movement by students of Harvard University in the United States. It has been reported that there were similar actions in 50 other Soviet cities.

While public opinion showed strong resentment toward the Tiananmen incident, Soviet leaders adopted a prudent attitude of not interfering in China's internal affairs. Is this attitude correct? I asked Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachev this question.

[Begin Rogachev recording in Russian fading into Mandarin translation] I have no doubt whatsoever that this is the only correct attitude toward such a problem. Of course, when such matters can be discussed in an open manner, individuals, groups, and organizations may express different views. However, the differences stem mainly from the lack of understanding of the overall situation. We may hold different opinions. However, we have decided that different views on certain issues should not affect our cooperative relations. We have initiated more civilized relations with China. We earnestly hope that the history of the early 1960's will never be repeated. As you remember, the ideological differences between the two parties escalated in all areas of bilateral relations. I am deeply convinced that both the Soviet Union and China will never allow a reccurrence of such incidents. [end recording]

In conclusion (Shedelov) said: The de-ideologicalization of Soviet-Chinese relations demands that we distinguish between emotions and national interests.

Gorbachev Receives Greeting From Yang Shangkun

LD1405205490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 14 May 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Yang Shangkun, president of the PRC, has sent a telegram to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev from on board his aircraft. The message expresses sincere greetings and goods wishes to the president of the Soviet Union and sincere gratitude to the Soviet side for the hearty welcome in Leningrad.

CPSU's Frolov Receives Newspaper Delegation

PM1505085990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 May 90 Second Edition p 6

[Unattributed report: "Meeting in the Editorial Office"]

[Text] A RENMIN RIBAO delegation led by Deputy Chief Editor Zheng Mengxiong, and also the newspaper's own correspondents accredited to Moscow, visited the PRAVDA editorial office yesterday, 10 May. The delegation took part in the PRAVDA festival.

I.T. Frolov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chief editor of PRAVDA, received his colleagues from RENMIN RIBAO. In this friendly conversation there was a keen exchange of opinions on the development of Soviet-Chinese relations and of ties between the two fraternal newspapers—PRAVDA and RENMIN RIBAO.

On behalf of the RENMIN RIBAO collective, Comrade Zheng Mengxiong thanked the PRAVDA staffers for their warm reception of the delegation. In our opinion, he said, the first PRAVDA festival was very successful. It was an important political event which strengthened ties between the CPSU Central Committee organ and the working people, between newspapers of the socialist and allied countries, and between the entire world's democratic press. We will carefully study this experience.

Northeast Asia

Coverage of MPR's Delegation Visit to Moscow

Gorbachev Expresses 'Optimism'

LD1405153990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 14 May 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] A conversation between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, Punsalmaagiyn Ochirbat, chairman of the People's Great Hural of Mongolia Presidium, and Gombojabyn Ochirbat, chairman of the MPRP Central Committee, took place in the Kremlin today. The Mongolian guests arrived in Moscow yesterday for a working visit which will last until tomorrow. Before the conversation started:

[Begin Gorbachev recording] I am confident that we have such potential for cooperation and in human relations that today, perhaps, we will discuss the contours and map out what to do in the future. I regard it with optimism. I would like to take this opportunity to convey cordial greetings to all our Mongolian friends and brothers. [end recording]

[Announcer] Apart from the issues of further strengthening the traditional relations of friendship and cooperation between the two countries within the context of democratic reform in the Soviet Union and Mongolia, topical international problems including, first of all, those connected with the situation in the Asian-Pacific region, were discussed. [video shows Gorbachev shaking hands with the Ochirbats and posing for photographers; Gorbachev and the Ochirbats talking at the table]

Gorbachev Receives Delegation

LD1405194990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1725 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] Moscow, 14 May (TASS)—Mikhail Gorbachev held a meeting today with Punsalmaagiyn Ochirbat, chairman of the Presidium of the People's Great Hural of Mongolia, and Gombojabyn Ochirbat, chairman of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP] Central Committee, who are in the Soviet Union on a working visit.

The most important issue of Soviet-Mongolian relations—improving ties in the spirit of the changes underway in the Soviet Union and Mongolia—were discussed.

M.S. Gorbachev expressed the Soviets' sincere interest in a successful renewal of Mongolian society which is undergoing an upsurge in its national consciousness and civic activeness.

The Mongolian leaders described the striving to consolidate the actions of all the responsible forces within the country on the platform of perestroyka. The decisions of the MPRP's extraordinary congress and of the recent sessions of the Mongolian People's Republic [MPR] People's Great Hural are aimed at vigorously overcoming the deformations and errors of the past and at achieving tangible progress in socioeconomic, public, political, and spiritual life.

The importance of the parties cooperating and of a broad exchange of experience between the CPSU and the MPRP under present circumstances was noted during the conversation.

Both parties expressed an understanding that the perestroyka processes in both friendly countries should impart a more mature character to Soviet-Mongolian relations and make them more mutually advantageous, taking full account of each country's real potential and specific interests.

Those taking part in the conversation were in favor of tackling sensibly and without delay the issues that have accumulated, and of paving the way for a dynamic development of cooperation. A thoroughgoing improvement of this cooperation presupposes mutual consent, equal rights, mutual respect, trust, and openness.

It was tentatively agreed to accelerate the process of improving the structure and mechanism of economic relations to enhance their effectiveness and social thrust. This will make it possible to susbstantially raise the interest of the partners in a rational conjunction of their material and labor resources and to make fuller use of the advantages of joint enterprises, specializations, and coproduction. The transition to current world prices in freely convertible hard currency is designed to facilitate a balance in trade and economic ties and to make them yield more results. The fundamental questions of clearing accounts will be examined by the Soviet and Mongolian Governments on a mutually acceptable and equitable basis.

During an examination of international problems the Soviet Union and Mongolia confirmed their adherence to strengthening peace and developing international cooperation in Asia as well as their readiness to continue constructive steps in this direction together with all interested countries. The major initiatives put forward by the Soviet Union in Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk serve these goals. The promising nature of the MPR's proposal to set up a permanent operating mechanism for political dialogue in northeast Asia and also of Mongolia's practical efforts to broaden contacts with the Asian states, regional international organizations, and the Nonaligned Movement was noted.

The Soviet and Mongolian leaders expressed satisfaction with the forward-looking development of the good-neighborly relations between the USSR, the MPR, and the PRC.

The conversation, in which Ts. Gombosuren, MPR foreign minister and member of the MPRP Central Committee Presidium, and R.P. Fedorov, first deputy head of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, also took part took place in an atmosphere of mutual interest in renewing and strengthening the friendly Soviet-Mongolian relations.

Gorbachev, P. Ochirbat Meet

OW1505013390 Ulaanbaatar MONTSAME in English 1719 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, May 14 (MONTSAME)—P. Ochirbat, chairman of the Presidium of the MPR [Mongolian People's Republic] Great People's Hural, and G. Ochirbat, chairman of the Presidium of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP] (?Central Committee), had a meeting today in Moscow with the Soviet President and leader M. Gorbachev, who invited them to pay a working visit to the Soviet Union 13-15 May.

P. Ochirbat and G. Ochirbat are meeting with the Soviet president for the first time in their present capacities.

Before the meeting a Mongolian TV correspondent had an interview with the Soviet leader. M. Gorbachev said he is looking optimistically at the prospects of the development of bilateral relations. We have such a potential both in cooperation and simple human relations that having discussed today the general outlines, we will map out what to do [words indistinct], he said.

The Mongolian delegation, which includes also T. Gombosuren, member of the (?MPRP Central Committee) Presidium and foreign minister of the MPR, and T. Gurbadam, ambassador to the USSR, is to have discussions with the Soviet Vice-President A. Lukyanov, Foreign Minister E. Shevardnadze, and (?CPSU Central Committee) Secretary A. Yakovlev.

Shevardnadze, Gombosuren Discuss Ties

LD1405221690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1755 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] Moscow, 14 May (TASS)—Today E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of foreign affairs, had a meeting with Ts. Gombosuren, member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the MPRP [Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party] and minister of foreign affairs of the Mongolian People's Republic [MPR], who is in the Soviet Union as part of the working visit of P. Ochirbat, chairman of the Presidium of the MPR People's Great Hural, and G. Ochirbat, chairman of the Central Committee of the MPRP.

In the course of a detailed dialogue there was discussion of the state and prospects of Soviet-Mongolian relations in the light of the processes of perestroyka and renewal taking place in both countries.

E.A. Shevardnadze and Ts. Gombosuren expressed profound interest in the further development of all-round cooperation between the two countries on the principles of friendship, full equality of rights, and mutual advantage. Emphasis was placed on the need resolutely to raise the effectiveness of economic relations by means of substantial restructuring of the machinery of economic interaction. The sides pointed to the need for full glasnost and openness in all spheres of bilateral relations.

The detailed exchange of opinion also embraced a wide circle of topical international problems. The participants in the meeting confirmed the coincidence or proximity of appraisals of the dynamic changes taking place in the world.

The ministers paid special attention to the situation in Asia and the Pacific. The opinion was expresed that the need has arisen for vigorous action in carrying out the tasks of reducing the military danger in the Asian-Pacific region. The Soviet Union has already undertaken a number of major unilateral steps in the direction of military detente in the region. E.A. Shevardnadze stressed the topical nature of the initiative of Mongolia regarding the formation of a permanently operating mechanism of political dialogue among states of the northeastern part of the Asian-Pacific region. Agreement was reached on strengthening coordinated activity in the field of protection of the environment.

Both sides were satisfied by the complete normalization of the relations of the USSR and MPR with the People's Republic of China, which is in keeping with the interests of all other countries.

Discussing the most acute conflict situations in Asia, E.A. Shevardnadze and Ts. Gombosuren expressed mutual assurance of the possibility of their settlement by peaceful political means.

On the Soviet side, understanding was displayed regarding Mongolia's new approaches to the performance of foreign policy tasks facing the republic on the basis of the pursual of a well-thought, balanced course in keeping with both the national interests and the possibilities of the country. Note was made of the steady strengthening of the international authority and recognition of the Mongolian People's Republic. The ministers advocated further development of Soviet-Mongolian cooperation on the international arena.

E.A. Shevardnadze informed his guest of the progress of the Soviet-U.S. talks and of steps being taken by our country for advancing the all-European process.

The ministers' meeting featured an atmosphere of traditional friendship and mutual understanding.

Yakovlev Receives G. Ochirbat

LD1405190790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 14 May 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] This afternoon a meeting took place between Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev, secretary of the

CPSU Central Committee, Polituro member, and Gombojabyn Ochirbat, chairman of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP] Central Committee. During the conversation the problems of interparty relations, and specific cooperation between the two parties were discussed. A constructive exchange of opinions took place on questions of the activity of the CPSU and the MPRP in conditions of perestroyka and revolutionary transformations in the economy and politics. [video shows scenes at meeting with Yakovlev and G. Ochirbat sitting at a table]

P. Ochirbat Meets People's Deputies

LD1405201190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 14 May 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Today a meeting took place between Punsalmaagiyn Ochirbat, chairman of the People's Great Hural of the Mongolian People's Republic, and people's deputies and the representatives of various committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The transition from relations of so-called fraternal assistance to mutually beneficial cooperation should determine the future of our economic ties, Ochirbat noted. The people's deputies said that greater significance should be given to ecological measures, in particular joint efforts to assist in preserving Bakyal and other unique natural features, including on the territory of Mongolia.

The guests were briefed in detail about the course of perestroyka in our country and about the foreign political conception of the USSR in the Asian Pacific Ocean region. [video shows Ochirbat at the meeting seated at a long table with other people].

DPRK To Return Remains of 5 U.S. Soldiers

SK1305232290 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 13 Apr 90

[Asian news from the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] The DPRK is willing to return to the U.S. side the remains of five U.S. soldiers who were killed on the peninsula during the 1950-1953 war, reports Japan's JIJI. This humanitarian action can take place next week when Americans killed during the Korean war will be commemorated. According to data of the U.S. Department of State, in the DPRK territory there are the remains of 8,200 U.S. officers and soldiers who were killed during the 1950-1953 war. The return of these remains to the U.S. side has been a major precondition for normalizing relations between Washington and Pyongyang. No diplomatic relations have been established between the United States and the DPRK and no meaningful contacts have been made in other sectors, either.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Sihanouk Meets With Foreign Diplomats in Beijing

OW1105225490 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Prince Sihanouk, head of the Cambodian Coalition Government, who recently announced that he was on long leave, met with foreign diplomats in Beijing on Friday. He said that the contradictions between him and two other allies in the coalition government—Son Sann elements and the Khmer Rouge—had nothing to do with his decision to leave active political life. He said that his relations with China remain very good, and that he regards China as his second motherland.

He reiterated his decision not to meet with Cambodian Government leader Hun Sen in Tokyo next month. Many obsevers consider Sihanouk's decision to be detrimental to peaceful settlement of the Cambodian issue.

Saw Maung Cited on Intent To Retain Power

BK1305090190 Moscow in Burmese to Burma 1430 GMT 12 May 90

[Station Commentary: "A Warning From the Leader of the Myanmar Military Government"]

[Text] The AFP news agency reported that Senior General Saw Maung, head of the military government in Myanmar [Burma], gave a two-hour speech in connection with the first multiparty elections in 30 years on 27 May. The speech dealt with the situation in the country before the elections.

The French news agency said Senior General Saw Maung called on the Defense Services personnel to remain neutral and told them to refrain from involvement in political campaigning. But at the same time, the speech by Saw Maung, the leader of the State Law and Order Restoration Council, also contained direct as well as indirect criticisms against political leaders and organizations. For instance, he accused Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the most popular oppositionist and leader of the National League for Democracy, who is presently under house arrest, of being responsible for agitating confrontation between the people and the military government. He said that in spite of repeated appeals to her by the military authorities, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi fostered her line of confrontation.

Senior General Saw Maung, who appealed to the Defense Services to be neutral, also blamed those people who are criticizing the 26-year rule of the Burma Socialist Program Party [BSPP]. As everyone knows the BSPP has now assumed the name of National Unity Party [NUP] and is the party fielding the most candidates in this election.

Senior General Saw Maung said those who are criticizing the BSPP today were once the leaders of that party. Some observers point out that that criticism was directed at former military officers and officials who once served under U Ne Win but who are now leaders of political parties competing against the NUP.

Military government authorities have frequently announced that they will not permit any individual or any organization to obstruct the elections. The partial lifting of martial law is the result of the stabilizing situation in the country. However, in his latest speech, Senior General Saw Maung said he cannot discard the fact that some forces might try to disrupt the elections. AFP said that although General Saw Maung said no one can provide guarantees that these forces will not try to cause disturbances and agitate trouble, he did not give any further explanation.

Dear listeners, observers studying the situation in Myanmar are trying to make a prediction about, if not the outcome of, at least the likely scenario after the elections. They are showing a particular interest in whether the military government will hand over power to the newly elected civil authorities as earlier promised. We conclude this commentary by noting Senior General Saw Maung's comments in that speech. He said there can be no discussions about the handing over of power under the present circumstances.

Air Services Agreement Signed With Indonesia

LD1305145990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0445 GMT 13 May 90

[Text] Jakarta, 13 May—TASS correspondent Aleksey Petrov reports:

Aeroflot aircraft are to make regular flights on the route Moscow-Jakarta-Moscow under an intergovernment agreement on air communication between the USSR and Indonesia which was signed yesterday in the Indonesian island of Bali. This is reported today by the ANTARA News Agency.

During talks which took place in an atmosphere of complete mutual understanding, Antara reports, there was a detailed discussion of questions relating to cooperation between the two countries in the realm of air transportation, including the leasing of Aeroflot aircraft by Garuda, Indonesia's national airline. Implementation of the agreement will commence on 1 June with twice-weekly flights by Aeroflot.

Both sides expressed the hope that the inauguration of regular air services between the Soviet Union and Indonesia will foster the further development of trade and economic cooperation and a strengthening of friendly relations between the two countries.

Near East & South Asia

Egyptian President Mubarak Begins Visit 14 May

Visit Previewed

LD1405171890 Moscow TASS in English 1650 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 14 TASS—President Mikhail Gorbachev met President Husni Mubarak of Egypt in a ceremony at the Kremlin today. The two leaders had a brief conversation. The Egyptian guest arrived in the Soviet Union on an official friendly visit.

During his three-day visit, Mubarak will hold one-to-one talks with Mikhail Gorbachev and meet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov. The Egyptian president will also address the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Soviet parliament and meet Soviet intellectuals.

The Soviet-Egyptian talks in Moscow are expected to focus on a wide range of international and regional issues, and bilateral cooperation in the economic, trade, scientific and cultural fields. Ways to settle the Middle East crisis are expected to feature prominently at the talks.

The first visit to the USSR by an Egyptian president in 18 years is taking place against a backdrop of radical changes in world affairs and the drive to restructure and renew the Soviet Union. It logically follows from the normalization of relations between the two states.

Observers believe that the visit will promote mutually acceptable and equal political and economic cooperation between the two countries. In particular, closer coordination of their efforts to resolve the Middle East crisis and establish a lasting and just peace in the region and the world.

Meets Gorbachev

LD1505104590 Moscow TASS in English 1025 GMT 15 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 15 TASS—President Mikhail Gorbachev had a one-to-one meeting with President Husni Mubarak of Egypt in the Kremlin today.

Mubarak arrived in Moscow on Monday on an official friendly visit.

Economic Ties Increase

LD1405122390 Moscow TASS in English 1120 GMT 14 May 90

[By TASS special correspondent Georgi Meizerov]

[Text] Moscow May 14 TASS—Trade turnover between the USSR and Egypt will amount to 685 million roubles this year, or 25 million roubles more than last year. This shows a trend for an increase in bilateral trade relations.

The Soviet business community believes that the volume of mutal trade may top one billion roubles in the next few years.

This will be promoted by the inter-governmental agreement on trade, economic, scientific and technical cooperation which was signed by the USSR and Egypt in 1988.

An increase in the share of ready-made goods in Soviet exports to Egypt is a positive factor. Machines and equipment now make up over 50 per cent of the total.

Egypt is the only Soviet partner with this high share of imports of Soviet machine-building goods. This is attributed to the fact that most industrial enterprises in Egypt are built with Soviet assistance.

They are now being retooled and reconstructed. The two sides are looking for new projects of joint construction. An agreement was signed to build a power-generating complex with Soviet assistance.

The USSR granted to Egypt a credit of 120 million clearing pounds sterling on easy terms.

The light and food industries which have vigorously been developing in the recent past, changed Soviet imports from that country. Garments, knitted goods, perfumes and other consumer goods make up a large share in these imports.

The Soviet cosmetics industry mostly relies on raw materials from Egypt, while every fifth orange sold in the USSR is delivered from that country.

The two countries are developing new forms of cooperation. The USSR has set up a joint cosmetics venture, while Egypt is now establishing a joint venture to produce and market electrical appliances.

A long-term inter-governmental trade and economic agreement to be signed during President Husni Mubarak's visit to the USSR will give impetus to the development of bilateral relations.

Envoy to Egypt Views Topics

PM1405153090 London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 11 May 90 pp 34-35

[Interview with Soviet Ambassador to Egypt Gennadiy Zhuravlev by Usamah 'Ajjaj in Cairo; date unspecified]

[Excerpts] AL-HAWADITH: There have been reports of an imminent meeting between Egyptian President Husni Mubarak and Soviet President Gorbachev. According to our information, this is the first meeting to take place at the Arab level, which makes it very important. May we first talk about the course of Egyptian-Soviet relations?

Gennadiy Zhuravlev: I am pleased to note the current development of Soviet-Egyptian relations, especially since the strengthening of these relations is in the Soviet and Egyptian peoples' real interests and serves the cause of strengthening world peace and security. It is also an important factor in guaranteeing stability in the Middle East. I am keen to draw attention to our pride in the the fruitful development and the human and social closeness between ordinary people in Egypt and the Soviet Union through huge projects, the most important of which are the High Dam and the power projects in Aswan—a shining symbol of staunch relations. We must restore the spirit of this cooperation, which is why the two sides were eager to call the current giant power project in Sinai "Aswan-2." [passage omitted]

The two states have tangibly carried out activities in recent years in the political field within the framework of the United Nations and the other international organizations. Also, messages have been exchanged between Presidents Gorbachev and Mubarak. This is in addition to the visits exchanged between senior officials in the two countries and the constant political consultations between the two foreign ministries. There are also parliamentary contacts. I believe that President Mubarak's visit will, in our view, constitute an important factor in the development of Soviet-Egyptian relations and boost understanding and cooperation prospects between the two countries.

AL-HAWADITH: Do you not believe that the issue of the Soviet Jews' emigration to Israel has negatively affected Soviet-Arab relations?

Gennadiy Zhuravlev: I want to emphasize here that certain circles in Israel wish to give an untrue picture of the Soviet Union's policy in the Middle East. And let me say that it is a false picture which casts shadows of doubt on our relations with the Palestinian people and the other Arab states. Our Arab friends understand that the problem is not the emigres from the Soviet Union, but, rather, their settlement in the occupied territories. What I want to say is that the law governing the right to exit and entry applies to all Soviet citizens, as is the case in the world's other states. The crux of the problem is that some Israeli leaders believe that the world may one day agree to their having the right to dispose of others' territory, by which I mean the occupied Arab territories. This is an inhumane, illegal, and totally unconstructive policy which stirs up the Arab states' and the Soviet Union's discontent. [passage omitted]

AL-HAWADITH: But do you not believe that the matter requires Soviet efforts to provide specific guarantees to prevent the Soviet emigres' settlement in the occupied Arab territories?

Gennadiy Zhuravlev: Indeed, that is what we are doing now in order to confront Israel's plans to settle the emigres in the occupied Arab territories, on the basis of the prinicples of international law as represented by the Security Council and UN General Assembly resolutions and the articles of the 1949 Geneva Convention. [passage omitted]

AL-HAWADITH: There is talk about a deal being struck whereby the Soviet Union would be allowed an active role in the peace process in return for restoring relations with Israel and agreeing to the Soviet Jews' emigration.

Gennadiy Zhuravlev: First of all, there neither are, nor can be, any deals in that regard. Besides, the Soviet Union has not changed its position on the need to end the the Israeli occupation of the Arab territory. It is strongly opposed to Israel's usurpation of the Palestinian people's legitimate national rights and condemns Israel's repressive measures against Palestinian residents and Israel's policy on the process of finding a settlement to the Middle East issue. This position has not changed. In fact the Soviet Union sets specific and declared conditions for any change in its relations with Israel.

AL-HAWADITH: Do you not agree with us that although the perestroyka policy has made important achievements in Soviet society, it has negatively affected the interests of the developing states and the Arab world. In other words, do you not believe that the Third World's peoples have borne the costs of perestroyka?

Gennadiy Zhuravlev: In fact completely the opposite is true: Through perestroyka in international relations we can preserve peace, prevent environmental and economic threats, halt the arms race, and resolve regional disputes—which is in the interests of mankind as a whole, including the developing and Arab states. Besides, adopting a strategy for developing the Third World states and laying sound foundations for the continuation of their economic and social development require additional resources. These resources can be secured by halting the arms race in the world. The East-West rapprochement is creating a beginning for this. In the past all that linked the United States and the Soviet Union was the strong rivalry in relations with the Third World states, and no one thought that the end of this rivalry and a U.S.-Soviet rapprochement would constitute a factor helping to resolve the Third World's problems. I believe that this rapprochement creates major prospects in that regard.

AL-HAWADITH: There is an analysis which refers to the existence of a tacit agreement between the Soviets and the United States which allowed the former to move freely in the Gulf via the recent initiative to resolve the Iraq-Iran conflict, in return for the United States' exclusive handling of the Middle East crisis in puruit of its own objectives and strategy. What truth is there in this?

Gennadiy Zhuravlev: I believe that with the emergence of the new thinking in all its political dimensions, it is now out of the question to talk using old concepts, because the concept of dividing the world into zones of influence can no longer continue. As for the Soviet Union's proposal to convene a tripartite meeting comprising the Soviet, Iranian, and Iraqi foreign ministers, it cannot be understood as transcending the UN secretary general's mission or the efforts to bring the parties' views closer. In fact it bolsters the UN secretary general's mission. And there are contacts with Baghdad and Tehran at various levels with a view to convening such a meeting in order to help the parties to the conflict surmount the grounds for the confrontation and reach a peace agreement between Iraq and Iran.

AL-HAWADITH: How would you assess recent events in the region and the fierce onslaught on Iraq, which has declared its readiness to defend itself against any potential Israeli attack?

Gennadiy Zhuravlev: We are very concerned about the arms race in the Middle East which brings the threat of terrible consequences in the event of any new military explosion in the region. It is clear that any attempt to hold the Arab side responsible for the resulting situation would conflict with reality and lead to negative results. So we believe there is an urgent need to halt and limit the arms race in that region. On many occasions we have expressed the need to mobilize the efforts of the Middle East states and the international community as a whole with a view to making the region free from nuclear and chemical weapons and other types of mass destruction weapons. This should coincide with the efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Middle East crisis and establish a just and comprehensive peace based on the parties' balanced interests. We have expressed our satisfaction with the Arab states' appeal to free the Middle East of nuclear weapons. We also welcome the willingness expressed by Iraqi President Saddam Husayn to allow representatives from the International Atomic Energy Authority to inspect Iraqi nuclear installations. So Israel should join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and place all its nuclear activities under that authority's supervision. We also call on the Middle East countries to work effectively to make the banning and total dismantling of chemical weapons part of the treaty banning the weapons of destruction as soon as possible.

AL-HAWADITH: Talking of chemical weapons in the Middle East, what stage have you reached in your negotiations with the United States in that regard?

Gennadiy Zhuravlev: We are discussing with the United States the possibility of concluding a bilateral agreement before the treaty banning chemical weapons is put into effect. The United States has proposed that the agreement stipulate that the two states' stockpiles of chemical weapons be reduced, and we have agreed in principle. But we also suggested that we can move forward by agreeing on three important points: reducing the chemical weapons stockpile, while working to eliminate them;

Ceasing to manufacture chemical weapons;

And the two states' total rejection of the use of chemical weapons before the treaty is put into effect.

And we have made major progress in our efforts to ban and eliminate chemical weapons. [passage omitted]

Laverov, Iranian Official Discuss Cooperation

LD1405215790 Moscow TASS in English 2135 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 15 TASS—Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Nikolay Laverov, who heads the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology, met on Monday First Deputy Minister of Power Engineering of the Islamic Republic of Iran Golam Resa Manuchehri Ardestani, who arrived in the Soviet Union as the leader of a delegation to the first session of the Soviet-Iranian standing subcommission for scientific and technical cooperation.

During the conversation, the state and prospects for scientific and technical cooperation between the two countries were discussed.

Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Naser Heirani-Nobari was present during the conversation.

Petrovskiy Receives Iranian Envoy

LD1405200290 Moscow TASS in English 1932 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 14 TASS—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy received today Iranian Ambassador to the Soviet Union Naser Heirani-Nobari at the latter's request.

They described recent Soviet-Iranian political consultations held in Tehran as useful and contributing to further (?constructive) exchanges of views on international issues, Including Iran-Iraq and Afghan settlements, In the interests of peace in the Middle and Near East.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Vorontsov Receives Zambian Envoy 10 May

PM1505092390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 May 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] On 10 May USSR First Deputy Foreign Minister Yu.M. Vorontsov received O.R. Haambote, Zambian ambassador to the USSR, at the latter's request. O.R. Haambote handed over a personal message from Zambian Foreign Minister L.J. Mwananshiku to USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze.

Dialogue, Polarization in South Africa Examined

MB1105160690 Moscow in English to Southern Africa 1900 GMT 10 May 90

[Aleksandr Fedorov commentary—read by announcer]

[Text] I cannot (?see) what our South African listeners think of the dialectic theory concerning a certain qualitative change resulting from gradual quantitative changes. But haven't we just observed the [word indistinct] proof of that in their country?

The racial, ethnic, and ideological problems have been piling up there for 80 years—and a mere 18 hours have produced a sharp reassessment of values. Eighteen hours was the total duration of the dialogue between the delegations of the South African Government and African National Congress [ANC] held from 2 to 4 May.

Both sides find it as a possible beginning for discussing the future political and economic structure of the country. According to dialectics, we can expect a deep qualitative change. Let us hope that should mean an end to orthodox apartheid and no prospects for its new inventions such as racial federations which would better be abandoned at subsequent meetings.

The white camp has fallen into two parts, similar to the way that Table Mountain separates the Groote Schuur Museum from the Parliament. The government and the ANC delegations were peacefully conferring at the Groote Schuur; while in Parliament, what was being done for solving the state problems from the position of force?

The demarche by Conservative deputies, who walked out, was a blatant call for tears and continued bloodshed. There is no doubt that the Conservative action had been planned carefully for a certain time with all its participants assigned their roles. First, the leader of the notorious Afrikaaner Resistance Movement, Eugene Terreblanche, addressed a student audience in Pretoria. He called on them to protect the Boer land from the ANC invasion and prevent turning the country into [words indistinct] for the whites.

Then followed the Conservative boycott in Parliament, and finally ex-President Pieter Botha entered the stage. He declared that he disapproved of some members of the ANC delegation and so left the National Party. That was an ideal move from the right-wing point of view. Some white people still put their trust in Pieter Botha, who is contemplating a return to politics. His escapade was meant to insist that talks should be conducted on the government's terms and that the ANC should be grateful that it had been admitted to the gentlemen's table.

But polarization is under way not only in the white community. The results of the Cape Town meeting have also been rejected by the Pan-African Congress [PAC], a left-wing radical organization which split from the ANC in 1959. In fact, its policies' forces have done nothing to consolidate the African forces either.

Radio Moscow's African Service has (?telephoned) the Inkatha leader Gatsha Buthelezi (?because it is) our impression that the chief is stalling. He paid lip service to the common goals of the Inkatha and the ANC, but stressed that since the Congress leaders had been based abroad, they cannot correctly assess the situation in the country.

There seems to be a direct link between the Inkatha's outrages in Natal and its attitude to the Cape Town dialogue of 2 to 4 May. Let us recall that it was the Inkatha that had long before been willing to talk with Frederik de Klerk's government, even if other African liberation organizations should refuse to do so.

This polarization of the white and black communities in South Africa shows that hard times are ahead. Tragic events may yet mark the way towards mutual understanding. The hopeful factor is that the population of the country is tired of protracted confrontation. Besides, the opponents of dialogue have neither new slogans to offer nor any advice how to scramble out of the apartheid [word indistinct].

East Europe

Effect of East Europe Changes Pondered

PM1405123390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 May 90 Second Edition p 7

[Article by V.L. Musatov, deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department: "Changes in East Europe and Our Perestroyka"—first paragraph is a PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] PRAVDA's readers show unflagging interest in the events taking place in East European countries. Where are these countries going? What is the future of our cooperation? What lessons should be learned so as to choose the correct path of renewal? The editorial office asked Valeriy Leonidovich Musatov, deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department, to share his thoughts on these matters.

The far-reaching changes in East European countries are frequently raised in the course of precongress debates on the draft CPSU platform and other documents and, quite naturally, attempts are made to work out the extent of the effect of these changes on our own country and the development of the socialist idea. A comprehensive analysis is needed in order to arrive at meaningful conclusions, but certain opinions can already be outlined.

What were essentially peaceful people's revolutions occurred in all countries in the East European region in 1989, while Romania saw an armed uprising. They resulted in a change of power, the collapse of the former party-state structure of power, and an end to monopoly rule by Communist or workers parties. Free elections in Poland, the GDR, and Hungary consolidated the new balance of political forces, with Communists and leftwing forces now in opposition with a small number of seats in parliaments. The Communist Party in Czechoslovakia was forced to retreat under pressure from mass actions organized by the "Civic Forum." Elections on a multiparty basis are now approaching in the CSFR [Czech and Slovak Federative Republic], as well as in Bulgaria and Romania.

Globally speaking, and in detachment from ideological schemes, there are grounds to consider the changes in East European allied countries as reflecting the worldwide democratic trend, and to perceive their essence as being a transition from totalitarianism to parliamentary pluralism, a civic society, and a rule-of-law state.

A closer and more objective examination of the nature of changes in East European countries makes it possible to speak of a process of changing the social system which was underpinned by the administrative edict system of the "party state" and debunking the ideological concept of "real socialism," and—in the foreign policy sphere—of a retreat from Europe's postwar division and a transformation of our alliance system.

Of course, the changes in our neighboring countries were building up over a period of many years. After all, the revolutions which were accomplished were the result of a nationwide crisis which was building up for a long time. Its main element was the crisis of the concept of state socialism with its authoritarian bureaucratic system and its dogmatic ideological stance. By the seventies, and despite all the attempts to modernize it, this model had proved its political and socioeconomic inefficiency. The alienation of the masses from politics and from participation in the running of the state, the violations of human rights, and the gap between the leadership's promises and the actual achievements resulted in breakdowns and acute crisis phenomena.

The lagging of socialist countries in the spheres of the economy and people's prosperity became increasingly noticeable in the age of the scientific and technical revolution. I think that partial gains, including those in the military parity sphere, failed to change the overall picture.

Given the existence of effectively a single ruling party, the administrative edict model for society's management applied the brakes on progressive transformations. The CPSU did not arrive at this conclusion immediately, we long nurtured illusions about the one-party system's creative potential. In East Europe's conditions, crucial importance attached to the question of the extent to which the ruling Communist Party, being the core of the political system, would be able to realize the need for far-reaching changes and elaborate practical steps along this avenue.

When the decisive moment arrived, it transpired that the ruling parties—over the many decades of uncontrolled rule—had lost their capacity for self-renewal, had undergone a bureaucratic degeneration, upheld dogmatic views, had lost the link with the people, and consequently their policy had lost the confidence of the people's masses.

Communists had greatly delayed reforms in most countries in the East European region, and—even in the countries where they had actually embarked on reforms (Poland, Hungary)—the initiative was very soon taken over by other political forces in conditions of pluralism.

The ruling parties—apparently monolithic and powerful, but separated from the machinery of state—started to gradually fall apart. Arguments about the past, with the opposition focusing attention on the Communist Parties' responsibility for the crisis, and the inevitable exacerbation of internal struggle between the representatives of traditional views and reformist approaches—all this to a certain extent paralyzed these parties' efforts.

Could this dramatic course of events in our neighboring countries been avoided? Hardly. Events were preconditioned. The causes were basically internal. There were, of course, also some substantial external factors. Perestroyka in the Soviet Union and the new political thinking provided an impetus for socialist renewal. But the majority of former leaders were incapable of heeding the signals of the time. The party masses, accustomed to receiving directives, lost their bearings.

The events in East Europe demonstrated both the positive and the negative aspects of the importance of our countries' interdependence and reciprocal influence. We lived through similar processes during the de-Stalinization period following the 20th CPSU Congress. Something similar, but in completely different historical conditions and with a different outcome, occurred now. Changes in the USSR set an example and excited people's minds. But the recognition that the concept of "real socialism" was flawed and the review of many historical assessments in the Soviet Union objectively weakened the legal base of the existence of monopoly-rule parties in East European countries. At the same time, the ruling stratum's claim to infalibility, its unwillingness to embark on changes of policy, and its attempts to respond with repressive measures only swelled the wave of popular dissatisfaction.

But this time, in contrast with the fifties and sixties and despite the screams about the "downfall of socialism," the Soviet Union behaved differently, Brezhnev's "limited sovereignty" doctrine was rejected. This stance stemmed logically from the new political thinking proclaimed by the CPSU, from the recognition of the peoples' social choice and of the party's responsibility to the nation. However, it would be an oversimplification not to notice that the change of the USSR's old stance boosted the daring of sundry opposition forces. This can be seen especially graphically in the example of events in the GDR.

People ask: If the Soviet leadership had a premonition of the impending changes, why did it not intervene and dismiss the former leaders whose conservative actions were damaging the cause of socialism?

First, these arguments are borrowed from the arsenals of the stagnation times—any strongarm intervention could not have been even thought of in the wake of April 1985 and the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan.

Second, it is well known that the CPSU leadership had notified its partners of its stance and its appraisal of the situation. The need for renewal and the pernicious effect of stagnation were discussed at bilateral and multilateral meetings in 1986-1989. But response to this ranged from agreement and hypocritical approval to total disagreement.

Third, the parties themselves dismissed the former leaders in the course of mass demonstrations by the people but, as a rule, the initial changes did not last long. The new leaders' involvement in the old leadership's deeds resulted in further personnel changes.

When it came to the test, it transpired that the stability reserve of authoritarian regimes of power was insignificant without the Soviet safety net, especially the ultimate resort of USSR military intervention. The situation everywhere was aggravated by "crisis at the top" and growing economic difficulties. It must be said that analysts frequently forget the psychological and emotional mood of the population, which played what was almost the main role. People wanted changes: "You and your policies have failed, get out." Covered-up instances of corruption among the higher party echelons and abuses of power intensified the symptoms of rejection, and ultimately discredited the Communist Parties. The opposition, unburdened by the past, rushed forward on the crest of a wave of criticism.

The result was identical everywhere—against the background of evolutionary transformations, transfer of power on the basis of "roundtable" accords, mass demonstrations, strikes, or even uprisings—power moved into the hands of new political forces advocating far-reaching changes but, as a rule, rejecting the socialist path.

Let us try and examine the phenomenal changes in East Europe from yet another angle. Was there any possibility of self-renewal by the administrative edict system of socialism and prolongation of its life? It is clear that this system had exhausted its potential in Europe. But was there any likelihood of a regulated and smooth transformation of the old system into a new one? Where is the borderline between continuity and renewal? After all, the socialist society's foundations were actually laid by the labor of the peoples. Or is it that the revolution "from the top" which was launched at the initiative of ruling Communist Parties, the revolution within a revolution as it were, was doomed and evolved of necessity into a democratic revolution by the people's masses resulting in a political coup. Western theoreticians hasten to declare that socialism's attempts at self-revival will end up in failure and society's disintegration is now irreversible.

History will provide an answer to this question. We believe in the potential of reborn socialism.

Exposing increasingly fresh layers, perestroyka in the Soviet Union has now approached a critical stage. Having gained successes in democratization but having allowed a gap to open up between political and economic reforms, having come up against criticism and dissatisfaction by the masses which demand specific positive developments as regards a better life, our party is taking measures to consolidate society and is preparing for a turnabout in the direction of radical economic transformations.

Communists retain the initiative of social transformations in a number of countries. The international socialist experience is extremely diverse.

The diversity of social development in East Europe is expressed by the fact that events, which began beneath the banner of renewing the existing form of socialism, have extended beyond this framework. The line being taken everywhere leads toward the formation of a new social structure, probably a mixed one, based on the principles of bourgeois democracy, free enterprise, and a social market economy. Center-right government coalitions with neoliberal overtones are taking shape. Life has proved that the expectations by Europe's social democratic circles to intensify the social role of revived social democratic parties meant to fill the political vacuum have yet to materialize. In several cases, the pendulum of political development is swinging far to the right. Rule by national-christian forces is emerging as an antithesis to rule by Communists.

These are the realities. So far, the state and social system's foundations in these countries remain the same as before, but amendments of their constitutions are under way. True enough, transformations of the economic base and social awareness will take a long time. Socialist symbolism is disappearing in many countries, all references to socialism are vanishing. The majority of the population seems unwilling to even hear of socialist ideas but, in actual fact, collectivist habits, the practice of social security and fairness, and intolerance of exploitation have become established in the mentality and behavior of the masses over the last 40 years. The tree may be down, but it is not uprooted.

The petty bourgeois element is now producing outbursts of anticommunist feelings. Wholesale criticism of socialism dominates the election campaign. There is no need to look too far for examples of anticommunist hysteria and persecution of Communists. Look no further than Czechoslovakia, where certain forces have taken it upon themselves to outlaw the CPCZ [Czechoslovak Communist Party].

Will the antisocialist trend prove durable? For the moment history is still grotesquely repeating itself, with new social movements—which pursued power beneath slogans criticizing the communist parties' "diktat" and calling for restoration of democracy and human rights—themselves frequently switching to the creation of a peculiar form of dictatorial rule, suppressing the rights and freedoms of part of society, and launching "witch hunts."

The draft CPSU platform says: "The ideas of socialism will be revived and will gain growing influence—we are convinced of this—in the process of civilization's overall progress." Some people are skeptical about this phrase. But the renaissance of socialist ideas will actually occur in the course of a hard struggle, fraught with collisions, for a radical renewal of the socialist society which has been created, for the shaping of its humane and democratic essence. Much, but by no means everything, will depend on the course of perestroyka in the USSR.

All signs in East European countries indicate an impending period of relative instability, changes of government scenery, quest for foreign policy orientation, and growing social tension, which is inevitable at the stage of transition from a plan directive economy to a socially regulated market economy. The influence of Western capital will intensify. The "return to Europe" will be no triumphal march. The time of political euphoria is almost over, and a process of far-reaching and painful reforms is beginning.

Leftwing forces in East European countries are now living through difficult times. We sympathize with them. Some Communist Parties have fallen apart, other have yet to overcome the consequences of splits, yet others are trying to transform themselves into modern leftwing-type parties. The total numbers of Communists have declined to one-third of the 1989 level. Even assuming that approximately one-third of former members had joined the party for careerist purposes, the decline is still large. Ideological influence has been reduced to a minimum, and the change of party name, total rejection of the past, and swift refashioning of programs to bring them closer in line with social democracy have not always produced benefits. Political adversaries deliberately curb financial and property opportunities for leftwing Marxist forces, afraid of their rebirth.

But even in such difficult conditions, the champions of socialism manage to gain considerable successes. The Party of Democratic Socialism (GDR) gained 2 million votes and 16 percent of deputies' seats at the elections. Up to 20 percent of voters voted for the Hungarian Socialist Party, the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, and other leftwing organizations. The socialists gained 33 deputies' mandates. The BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] is campaigning beneath slogans for society's renewal. The NSF [National Salvation Front] advocates Romania's development along the path of progress and democracy. It is impossible to develop pluralism in political life and strengthen rule by the people at the end of the 20th century without participation by leftwing socialist forces.

As we draw closer to a multiparty system and define the CPSU's role in society, we in the Soviet Union cannot fail to draw conclusions from the defeats of and concessions by our Communist friends. Wavering, ideological compromises, and halfhearted practical measures resulted in their split and the surrender of their positions.

In today's complex situation, a parting of the ways with splittists and factionists—the sooner, the better—will help us preserve an energetic party. I think that the

CPSU must remain a mass democratic party of the socialist choice, with flexible organizational structures enabling it to solve the tasks of both parliamentary and extraparliamentary struggle. The question of the CPSU's allies is important at the present crucial stage.

Soviet perestroyka certainly needs propitious external conditions. The Soviet Union is interested in proper good neighborly relations with East European states. We thus have on the agenda the need to seek a new balance of interests, lacking the ideologized party principle of the past but making it possible to build durable mutually advantageous cooperation.

The new experience of relations with our neighbors is just beginning to develop. The initial steps are promising, even though numerous difficulties exist. Thinking about the future, we must show concern for galvanizing our presence in the region and involving new political strata in cooperation.

It is impossible to overlook the fact that certain circles in these countries are alarmed by the serious difficulties of perestroyka in the USSR and the exacerbation of interethnic conflicts, and would like to distance themselves from us. Some people in the West are pushing our neighbors toward the idea of shifting the line of Europe's division to the Soviet Union's western borders, and would like to see us on the periphery of European integration. These calculations are incompatible with the all-European process.

At the same time, soberminded circles in East Europe realize the genuine importance of ties with the Soviet Union and advocate the utilization of the political potential of cooperation within the Warsaw Pact Organization and the reconstruction of CEMA with due consideration for the new realities.

We and our neighbors share common tasks as regards creating a collective non-bloc security system in Europe and shaping a climate of trust and equal economic, scientific, and technical cooperation on the continent. Our common interest lies in ensuring success for the democratic changes in our countries in conditions of peace and stability.

Proposed Changes in Albania Surveyed

PM1105114190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 May 90 Morning Edition p 1

["Review prepared by" A. Nikolayev in Athens and P. Golub in Moscow: "Albania: Major Reforms"]

[Text] According to news agency reports, the Albanian parliament has approved a number of major amendments to the country's legislation, which are seen as important changes in the state's political line and political system.

Speaking in parliament, A. Carcani, chairman of the Albanian Council of Ministers, spoke about his country's intention to join the work of the CSCE. It is well known that Albania was the only European country that did not participate in the CSCE's work in 1975, and for many years it pursued a course of foreign policy isolation.

Under the new legislation, which is primarily concerned with expanding citizens' rights, a hitherto nonexistent Ministry of Justice will be formed in the country. Defendants will henceforth have the guaranteed right to legal defense and to swift court hearing and appeal procedures. The number of crimes punishable by the death sentence has been sharply reduced (from 34 to 11). This form of punishment will no longer apply to women.

Political observers see the Tirana leadership's decision to legislatively enshrine the citizens' religious freedom as an important step. According to the new legislation, the church in Albania will be separate from the state and Albanians will be allowed to "conduct religious propaganda."

The state's attitude toward the Albanians' right to travel abroad has also changed. All citizens now have the right to obtain a passport for foreign travel, and, as Tirana announced, not returning to the country from abroad will not be treated as a serious crime—high treason—but will come under the heading of "legally punishable misdemeanor" and will be punishable by three months' imprisonment.

Speaking to deputies from the Albanian People's Assembly, M. Myftiu, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, stressed that these changes are aimed at the further strengthening of socialist democracy.

The Albanian news agency ATA also reported that many restrictions on foreign investments in the Albanian economy are being lifted. However, the agency stresses that the country does not intend to seek credits abroad or to conclude international agreements which would to some extent infringe on the country's independence and sovereignty.

Political observers devote particular attention to that part of A. Carcani's speech in parliament where he welcomed Moscow's and Washington's positive response to the Albanian proposal on restoring diplomatic relations. Last month, Head of State R. Alia expressed his country's interest in restoring such relations.

Analyzing the reforms undertaken by the Albanian leadership, AFP stresses that the decisions made by the parliament in Tirana testify to Albania's desire to end the country's diplomatic isolation. REUTER notes that these are the largest and most far-reaching reforms since the republic was founded in 1946. UPI in turn described the Albanian parliament's decisions as opening a new era in Albanian history.

International commentators are noting with satisfaction the fact that the current changes in Albania occurred on the eve of an important event—the imminent official visit to this country by UN Secretary General Perez de

Cuellar. The reforms in Albania, they believe, will promote the success of the secretary general's upcoming talks with the republic's leaders.

Bulgarian Group Visits, Studies Election Work

PM1405154990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
12 May 90 Second Edition p 6

[TASS report under the general heading: "Official Announcements"]

[Text] According to the plan for interparty ties a delegation from the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] Higher Party Council headed by V. Ilchev, secretary and coordinator of the BSP election center, was in Moscow 7-11 May. During conversations at CPSU Central Committee departments, at Moscow city and Perovskiy Rayon party committees, the USSR Supreme Soviet Secretariat, and the Central Electoral Commission, opinions were exchanged on a broad range of questions relating to the organization of work in connection with elections of soviets of people's deputies at all levels.

Protests by GDR Workers Reported

PM1405120990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
12 May 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent V. Lapskiy: "GDR: Protests Are Mounting"]

[Text] Berlin— A new wave of demonstrations has lashed the GDR. It differs qualitatively from previous mass demonstrations, whose main demand was the speediest unification of the two German states. Now that the unification process has been set in motion, 100,000 GDR citizens have opposed the dismantling of the social security system and demanded social guarantees.

On Thursday at the sixth session of the Volkskammer there was a discussion of the progress and content of government talks to create a currency, economic, and social union with the FRG. Thousands of Berliners gathered in front of the Palace of the Republic, where the session was taking place. They brought with them numerous placards and posters demanding that the parliament and government prevent the GDR from being in the position of a poor relation during Germany's unification.

On one placard I read: "We demand a minimum of 70 percent of the wages of FRG teachers!" It was being carried by teachers. There were also representatives of many other professions here, including light industry workers, who are also afraid of a lowering of their living standard. Incidentally, the day before the demonstration the kindergartens and schools in some regions of Berlin were closed for several hours—a warning strike was being held. Demonstrations and strikes took place in dozens of cities of the republic, from Rostock to Zwickau.

Together with the city working people, the peasants have raised their voiceS. They are angry that large consignments of food are being imported from the FRG to the GDR "unofficially," that is without customs duty and without hindrance, edging out local produce. The competition is obviously unequal. The cooperative members and agricultural workers are demanding that the border be closed to "unofficial" dealers from the FRG and since the government is displaying lack of resolve in the matter they are acting themselves, and very vigorously. On Thursday they closed 11 border transit points between the GDR and the FRG for a while, driving tractors and other heavy vehicles there. The demands that the output of local agriculture be defended against the onslaught from the West are being heard increasingly persistently.

Hungary's Antal Cited on New Government, Program

PM0605142190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
5 May 90 Morning Edition p4

Dispatch by IZVESTIYA correspondent F. Lukyanov dispatch "Panorama of International Life" rubric: "Jozsef Antal To Form Government"]

[Text] Budapest—As expected, Arpad Goncz, acting president of the Hungarian Republic, has entrusted the formation of a new government to Jozsef Antal, the 58-year-old historian and chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, which won the elections. At the suggestion of the latter, ministers will be appointed by presidential decree.

According to Antal himself, during preliminary consultations between representatives of the three parties in the "small" coalition, agreement was reached in principle on a number of basic issues. The Hungarian Democratic Forum has reserved the most important ministerial portfolios for itself, including defense, foreign affairs, and internal affairs. The Smallholders Party will be given the agricultural portfolio as a minimum, while the Christian Democrats will be given the portfolio of social security and health minister. As Antal said at a news conference, this distribution of posts was one of the conditions of the agreement reached between members of the coalition. It is true, Antal said, that it is still too early to speak of specific persons nominated for ministerial posts, but, by all appearances, the candidates will be decided by 20 May. In this connection the chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Forum added that the future government is interested in enlisting the support of the Alliance of Young Democrats, with which negotiations are also in progress regarding its participation in the government at expert level.

Antal willingly shared his ideas with journalists on future changes in the government structure. He said, for example, that, as a result of the cardinal switch to a market economy, the State Planning Commission will be dissolved and its specialists offered other work, including in the new department being created: the ministry for employment affairs. With regard to the international treaties and agreements concluded by former Hungarian governments, they will all be observed by the new government, which does not exclude the possibility, however, of their being reviewed on a mutual basis.

In Antal's opinion a series of changes must now be made to the country's Constitution, including abolition of the mandatory two-thirds majority approval of any fundamental bill, in order to ensure that the new government can function normally. Relations between the government and the opposition, Antal said, must become those of a partnership in order to create stability of government.

In the opinion of the Hungarian Democratic Forum chairman, the main danger for the government itself and for the country as a whole is the situation in the economy. It is primarily a question of financial stability and the foreign debt. The Hungarian Democratic Forum program and proposals by groups of independent experts, including from abroad, will be used as a basis when drafting the government program, which, by all appearances, will be submitted for parliamentary approval together with the list of ministers in the second half of May.

Before the present constituent session of the new parliament completed work, deputies adopted the draft of the foreign affairs committee, headed by former Foreign Minister G. Horn, on the situation which has taken shape around Lithuania.

Leader of Polish Social Democrats Interviewed

LD1405153990 Moscow TASS in English 1332 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] Warsaw May 14 TASS—Despite Solidarity leader Lech Walesa's forecast of a death within three months, efforts to eliminate the party politically and keep its mouth shut by nationalising its publishing cooperative, Poland's Social-Democracy party is alive and kicking, party leader Leszek Miller said in an interview with TASS.

In contrast to the ruling political forces, the party is convinced in the need to seek new socialist models, Miller said.

"Our opponents reject this way, staking on the introduction of capitalist development models," he said.

"We are well aware that the Social-Democracy Party will get a chance to implement its aims only in the future, he said.

The party is going through a difficult time, as new people with little political and organisational experience advance. The party emerged at a time when people with leftist views are being persecuted for their political convictions in Poland, he said.

Reports are streaming in that people with leftist views are fired or ostracized. This creates an atmosphere of fear. Many say they are prepared to vote for the party at elections, pay members' fees, but refuse to join the party formally, afraid of persecution.

Forces in the Solidarity cam who want a confrontation and aim to renounce the agreements and the spirit of "the round table", which laid the emphasis on evolutionary changes, are becoming more active, he said.

However, moderate forces—the government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki—are at the helm.

Despite efforts to whip up intolerance against the leftist forces, and a media black-out, the party is bracing up for the forthcoming local elections. Several thousand party members have been fielded and in terms of representation, Social Democrats are second only to Solidarity's civil committees.

The forthcoming community elections will be the first test of party strength.

The party opposes the government's economic stabilisation programme, which has become a heavy burden on common Poles and attempts to replace the monopoly of the former Polish United Workers' Party with the monopoly of solidarity.

Commenting on international cooperation, Miller said social democrats believe relations with the Soviet Union based on equality and justice are of key importance for Poland.

The Social-Democracy Party wants to expand economic contacts with the Soviet Communist Party and expand joint business activities, like publishing.

Local Soviet Communist Party and Social-Democratic organisations could cooperate in personnel training programmes and youth contacts.

There are broad opportunities for cooperation in public relations and publishing, in which the Soviet Communist Party could be of great help for the Social Democracy Party in developing its own information service, he said.

Polish Sejm Bodies Discuss USSR Troop Pullout

PM1505081590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 May 90 First Edition p 3

[Lieutenant Colonel F. Martynkevich report: "Joint Session"]

[Text] A joint session of the Sejm's defense and international policy commissions has been held in Warsaw to examine the terms of the Soviet troop presence in Poland. General of Division M. Dembicki, Polish government representative for matters relating to the Soviet troops' presence, delivered a report. Deputies of the upper house of parliament indicated the need to reduce the number of Soviet troops and for their complete withdrawal in the context of the subsequent development of the international situation.

Anti-Submarine Warship Sails From SFRY Port

LD1205052390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1024 GMT 12 May 90

[Text] Belgrade, 12 May (TASS)—The official, friendly visit of the large anti-submarine warship Ochakov ended today. Many inhabitants of the city of Split came to the port to see off the Soviet sailors. The warship was visited by representatives of the Yugoslav naval command. Rear Admiral V. Grishanov, who is in command during the voyage, expressed sincere gratitude for the hospitality and warm reception.

West Europe

Gorbachev Receives Apostolic Nuncio

LD1405172490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1627 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] Moscow, 14 May (TASS)—In the Kremlin today, Mikhail Gorbachev, president of the USSR, received the Vatican's special nuncio in the Soviet Union, Monsignor Francesco Colasuonno.

Colasuonno conveyed to Gorbachev a message from Pope John Paul II, in reply to an earlier letter from the USSR president to the head of the Holy See.

During their conversation, Mikhail Gorbachev expressed deep satisfaction with the deepening and development of contacts between the Vatican and the Soviet Union. The USSR president noted that those values which lie both at the base of the policy of perestroyka and in the approaches of the Holy See—namely, acknowledgement of the prime significance of human rights and the rights of peoples—are a reliable basis for mutual understanding between them.

We are at present going through a stage in the development of Europe and in the world as a whole, Gorbachev continued, when a heightened sense of responsibility is required of everyone. If everyone, including the USSR and the Vatican use their opportunities and their influence, then a truly new and peaceful phase in the life of the community of mankind can open. The attainment of this new phase is a lofty, noble goal.

Dwelling on the progress of perestroyka in the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev noted that it is currently going through a stage of decisive revolutionary transformations when, as never before, calm, objectivity, and dialogue are required. In our society, which has undergone many dramas and even tragedies, it is especially important to implement the changes which are due in a spirit of democracy, humanism, conscience, the law, and on the basis of the priority of common human values. It is precisely in this manner that the president intends to act.

Colasuonno conveyed to Gorbachev cordial greetings from Pope John Paul II, and wishes for the success of the renewal of society underway in our country. His holiness daily follows the events unfolding in the USSR, and prays for a happy outcome to them. The head of the Roman Catholic Church proceeds from the role of the USSR in Europe and in the world, the role of Gorbachev's activity, and the contribution of perestroyka to the cause of stability and peace throughout the world. It is precisely in this context that the Holy See considers the development of relations with the USSR.

Mikhail Gorbachev wished Msgr. Francesco Colasuonno success in his work. As president of the country, he said, I am obliged to think of the well-being and the resolution of the problems of the country's citizens—believers and nonbelievers alike, Orthodox and Catholic, and people adhering to other faiths. On this basis we can find good ground for cooperation.

In conclusion, M.S. Gorbachev conveyed greetings and best wishes to Pope John Paul II, and stressed the significance of personal meaningful contact between the head of the Vatican and the Soviet leadership.

UK Defense Secretary King Arrives 14 May

Meets Yazov

LD1405134390 Moscow TASS in English 1333 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 14 TASS—British Defense Secretary Tom King arrived here on an official visit today. This is the first trip undertaken by a British defense secretary to the Soviet Union in the post-war period.

At the airport the British guest was welcomed by Soviet Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov and other officials.

On the same day Soviet Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov had a talk with Tom King.

The sides discussed problems of security, changes in the European military-political situation linked, particularly, with the prospects of German reunification. The two ministers outlined the stands of their governments on problems of reducing the stands of their governments on problems of reducing conventional armed forces and armaments in Europe, exchanged views on the future of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and NATO.

The British guest laid a wreath on the grave of the unknown soldier at the Kremlin wall.

Talks 'Successful'

LD1405181190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1715 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] Moscow 14 May (TASS)—Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitriy Yazov, USSR defense minister, has described as successful the results of the talks that he held today in Moscow with Tom King, Great Britain's defense secretary, who has arrived here on an official visit. According to the Soviet minister, these talks "have made it possible to gain a better understanding of the positions of the two countries on many problems of disarmament and European policy."

Speaking to journalists in the building of the USSR Defense Ministry at the end of his meeting with Tom King, the Soviet minister said that his visit to Great Britain last year and the present visit to the USSR by the head of the British war office, the first one since the war, indicate that Soviet-British contacts in the military sphere "are becoming regular, and the talks more specific and productive of results." "It can be said, Dmitriy Yazov noted, that meetings of this kind deepen the process of drawing together our armies and much has been done in this regard over the past two years." According to the minister, the "discussion of issues which were touched upon at talks between President of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev, and Prime Minister of Great Britain Margaret Thatcher, was continued" at the meeting. However, he added, naturally "we were unable to solve on one single occasion all problems on which differences remain between the two countries." In particular Dmitriy Yazov noted that there were differences in their positions on the question of membership of the NATO bloc by the future united German state.

Speaking about the Vienna talks on reducing conventional forces and armaments in Europe, Dmitriy Yazov said that some slowing down in the pace of these is linked with the fact that the serious political changes that are taking place on the continent "require certain corrections to be made to the talks." "The processes which have taken place in Eastern Europe have also affected the quantitative side of conventional armaments," he noted.

Tom King also expressed satisfaction with the results of the meeting with the USSR defense minister. "Of course we did not have complete unity of views on the problems that were under discussion, he said; however, it is important that we are able to discuss them constructively and in a friendly atmosphere." In the British minister's opinion, the atmosphere today of Soviet-British dialogue in the military sphere differs sharply from that which existed several years ago, when "distrust and suspicion dominated" in relations between Great Britain and the USSR.

Radio Views Visit

LD1405121190 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] Britain's defense secretary, Mr. Tom King, begins an official visit to the Soviet Union today. This is what our defense correspondent, Naval Captain (Yakovlev), writes:

Tom King is the first British defense secretary to visit this country in the record of relations with Britain. Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Dmitriy Yazov, who paid an official visit to Britain last year, has said we must build up a potential of trust and, what is more important, to do our best to realize this potential of trust.

Preparations have been made in the Soviet Defense Ministry to meet the wishes of the British side to the full. During his five-day stay here Mr. King will visit Soviet military installations and bases in four Soviet cities. He will also have meetings with the Soviet defense minister, Dmitriy Yazov, and with instructors and students of the Military Political Academy. He will also visit a paratroop school, army units and ships of the Black Sea Fleet.

It is felt in Soviet military quarters that the success of the shaping of positive changes in Europe, and the rest of the world for that matter, depends on the level of openness in the military area, including between the Soviet Union and Britain, concludes our defense correspondent Naval Captain (Yakovlev).

Tanker Collides With West German Freighter

Details Viewed

LD1405202590 Moscow TASS in English 1954 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] Stockholm May 14 TASS—The Soviet Volgoneft-263 tanker collided with West German Betty dry cargo carrier off the eastern coast of Sweden today. The collision occurred in conditions of reduced visibility.

Both vessels were damaged but remained afloat. No casualties were reported. The West German carrier, holed above the waterline, headed for the Swedish port of Karlskrona.

The Soviet tanker remains in the disaster area. It lost some 850 tonnes of oil. Further leakage has been prevented.

According to Kjell Dahlstedt, representative of the Swedish Coastal Guard, favourable weather conditions in the area hold off the danger of coastal pollution.

Seven Swedish vessels, including three specially equipped for sea surface cleaning, have arrived at the disaster area. Work to collect the oil are to begin soon. It is hard to say how much time it will take but the oil film is thin and part of it is sure to evaporate, Dahlstedt said.

The Swedish Telegraph Bureau reported that another Soviet tanker, Volgoneft-135, is heading for the disaster area to receive all the remaining oil from the damaged tanker.

More on Collision Revealed

LD1505080490 Moscow TASS in English 0706 GMT 15 May 90

[By TASS correspondent Dmitriy Gorokhov]

[Text] Stockholm May 15 TASS—The Swedish Telegraph Agency reported aditional information about the collision between the West German freighter Betty and the Soviet oil tanker Volgoneft 263 on the Baltic Sea on

Monday. The incident occurred one foggy morning off Sweden's southeast coast, eight sea miles off the Utlaenga Island.

The West German bulk carrier rammed into the Soviet tanker, puncturing its hull. Nine hundred tonnes of oil spilled into the sea.

The Swedish Coast Guard service sent seven specially-Equipped oil fighting vessels into the sea.

The oil slick poses no danger too the coastline. The Soviet tanker remained at sea and will pump the remaining oil into the sister vessel.

The West German freighter was slightly damaged an was taken to the port of Karlskrona.

Head of the Swedish Marine Police told the Swedish Telegraph Agency that some members of the West German crew were drunk during the accident. This fact was also noted by Swedish coast guards.

The Swedish authorites will investigate the incident.

Kopteltsev Speaks at German Unification Meeting

Suggests NATO Membership for Moscow

AU1405193590 Hamburg DIE WELT in German 14 May 90 p 5

[Hans-R. Karutz report: "Gorbachev Adviser: Moscow Should Join a Changed NATO"]

[Excerpt] Potsdam—At a historic place, Valentin Kopteltsev, a close aide of Gorbachev, made the surprising proposal that the Soviet Union should be accepted as a new member of "a changed NATO that had given up the old way of thinking." On the scene of the Potsdam Conference of 1945, Kopteltsev, who took part in a meeting of the German-German Church Congress movement as a guest, also suggested that a peace treaty should be concluded with a unified Germany.

Kopteltsev said that this was a "clean solution," but he also made it clear that the idea of the NATO variant was intended to help the hard-pressed CPSU chief politically in his own country; to dispel emerging fears among the Russians in view of German developments; and to signal to the Germans that "we do not hinder the course of German unity," as Kopteltsev stressed in a public discussion before Potsdam Christians. They were as stunned as the experts on the podium as they listened to him in the Potsdam Erloeserkirche.

Overcome Enemy Images

Under the chairmanship of Reinhard Appel ("What you are saying here is sensational"), a colloquium including Kopteltsev (department chief for international relations in the CPSU Central Committee and thus a confidant of Valentin Falin), Berlin's Christian Democratic Union chief Eberhard Diepgen, David Kramer (German Marshall Fund), the peace researchers Walter Stuetzle (Stockholm) and Siegfried Fischer (GDR), were discussing the "Future of the Germans in Europe." The explosive topic of the "Soviet Union in NATO" developed when Church Congress President Erhard Eppler (Social Democratic Party of Germany) asked this provocative question: "How should the USSR react, do you think, if such a proposal came from the West today?" Eppler added that after all, even Molotov had applied for Moscow's membership in 1954, "at the peak of the Cold War...."

Kopteltsev seemed to have waited for this cue: "Yes, I am personally in favor of making such an offer." Today everyone should "have an interest in overcoming enemy images." If this were possible Gorbachev would also support it. Kopteltsev added that he could "not guarantee that this proposal would not be challenged in the Soviet Union." In this respect, he hinted at opposition from military and arms quarters. He said that such a membership could become possible "if NATO proves able to give up its old way of thinking." Kopteltsev immediately tried to dispel the assumption that Moscow wanted to drive the Americans out of Europe: "We are not opposed to Americans in Europe." In this context, Kopteltsev even philosophized publicly about the possible failure of the chief of the Kremlin: "There is no way back, no matter what happens—even if military people were to come to power."

Kopteltsev said that after the Germans had committed a breach of contract three times (the party diplomat mentioned the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Hitler-Stalin pact, and "Adenauer's embargo on pipes"), a peace treaty with Germany would be the best solution: "One or two years ago, the Federal Government would have been extremely happy about such an offer—why not today?" asked Kopteltsev. Then he expounded the deeper reasons for the Kremlin's move: "The people in the Soviet Union are worried about the German question. Gorbachev wants to face them with a clear conscience and tell them that the German question will be solved. War will never again start from German soil."

Kopteltsev's remarks obviously form part of a new diplomatic offensive. His colleague Andrey Grachev—Falin's deputy in the Central Committee International Department—in an interview with AFP last weekend [12-13 May], spoke about a "peace document" that Moscow considered important. In this document, the united Germany should give and lay down "guarantees on the borderline, its military strength, its renunciation of nuclear weapons, and a time frame for the withdrawal of the allied troops." [passage omitted]

Views German Sovereignty

LD1205204190 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1953 GMT 12 May 90

[Excerpt] Potsdam (ADN)—The Soviet Union does not want to deny a united Germany full sovereignty, said Valentin Kopteltsev, department chief for international relations in the CPSU Central Committee, today [12 May] in Potsdam's Erloeserkirche.

The second day of the international colloquium on German unification in a European context, organized by the Evangelical Churches of the FRG and the GDR, ended with a public discussion on the topic: "Joint security and the future of the alliances".

The Soviet expert described the most recent proposals of USSR Foreign Minister Shevardnadze as an opportunity to complete internal processes of German unification even at this stage, when the schedule and sequence of the external aspects are still being negotiated. He rejected NATO membership for united Germany. [passage omitted]

FRG Paper Notes Work on Draft Peace Treaty

LD1205082590 Hamburg DPA in German 0654 GMT 12 May 90

[Text] Hamburg (DPA)—According to a report in the Hamburg-based news magazine DER SPIEGEL the Soviet Union is aiming for the conclusion of a peace treaty in the context of German unity. Experts from the Foreign Ministry in Moscow and the International Department of the Central Committee are currently working flat out on a draft treaty, which may be explained to U.S. Secretary of State James Baker during his upcoming visit to Moscow next week. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev may then present Moscow's package of proposals to U.S. President Bush personally during the summit, SPIEGEL writes in its latest edition, quoting sources in Moscow.

The renunciation of a future greater Germany of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and other means of mass destruction is to be laid down in the peace treaty. Apart from this the Germans should refrain from all military activities against third parties. "A certain presure for change will thus be brought about as Germany would be of no interest to NATO if it [NATO] does not change its security doctrine," a Central Committee expert is quoted as saying. In any case Moscow will negotiate hard "however long it may take."

According to Soviet ideas, 12 to 16 states at most should participate in the negotiations on a peace treaty: "Besides the immediate participants in the war, all nations who suffered directly under German occupation," the magazine quotes a Soviet expert as saying. A large international court is to be avoided. The Soviet Union intends to renounce reparations but not an obligation to compensate individuals.

Genscher Receives Outgoing Envoy to FRG

LD1105223190 Moscow TASS in English 2106 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Bonn May 11 TASS—West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher met Soviet Ambassador to West Germany Yuliy Kvitsinskiy here today on the occasion of the completion of his term of duty.

Genscher thanked the ambassador for his work, stressing the importance the West German Government attaches to the development of relations with the Soviet Union.

Relations with the Soviet Union will be central to the united Germany as well, he stressed.

Both West Germany and the Soviet Union are making an important contribution to the creation of a new Europe, he said.

Talks between foreign ministers from the two German states and four world war two victors in Bonn were positive and reassuring, he said.

Gorbachev Hails Austria Treaty Anniversary

LD1405115290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has sent Kurt Waldheim, federal president of the Republic of Austria, congratulations on the event of the 35th anniversary of the signing of the state treaty on the restoration of an independent and democratic Austria. The telegram expresses the conviction that the state treaty and Austria's status of permanent neutrality will remain a reliable foundation for the further deepening and growth of Soviet-Austrian relations. The telegram expresses wishes of happiness and prosperity.

In connection with the 35th anniversary of the state treaty on the restoration of an independent and democratic Austria, Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov has congratulated Franz Vranitzky, federal chancellor of the Republic of Austria, and also the government and the people.

Gorbachev, Queen of Netherlands Exchange Greetings

LD1105162290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1440 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Moscow, 11 May (TASS)—In connection with the Netherlands national holiday, USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev has sent Queen Beatrix a congratulatory telegram, in which hope is expressed that the traditional beneficial relations between our countries, as an important element of strengthening security in Europe and in the world, will develop for the future good of mankind.

The Queen of the Netherlands Expressed gratitude for the congratulations and conveyed best wishes to the Soviet people in a message of reply.

Outgoing USSR Envoy Feted at Reception

LD1005200890 Hamburg DPA in German 1709 GMT 10 May 90

[Excerpt] Bonn (DPA)—Yuliy Kvitsinskiy, the Soviet ambassador to the Federal Republic, took his leave from political life in Bonn today with a reception. He is to become deputy foreign minister in Moscow and will in future be responsible for talks between the two German states and the four victorious powers of World War II. The new ambassador in Bonn will be Vladimir Terekhov, for whom agreement has already been granted. [passage omitted]

Latin American & Caribbean

30 Years of Soviet-Cuban Ties Hailed

PM0905131990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 May 90 Second Edition p 5

[Own correspondent A. Moiseyev dispatch: "Based on Equal Rights. Cuba and USSR Restored Diplomatic Relations 30 Years Ago"]

[Text] Havana—The question is often asked: Why did the normalization of relations between our countries take place officially almost 18 months after the victory in Cuba of the people's anti-imperialist revolution? At that time, in the first months of the changes, the distribution of political forces on the island was uncertain. Reactionary elements continued to control a number of the biggest newspapers and journals in the country.

Many prejudices regarding the Soviet Union which had been implanted over the decades by their northern neighbor's anti-Communist propaganda still existed in various strata of the Cuban population, and Fidel Castro's government needed time to neutralize the spread of anti-Soviet stereotypes in the country and to convince the masses of the need to establish friendly relations with Lenin's motherland. By 8 May 1960 such conditions had been created.

"The situation at that time was really very complex," Jose Raul Viera, Cuba's first deputy foreign minister, said. "And not only inside the country but also around it. The first contacts between our states were established in the economic sphere. The United States had mounted a merciless war against the Cuban revolution. At first it sharply reduced, and then completely halted, purchases of sugar from us—the republic's main export product—and blocked deliveries of fuel to the country. During the economic blockade, which was a difficult time for the revolution, the Soviet Union extended the hand of solidarity to the new Cuba and stated its willingness to deliver several million tonnes of oil to the Island of Freedom.

"The blockade started by the United States aimed to eliminate the shoots of the new life on the island by depriving the people of the means of existence. Soviet aid gave us a chance to survive and to continue development. We value this highly. Our ties are based on equal rights, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, and consideration of mutual interests. They are becoming increasingly comprehensive in the economy. Today we are trading with each other not only in sugar and petroleum but also nickel, chromium, and citrus fruits. Prospects in the sphere of medicine, biotechnology, and the creation of joint tourist enterprises are very promising. I would like to stress that the USSR has been delivering oil to us regularly and continuously for 30 years. This has enabled us to survive during the U.S. economic blockade.

"It is difficult to find in Cuba even one province where one is not conscious of the fruits of cooperation between our states. Of course, times are changing. Today the situation in the world is not the same as it was 30 years ago. As in your country, we became more demanding of production technology and the quality of goods. We are persistently searching for ways to increase the effectiveness of our collaboration and to improve ties. I believe that new possibilities are opening up before us and that cooperation will expand and deepen daily. As for opinions appearing in the world press about basic contradictions between our countries, I believe that they did not and do not exist. The visit to Cuba by M.S. Gorbachev a year ago, during which a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between our states was signed, serves as confirmation of this.

"Cuba is a small country," Jose Raul Viera said. "And it is situated very close to a big state—the United States—where respect for other states' sovereignty is lacking. Right now someone in Washington is under the illusion that our people may cease to defend their independence and their revolution. People there are hoping that the USSR will stop delivering raw materials and equipment to the island and will not fulfill its trade commitments. We would like to dispel these illusions. Cuba today is a political fortress in which everyone is united by the combat slogan 'Socialism or death! The country or death! We shall triumph...!'"

...At this significant time of the 30th anniversary of the restoration of diplomatic relations between our countries a USSR Supreme Soviet delegation led by O.D. Baklanov, USSR people's deputy and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, is in Cuba.

"This is the first visit to Havana by a delegation of the present USSR Supreme Soviet," O.D. Baklanov said to journalists. "We attach particular significance to the development of parliamentary contacts in connection with the growing role of the two countries' representative organs in solving the most important questions of internal and foreign policy. A comparison of assessments of the situation in the world and also the processes taking place in our countries is an important starting point for cooperation between the Soviet Union and Cuba. Sincerity, openness, and mutual understanding have always been an impetus to such joint deliberation on questions of key significance. The meeting with Cuba and its industrious, talented, and kindhearted people was a real festive occasion for our delegation."

Ambassador Notes Relations

LD0705224290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 7 May 90

[Remarks by Jose Ramon Balaguer Cabrera, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Republic of

Cuba to the USSR, on the occasion of the 8 May 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the USSR; place and date not given—recorded; from the "Vremya" program; Balaguer speaks in Spanish with superimposed Russian translation]

[Text] Dear Soviet comrades, during the course of these 30 years the Soviet people have always been with us in the struggle for strengthening and developing the revolution. That was the case in the difficult days of the attack by mercenaries on the Bay of Pigs; during the terrorist blockade; and in battles in the international arena, defending our right to genuine and complete independence in the course of a free and sovereign homeland.

In each of the development plans implemented by us we felt your solidarity strengthening our relations with respect, trust, and sincere friendship—relations which are and which will be inviolable. The experience accumulated over those 30 years is an enormous wealth for our peoples. Soviet assistance to Cuba has made it possible for us to create an economic, scientific, and technological base which already today is demonstrating in certain spheres unique achievements and results, comparable to the foremost achievements in the world. An example of this is the research center in the area of health care and biotechnology, as is the system of health care for the population as well.

We can now already give the Soviet people modest but sincere help in such difficult situations as the earthquake in Armenia; the railway catastrophe in the Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic; recent medical assistance to children who suffered after the catastrophe at Chernobyl; and assistance to veterans of the Afghan war.

All Cubans recognize what the USSR means for the world, and know its adherence to ideas of peace. The unprecedented efforts of the Soviet leadership and its people, aimed at liberation from the threat of a new war, are truly a factor of unsurpassable significance as is the precise implementation of the pure [svetiykh] ideas of Lenin after carrying out the October revolution—ideas which are being filled with new life in these days of celebrating the 45th anniversary of the victory over fascism.

On the day of the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the USSR, I would like to say that the Cuban people, and especially Comrade Fidel Castro, congratulate every representative of the Soviet people who has given assistance to our homeland, and from the bottom of their hearts wish you success in carrying out profound transformations in all spheres of the life of society. Thank you very much, said the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Cuba.

Correspondent Reviews Relations

LD0705205690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1820 GMT 7 May 90

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Tomorrow will see the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and revolutionary Cuba. Our correspondent in Havana, Viktor Gorbachev, reports:

[Gorbachev] [passage omitted] Marking the jubilee, one can recall many achievements and many examples of solidarity. Our relations constantly grew stronger and encompassed new areas. However, they became not only firmer and more diverse, but also more complex. This has become especially noticeable in recent years. First and foremost, since the beginning of perestroyka, a great difference in domestic policy and in approaches to socialist construction has emerged. We have encountered immense economic difficulties and for this reason we would like to move on as soon as possible to mutually-advantageous and balanced relations with Cuba. But Cuba is also going through a difficult period and naturally is interested in the continuation of Soviet aid. The situation is quite complex and should not be simplified. A great deal now depends on the ability of the sides to reach mutual understanding and move toward compromise in difficult discussions.

It seems to me that veterans of diplomacy could also remember the difficult moments and the complex problems which we have resolved together. This real life, quite distant from its official versions, has taught us much over 30 years and has created the traditions on which is is now possible to rely. When I asked Jose Viera, deputy minister of foreign relations of Cuba, whether the new situation has had a negative effect on our relations, he replied: [Begin Viera recording in Spanish with superimposed Russian translation] The time of profound changes which are taking place in the Soviet Union and Cuba and in the world as a whole, of course, require new approaches and new discussions. But these talks and discussions in search of new approaches are being conducted by two governments who understand each other and are striving for the further development of relations between their countries. Therefore, one can assert that there are no cracks in relations between us. They remain stable. [end recording]

Supreme Soviet Session

Moscow TV Carries 14 May Supreme Soviet Session

Gritsenko Reports on Pensions

LD1405162590

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1500 GMT on 14 May begins carrying a recording of the 14 May USSR Supreme Soviet session in the Kremlin in Moscow.

Lukyanov is shown chairing session. He says there is a good quorum. Deputies are asked to register—418 present. There are 85 people's deputies, not members of the Supreme Soviet, also taking part.

Lukyanov says work continued on Sunday to enable discussion of the Law on Pensions to be completed today. The section on pensions for length of service has to be examined.

At 1504 GMT Gritsenko comes to the rostrum to report. Deputies have been given new versions of Articles 59-64. Deputies have also made proposals on Article 63 concerning air crews, and on Article 64 and 66. Gritsenko details categories of workers involved. Proposals on the resolution bringing the new law into effect have also been drafted and distributed. An attempt has been made to resolve the problem of transfering from the old pension scheme to the new conditions.

The greatest difficulty at present, Gritsenko continues, is pensions for those who work at sea. For other categories, it is proposed that the government be instructed to draw up the details. The minister of finance has provided some details on possibilities for when to bring new regulations into effect. Commissions are to be instructed to work out some details of implementation. Gritsenko suggests that deputies now embark on an article-by-article discussion.

At 1515 GMT questions are addressed to Gritsenko. Savitskaya asks: Why are we discussing some things that were already covered in adopting the law as a whole? Gritsenko says only the amendments are to be discussed. Doga says the attempt to define categories of agricultural workers, too, finely will lead to loss of prestige for the manual workers. All agricultural workers should be treated equally. Gritsenko says it has already been agreed to give women peferential treatment. He refers to documentation concerning professions to be given preferential treatment. An unidentified deputy asks why suggestions about municipal transport workers have been ignored. Gritsenko says this is covered under provisions for republican funding of pensions. Katilevskiy asks about train drivers provisions—are industrial locomotive drivers included? Gritsenko answers in the affirmative. Lesyuk makes a point about farm workers. Palagnyuk requests that women agricultural workers be better considered. Gritsenko says the resolution does ask the government to consider early retirement for women. Lukyanov reminds the deputies that a note from the Ministry of Finance on funding has been distributed. Deputy Nozdrya asks if research vessels are covered under the provisions for seamen. Lukyanov says the government's instructions will cover this. Shcherbakov says there is a suggestion that provisions should go according to conditions of work, not according to specific professions. The proposal covering all train drivers has been made in this way.

At 1534 GMT Lukyanov asks for amendments prior to the vote on articles. Deputy Akayev proposes an amendment to Article 60 concerning shepherds in extreme conditions. Shcherbakov says the question has not been discussed in detail and suggests that it is something for a decision at the republican level. Gritsenko recalls the history of discussion on this issue. Altitude has been recognized as a factor affecting health. Gritsenko suggests leaving details to republican bodies. Shcherbakov says that no vote has been taken yet on shepherds and gives some figures for the cost of funding such provisions. Lukyanov says that shepherds are covered in the documents which deputies have. Gritsenko says that the question is covered in general in what has already been adopted and that details can still be changed if necessary. He asks Akayev if it is worth making a separate issue of his question. Akayev goes into details of how the proposals would affect shepherds in Kirghizia. Lukyanov reads out the written form of Akayev's proposal.

At 1548 GMT Amanova suggests leaving the wording concerning shepherds as it stands. Masaliyev speaks for nomadic shepherds and reindeer breeders, noting the value of their produce, offers an amendment to Article 60 in terms of nomadic shepherds. An unidentified deputy speaks about the extreme conditions in which reindeer breeders work. Lukyanov goes into semantics of who the professions of shepherds and reindeer breeders are described. Shcherbakov speaks about the costs of the various proposals, speaking on behalf of the government. Masaliyev speaks about the price of wool in the context of the new conditions for administration of republican budgets. Shcherbakov recalls what has already been decided—all consumer production matters are in the hands of the republics; most tax income now goes to the republics. Income and expenditure should be settled in the same place.

Lukyanov says they are getting bogged down in details of individual jobs again.

At 1601 GMT Deputy Rogozhina notes that deputies are discussing points out of context of the laws already adopted. We are merely banging our heads against a wall discussing these local points. They would all be better resolved at the local level on the basis of the all-Union law. Matters of all-Union importance such as work at sea, underground, and in the air are the ones we should be discussing.

There is considerable uproar in the hall. Rogozhina argues with Akayev over where in the Soviet Union shepherds are at work.

At 1607 GMT Lukyanov calls for a vote.

Amendments Offered, Voted On

LD1405185690

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1622 GMT on 14 May resumes carrying a recording of the 14 May USSR Supreme Soviet session in the Kremlin in Moscow.

Lukyanov summarizes the discussion so far and Deputy Osipov gives some information about the average age of northern peoples and calls for them to be shown support in the law.

Lukyanov puts an end to the arguments. He puts Akayev's amendment to the vote. The amendment is not passed.

At 1632 GMT Alekseyev raises a point about truck drivers working in mining areas and their difficult working conditions. Shcherbakov, for the government, defends the formulation of Article 60, which he believes covers those drivers mentioned by Alekseyev. Shcherbakov says that the government wants the law to have direct action and feels such proposals may tie the government's hands and make the law unworkable. Lukyanov puts Alekseyev's point to the vote: 21 in favor, 302 against, 43 abstain.

At 1638 GMT Komarov goes back to the shepherd issued asking that the word shepherd be included in the draft, otherwise they will be totally ignored. Lukyanov reminds deputies of the formulation. He then puts Komarov's proposal to the vote: 351 in favor, four against, 24 abstain. The amendment is adopted. An unidentified deputy raises a point about difficult working conditions of machine operators. Lukyanov draws deputies' attention to the wording of the draft. Gritsenko reiterates the work of the committee. Shcherbakov reads out a clause from the draft resolution. Various deputies make brief points. Lukyanov puts the latest amendment to the vote: 200 in favor, 114 against, 65 abstain. It is not passed.

At 1650 GMT Obolenskiy draws the attention of deputies to Article 60 and suggests a change regarding teachers and length of service. He believes the clause in question needs clarification. Shcherbakov reminds deputies that the resolution will allow teachers to a pension on completion of length of service. Lukyanov asks for a teacher's view. An unidentified deputy speaks from the floor. A vote is called on Obolenskiy's amendment: 27 in favor, 335 against, 21 abstain.

At 1656 GMT Babchenko asks that "drivers of municipal passenger transport" be written into Article 60. Gritsenko replies. Sukharuchenko also calls for this point to be discussed separately.

At 1659 GMT Biryukova says the government has discussed this matter with the republics. She believes drivers of municipal transport should be included in the resolution, not in the law itself. Lukyanov points out that there are problems with recruiting drivers in both large and small cities and towns. He suggests leaving the article as it is, but puts Babchenko's proposal to the vote. It is not passed.

At 1703 GMT an unidentified deputy raises the vexed question of reindeer breeders and makes a proposal which is rejected. Deputy Doga proposes a change regarding the pensionable age of women in agriculture.

At 1709 GMT Biryukova says the issue of women has been resolved. Doga argues that it has not and is indignant. Lukyanov reiterates that everything pertaining to women was resolved yesterday. He puts Doga's proposal to the vote: 227 vote in favor, 90 against, and 55 abstain.

Lukyanov announces a 30-minute break.

Aviation Pensions Debated

LD1405194290

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1715 GMT on 14 May continues to carry a recording of the 14 May USSR Supreme Soviet session in the Kremlin in Moscow.

Lukyanov opens the afternoon session with a debate on the part of the law concerning aviations workers. Article 63 has two amendments. Gritsenko explains the amendments. Demakov speaks about point A of Article 63 on pilots. A question about safety of flights is raised.

Laptev assumes the chairmanship of the session at 1720 GMT.

Demakov says that point B concerns lowering the age for air traffic controllers to 50. Voskoboynikov relates the cost of an amendment to the cost if there is an accident. An AUCCTU representative supports the amendment. Gritsenko says it is a controversial point. We have not heard a final decision from the government. It should be voted on; in the commission we were divided.

At 1727 GMT Shcherbakov reports some medical research results on flying, and compares pensionable ages for air traffic controllers in Austria, Hungary etc. Canada has the lowest age at 50. Laptev puts it to the vote. Biryukova says the 50-year age limit is when they have been working over 20 years at their consoles. International Organization of Labor guidelines are quoted. It would be socially unjust to others to give the air traffic controllers such a big benefit. Laptev sums up the three proposals. An unidentified deputy says it's nothing to do with benefits, it's a question of air safety.

At 1737 GMT Laptev puts to the vote lowering the pensionable age of controllers to 55 having done 12.5 rather than 15 years service—424 vote in favor, says Laptev (no figures are actually shown). Savitskaya says this was already voted on earlier. Laptev puts it to the vote again—321 in favor, 61 against, 26 abstain. Laptev puts to the vote lowering pensionable age to 50. Results: 144 in favor, 214 against, 43 abstain. The commission supports 45 years for women. Laptev puts to vote lowering the pensionable age to 45 for women air traffic controllers. Results: 152 in favor, 188 against, 47 abstain.

At 1748 GMT Obolenskiy speaks on cabin staffs. Mukhamedov wants the law left as it was regarding cabin staffs and their pensionable age. Demakov explains the difference between pilots and cabin staffs. Savitskaya says cabin staffs should not be left worse off than the others. An air hostess is not just a waitress, but a member of the plane crew. She has special medical training etc.

At 1756 GMT an unidentified deputy speaks about cabin crews. Many of them are former Afghanistan veterans. He wants it left in the former wording. A woman deputy says we are always saying we want to release women from work in extreme conditions. Another woman says it should be left in the former wording. Shcherbakov speaks on male cabin crews and says that people get a pension so they do not carry on working having lost their professional skills. In other countries cabin crews are not pensioned off earlier. They work to 60 or 55 for women. He explains the differences in conditions for women pilots and air hostesses.

At 1806 GMT Laptev puts to the vote an amendment lowering from 10 to 7.5 years the length-of-service provision for cabin crews—228 vote in favor, 140 against, and 31 abstain. The amendment is not passed.

At 1809 GMT Laptev turns to a discussion of Article 63. Shapovalenko makes a point on this and is followed by Shcherbakov on behalf of the government.

At 1811 GMT Obolenskiy returns to the matter of the air cabin staff.

At 1812 GMT Laptev wants to put Obolenskiy's proposal to the vote, but Biryukova wants to get a word in. Finally, he manages to get the proposal voted on—162 in favor, 196 against, and 41 abstentions. It is not passed. Laptev wants to move on to Article 64, but Deputy (?Amanova) wants to clarify a point on Article 63. Shcherbakov clears this up. Deputy Safarov reminds the chair about the voting procedure for the previous amendment. Laptev reads from his papers about this.

At 1818 GMT Deputy Demakov calls for clarification over a point on Article 63.

At 1819 GMT Laptev tries to get the debate started on Article 64, passing the floor to Korshunov who criticizes the government's reply to a deputy's point on air crew pensions. Shcherbakov reads from Article 127 to answer him. Various unidentified deputies make points relative to these two articles. Shcherbakov explains the distinctions between pensions for air stewards and air stewardesses as provided by the state budget. Korshunov calls for an amendment to put the retirement of air stewards at 55. Laptev calls for a committees to get together in the break to clear up this question of the air crew.

At 1831 GMT Deputy Yudin calls for an amendment to Article 64 regarding payment and conditions of seasonal agricultural workers. Laptev puts Yudin's amendment to the vote. It is adopted with 357 votes in favor and 12 against.

Laptev reads out names of proposed members of the Conciliatory Commission. He then announces a 90-minute break.

Debates, Votes Continue

LD1405204690

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1838 GMT on 14 May continues to carry a recording of the 14 May USSR Supreme Soviet sesion in the Kremlin in Moscow.

The evening session begins with Lukyanov back in the chair. He calls on deputies to register: 412 are present. Debate is resumed on Article 64 with deputies Safiyeva, Mongo, and Zanokha making further points and suggested amendments to sections dealing with reindeer-breeders, shepherds, sheep-breeders, huntsmen, and fishermen. Gritsenko says that the commissions have by and large supported their proposals. Biryukova draws attention to sheep- breeders who work at particularly high altitudes. Shcherbakov points out the different conditions which apply to work in desert and semidesert regions and to nomadic and seminomadic reindeer-herdsmen and huntsmen.

At 1900 GMT a vote on including the point about shepherds is taken: 326 in favor, 29 against, 16 abstain. A deputy suggest putting in another comma, so that parts of deserts with water do not get included among parts of desert without water. Nomadic hunters and fishermen will be included under instructions to government in the resolution.

At 1905 GMT an unidentified deputy from the Ukraine talks about people who work on live high-voltage power lines. Article 64 should be amended to entitle them to early retirement at 55. Gritsenko says his committee has not received this proposal, but has had a similar one concerning power engineers. The topic has been covered under point seven of the resolution, to be decided at the republican level. Shcherbakov says the matter is not one that has to be written into the law itself.

At 1911 GMT an unidentified deputy talks about the hard conditions for farm machine operators. He wants them included under Article 64 for retirement at 55 after 25 years' service. The proposal has been turned down twice, says Lukyanov, pointing out the difficulty of defining the work involved. The deputy argues with Lukyanov's definitions. Deputy Orekhov suggests defining the category as field workers. Lukyanov says they are covered under Point 7. An unidintified deputy says that if other workers are being put into such narrow categories, then how about chemical workers in hazardous conditions? She disapproves of the style of discussion. Lukyanov puts the inclusion of "machine operators directly involved in farm production" to the vote: 276 vote in favor, 62 against, 47 abstain. The amendment fails because of numbers for each chamber.

At 1925 GMT an unidentified man who says he is not a deputy speaks from the rostrum. He says the proposal would not only mean there was no money to pay the pensions, but nobody would be left to do the work if the idea were extended to all sorts of professions.

At 1927 GMT an unidentified deputy argues about the voting. Lukyanov gives a detailed result. The Soviet of the Union did not pass the amendment. A Conciliation Committee will be formed on the issue. Lukyanov chides deputies for getting too emotional. We can't keep voting on the same thing, he says.

At 1931 GMT Lukyanov reads out a written proposal for Article 14 concerning farm workers. He says this will be passed to commissions and committees. Biryukova recalls Zhuravlev's proposals on women workers; this, too, will be passed to committees. Gritsenko gives a reminder of a notice needed to include proposals in considerations. Lukyanov says what is needed now is a law on the foundations. Details can always be amended later. Lukyanov cuts off the discussion on farm workers.

At 1938 GMT Gritsenko speaks about Article 63 provisions for air cabin staff. A proposal has been made concerning early retirement for male staff, which Gritsenko reads out. The vote is 312 in favor, 35 against, and 24 abstentions. The amendment is adopted.

At 1941 GMT Gritsenko speaks about a proposed amendment to Article 64, Sub-clause 6 concerning machineoperators in ports and some seagoing workers. Shcherbakov talks about how regulations are reckoned for different categories of shipping workers. Lukyanov puts the amendment to the vote: 210 in favor, 94 against, 60 abstain. The amendment fails. Lukyanov puts a proposal by seamen deputies to the vote: 143 in favor, 171 against, 49 abstain.

At 1950 GMT Rogozhina speaks about Article 13. Much work has been done on the law, with the aim that those who work best will be best off. She recalls an earlier amendment which, she thinks, rewards those who work least and worst. She proposes an amendment to Article 13 abolishing pensionable age and putting in length of service instead, or amending Article 67 to ensure fair treatment. Deputies should also bear in mind that the changes which have been made will mean a heavier burden of pension contributions. Rogozhina reads her proposed amendment to Article 13—men get pension after 35 years' service, women after 30 years. Lukyanov asks the chairman of Veterans' Affairs Commission, together with Biryukova and Rogozhina to discuss the amendment and report.

At 2000 GMT Likhanov reiterates the point that new laws should be better than existing ones. He goes back to the injustice to air stewardesses in the adopted amendment. A deputy in naval uniform expresses shock at the decision over fishermen. Lukyanov reassures him that these matters can be returned to. Deputy Druz raises the issue of veterans and war invalids. Shcherbakov reads out a proposal by Deputy Shchelkanov regarding those disabled from birth. Another deputy defends the rights of women and asks whether we have done the right thing by putting them on tractors and sending them down mines. When are we going to start thinking about their femininity? He calls for a law on Soviet women. Lukyanov thanks him.

At 2012 GMT Lukyanov goes on to review tomorrow's agenda, which will continue today's debate and adopt the law on pensions, and then continue debate on taxation of enterprises. The Soviet of Nationalities is to have a brief session now. He says goodbye until 1000 Moscow Time, 16 May.

At 2017 GMT the recorded relay ends.

The continuity announcer reports on the brief session of the Soviet of Nationalities which debated the matter of insults to the honor and dignity of the president of the USSR. Sharipov was elected chairman of the Commission on Socioeconomic Development of Republics, Oblasts, and Krays.

Lukyanov Stresses Pension Bill 14 May

LD1405084690 Moscow TASS in English 0817 GMT 14 May 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent]

[Text] Moscow May 14 TASS—The protracted pensions bill debate in Soviet Parliament seems close to an end.

Opening today's joint meeting of the Supreme Soviet's two chambers, Anatoliy Lukyanov said the authors of the bill worked all Sunday to include in it all the latest proposals and amendments suggested on Sunday. The proposals are chiefly linked with additional payments for long service. Lukyanov expressed the hope that it would be possible to adopt today this most important legislation, impatiently awaited by millions of Soviet people.

After adopting the pensions bill, parliament will shift to the discussion of bills regulating the appointment of managers at enterprises and laying down the rights of the USSR tax inspection.

Debate Progressing Slowly

LD1405105190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0800 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] [Announcer Vladimir Markin] The third session of the USSR Supreme Soviet is continuing. Today, in accordance with standing orders, there is a joint meeting of the chambers. We are going over to the All-Union

Radio Correspondent in the Kremlin. Marina Novitskaya is at the microphone:

[Novitskaya] Good morning.

[Markin] Good morning.

[Novitskaya] Today the deputies are again working on the draft law on pensions for USSR citizens. As you know, this work has been going on for almost two weeks now. Great difficulties are being encountered. The deputies have now embarked on one of the most complex sections, pensions granted after a specific number of years' service. I remind you that such pensions are paid to people employed in sectors where they are obliged to retire early, before reaching the age at which they are entitled to receive a pension. Who does this apply to? Speaking figuratively, it applies to those who work in the air, at sea, and under ground, to workers in transport, geologists, women textile workers, and other categories.

For example, it took almost an hour to settle the question of whether to include on this list shepherds working in mountain pastures above 2,000 meters. Even when a vote was taken, it was decided to leave the decision on this question to individual republics. It is easy to understand why the deputies are persevering with this question. They are representing the interests of the people who elected them. Nevertheless, one would hope that an approach in keeping with the interests of the state will prevail.

A memorandum from the minister of finance was distributed here today. He informed the deputies that the implementation of decisions and laws on major social problems which have already been adopted by the Supreme Soviet will cost, when expressed in (?annual terms), over R5 billion a year in aditional expenditure. The laws on pensions and leave will cost another R42 billion. The program to eliminate the consequences of the Chernobyl accident will cost R16 billion by 1993 alone. And there are measures to assist young people and allowances for families on low incomes and the disabled still to come. This will all call for additional expenditure. Maybe the minister is slightly over- dramatizing the situation by depicting the situation this way. But this information will probably give the deputies food for thought.

The debate became a bit repetitive. The question of agricultural machinery operators came up again. It is proposed that they, too, should receive a pension after a given number of years. If things go on this way, it may not be possible to adopt the pensions law today either, even though people are waiting for it. I think there will also be much debate about the decision on bringing the law into operation, because the commission of deputies and the government are at odds with each other on this. So, let us wait and see how the debate develops. However, it would be good to get this work finished today.

[Markin] Marina, the pensions law is not the only question on the agenda today.

[Novitskaya] The agenda is behind schedule already. Yesterday—or rather Saturday—they should have started debating the draft law on taxing of enterprises. This did not happen. If they manage to finish with pensions today, they may be able to return to the taxation bill today. But time is already short.

[Markin] Well, thank you for your interesting infomration. Now we return to the studio for the rest of our program.

Bill Fails to Pass

LD1405165890 Moscow TASS in English 1640 GMT 14 May 90

[By TASS Parliamentary Correspondent]

[Text] Moscow May 14 TASS—The Soviet parliament today again failed to pass a pensions bill. The joint meeting of the Supreme Soviet's two chambers postponed a decision on the bill, which comprises more than 130 articles, until Tuesday.

Deputies disagred over benefit pensions for various categories of the population. Some of them insisted that the professional groups, to which they belong, be also entitled to benefit pensions.

One of the chambers, the Council of Nationalities, then met to take a decision on a bill on the protection of the honour and dignity of the Soviet president.

On Saturday, the chamber failed to approve the bill. However, the other chamber, the Council of the Union, passed it. So a conciliatory commission was set up.

Ilmars Bisers, deputy chairman of the Council of Nationalities, told the chamber about the results of the commission's work. Then the bill was put to the vote and passed.

The Council of Nationalities named Yuriy Sharipov, an economist from Bashkiriya, as chairman of the Council's Commission for Social and Economic Development of Constituent Republics.

He will replace Lithuanian Deputy Eduardas Vilkas, who has resigned from this post.

Nationalities Council Passes Presidential Law

LD1405201990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 14 May 90

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Today, for the first time, the state flag of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic was set up in the session hall of the [USSR Supreme Soviet] chambers.

At the end of the day, the Council of Nationalities adopted the law on defending the honor and dignity of the USSR president, which was approved by the Council of the Union on Saturday.

Tomorrow the session will continue its work at a joint sitting of the chambers.

Pension Bill Debate Resumes 15 May

LD1505072990 Moscow TASS in English 0719 GMT 15 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 15 TASS—Both chambers of the Soviet parliament met today to continue passing the new pension bill article by article.

Council of the Union chairman Ivan Laptev, who chairs the joint session, said he hopes that the bill will finally be passed today.

The passage of the bill stalled during an argument over which job categories should get special pension benefits.

The government opposed expanding the current list of job categories enjoying special pension status, saying that authorities should concentrate on improving working conditions instead.

However, the parliament gave in to demands from representatives of several industries and regions, opening the gates for more demands.

Political & Social

Shevardnadze Receives Four Countries' Ambassadors

LD1205194190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 12 May 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Today Comrade Shevardnadze received the ambassadors from Cambodia, Brazil, the DPRK, and Japan.

He had an in-depth exchange of opinions with Bo Rasi, the Cambodian ambassador, on the whole range of Soviet-Cambodian relations, and also on issues relating to the state of and prospects for a Cambodian settlement.

Rego Barros, the Brazilian ambassador, handed Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze a reply to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev from Brazil's President Collor. In particular, the readiness of both sides for a continued upward growth in bilateral cooperation in the most diverse fields was reaffirmed.

In the course of his conversation with Son Song-pil, the ambassador from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze spoke of the Soviet Union's solidarity with the DPRK's principled position on the question of a political settlement in Korea on the basis of the foreign military presence being removed, peace being strengthened on the Korean peninsula, and contacts and ties between the North and the South of Korea being developed with the aim of restoring the country's national unity.

Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze received Edamura, the Japanese ambassador to the USSR, in connection with his forthcoming final departure for home. The two sides voiced their satisfaction over the on-going accumulation of positive elements in Soviet-Japanese relations.

There will be a full account in the press of Comrade Shevardnadze's meetings with the ambassadors of Cambodia, Brazil, the DPRK, and Japan.

Yeltsin's Hospitalization in Spain Reviewed

LD1205211990

[Editorial report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1830 GMT on 11 May broadcasts a report on USSR People's Deputy Boris Yeltsin's recent visit to Spain, during which he suffered a back injury leading to his hospitalization. The announcer explains that on his recent private visit to Spain, Yeltsin suffered a spinal injury that landed him in the hospital. Doctors decided that he had to have an operation, or face a possible 80 percent paralysis. The operation took place, and a few hours later he was able to stand unaided. Four days later, the announcer continues, he was discharged with a clean bill of health. The video shows Yeltsin in the hospital and afterwards.

Yeltsin's book "Against the Grain," the announcer says, is being "reproduced in Russian" in Sverdlovsk, "in a limited print run for the time being." Yaroshenko, who was with him in Spain, explains that the entire proceeds from the book—450,000 dollars—are going to AIDS research. His back trouble, the announcer says, was caused when the small plane in which he was flying to Barcelona made a forced landing following electrical failure. The landing was rough, and Yeltsin was hurt. The operation was a complete success, the announcer says, and he is now in fine shape. He has been to Leningrad to see Democratic Russia deputies, and is now "ready to continue the struggle at the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR," the announcer concludes. The video shows the English edition of Yeltsin's book.

Interviewed at Documentary Premiere

LD1405212690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2019 GMT 14 May 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] Documentaries continue to occupy a paramount position among artistic genres. Whereas political leaders of the past were being studied by movie-makers only two or three years ago, politicians who are currently active are now increasingly finding themselves at the end of cinematic and television cameras, as well as in the pages of journals and newspapers. Many people probably remember the film by director Aleksandr Sakurov, and now here is another documentary:

[V. Maksimov] The premier of the documentary film "Boris Yeltsin: Portrait Against a Background of Struggle" was held at Cinema House today. Let me say right away that it was very difficult to get in to this premiere, because the film's hero also attended the premiere. This is Boris Nikolayevich's first interview for Soviet Television since the air accident in Spain, so this was naturally the first of my three questions:

[Begin recording] [Maksimov] Boris Nikolayevich: "Television News Service," late night news, can I ask one question? First of all, how do you feel after Spain?

[Yeltsin] It has to be said that it was a most unique operation, of course, but it was clearly like this: A talented surgeon as well as a unique representative of homo sapiens, from the point of view of my health as a Urals man, and my genes. So I feel OK.

[Maksimov] What kind of mood are you in?

[Yeltsin] A good one. Ready for the fight.

[Maksimov] Have you seen the film?

[Yeltsin] No.

[Maksimov] Please.... [end recording]

It was not possible to continue the conversation. It should be added that this film was made by director Gennadiy Popov and by Studio A, with the participation of the Yunost creative association, of the Central Studio for Documentary Films. Before the film was shown the people who made it spoke:

[Begin recording of unidentified man in the film, shown on screen] I have not been properly informed about Comrade Yeltsin's merits and shortcomings, so I do not yet consider it necessary to take part in this campaign. [end recording]

After the film had been shown there was a meeting with Boris Yeltsin, a people's deputy of the USSR and Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. [Video shows Yelstin interviewed in a crowded foyer; movie-makers addressing audience; clips from movie]

Constitutional Oversight Committee Named

90UN1744A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 April 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet "On the Election of Members of the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee"]

[Text] In executing the instructions of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the USSR Supreme Soviet decrees:

To elect as members of the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee:

Abramovich, Aleksandr Mikhaylovich—department head of the Belorussian State University imeni V.I. Lenin, doctor of juridical sciences, professor.

Agzamkhodzhayev, Anvar—department head of Tashkent State University imeni V.I. Lenin, doctor of juridical sciences, professor, corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of the Uzbek SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]

Annanepesov, Murad—vice president of the Academy of Sciences of the Turkmen SSR, doctor of historical sciences.

Boskholov, Sergey Semenovich—doctoral student of the Academy of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, juridical sciences candidate, assistant professor.

Burchak, Fedor Glebovich—head of the Legal Department of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, doctor of juridical sciences.

Bykov, Anatoliy Grigoryevich—department head of Moscow State University imeni M.V. Lomonosov, doctor of juridical sciences, professor.

Ivanova, Rosaliya Ivanovna—professor of the juridical faculty of Moscow State University imeni M.V. Lomonosov, doctor of juridical sciences.

Intskirveli, Georgiy Zakharevich—department head of Tbilisi State University, doctor of juridical sciences, professor.

Karapetyan, Lyudvig Mnatsakanovich—vice-rector of Yerevan State University, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor.

Mirzoyev, Safa Abbasogl—assistant professor of Azerbaijan State University imeni S.M. Kirov, candidate of juridical sciences.

Muksinov, Irek Sharifovich—leader of national-state relations problem group of the State and Law Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, candidate of juridical sciences.

Piskotin, Mikhail Ivanovich—editor-in-chief of the journal NARODNYY DEPUTAT [People's Deputy], doctor of juridical sciences, professor.

Smokina, Andrey Ivanovich—assistant professor of Kishinev State University imeni V.I. Lenin, candidate of juridical sciences.

Sobakin, Vadim Konstantinovich—consultant of the Department of the CPSU Central Committee, doctor of juridical sciences.

Tolstoy, Georgiy Kirillovich—professor of Leningrad State University, doctor of juridical sciences.

Turgunbekov, Rafik—head of department of the Philosophy and Law Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Kirghiz SSR, doctor of juridical sciences.

Usmanov, Ochilbay—department head of Tajik State University imeni V.I. Lenin, doctor of juridical sciences, professor.

Filimonov, Vadim Donatovich—first vice-rector of the Tomsk State University imeni V. V. Kuybyshev, doctor of juridical sciences, professor.

Yagudin, Shakir Shakhmedovich—department head of the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, candidate of juridical sciences.

[Signed] A. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet
26 April 1990

Dangers of Alternatives to Perestroyka Cited

PM1105090190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
11 May 90 Morning Edition p 1

["Political Diary" article by Pavel Gutiontov: "Is There a 'Reasonable Alternative?'"]

[Text] I do not share any feeling of delight at the incantation: There is no reasonable alternative to perestroyka. The main problem is precisely that there are unreasonable alternatives, they continue to exist, and, what is more, they are taking on dangerous, perfectly visible outlines. Calls to "tighten the screws" ring out increasingly loudly, eliciting increasingly frank applause. And if it is possible to speak seriously of consolidation, at present it is perestroyka's opponents who are most rapidly groping for a united platform.

Just look, former dissident Igor Shafarevich, who rejects socialism, has signed a letter containing, among others, a demand for a Russian Communist Party to be created. This in no way surprises, for instance, this party's enthusiastic advocate Richard Kosolapov, the former chief editor of the journal KOMMUNIST and one of the architects of the memorable idea of "developed socialism." It looks as though they have set aside their disagreements "until later"—should the country return to developed socialism, to Stalin's socialism, or to an orthodox monarchy.... For the moment agreement on the main issue is quite enough for them: the need to **return!**

But their opponents on the opposite flank prefer to argue noisily among themselves about "procedural matters." The "flying troyka" [allusion to image of Russia used in Gogol's "Dead Souls"] of our young democracy still resembles old man Krylov's swan, crab, and pike [allusion to Krylov fable: They all pull in different directions]. Not to mention the Democratic Union, whose main political idea, in Leonid Batkin's caustic phrase, is a "program for getting themselves put behind bars: People run all over town looking for some means of getting put away, if only for a couple of weeks." Unfortunately, considerably more serious people are also in the grip of the infantile disorder of leftism. There is no consensus in the "Noah's ark of perestroyka," as Batkin again has dubbed the Interregional Deputies' Group. It is painful to see how long the democrats have been unable to find a common language with their natural allies, primarily among the initiators of perestroyka and reformers among the party leadership. It seems that their ever-increasing mutual resentment is in many respects a fruit of misunderstanding, which may cost the country very dearly. Some cannot waive their principles or miss any opportunity to boggle the minds of television viewers with their scathing remarks, while the others cannot see their opponents' many rational proposals for the—often staggering, it is true—scathing nature of their remarks.

Unfortunately, it is a myth that perestroyka is irreversible. Let us be frank, over the last five years its fruits have been tasted mainly by the intelligentsia, which has received the opportunity to say what it thinks and reads what it likes; it is primarily for the intelligentsia that the tightly closed doors to the great wide world have been opened. God forbid that we belittle the importance of these first freedoms, for the tree of true political, economic, and national freedom can only grow from them. But it is absurd to close your eyes to the fact that it is as easy as anything to trample these first shoots back into the asphalt and that you cannot shelter from the perfectly possible frosts behind a placard saying "No Support for Gorbachev!"

The constituent congress of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Social Democratic Party was held the other day. I was accredited to it. I heard speeches from delegates and familiarized myself with the documents adopted by the congress—and I think that the emergence of social democracy is a matter for a separate discussion. For the moment I would restrict myself to a single quotation. The political report included the thesis: "No coalition with the Bolsheviks. We cannot strengthen them by lending them our support—be they renewers, national Bolsheviks, or left-wing populists.... We will combat them now that they are strong, until they break up after the 28th congress...."

First of all, who said that a 19-million-strong party—hitherto the **only** organized political force in the country—will "break up" after its 28th congress? The **kind** of party that results from the congress and the trends that prevail at it are another matter and fundamentally important. But, needless to say, nobody will be coerced into any coalitions. And yet it would be interesting to know whether the new party's leaders thought about how many days this party would last if (god forbid, of course) the "Bolshevik renewers"—who are so resolutely being refused any support at the moment—were to suffer a defeat?

Ostap Bender [confidence trickster in 20th century satirical Soviet novels] once arrogantly said: "I'd take it bit by bit. But I need it immediately." Nothing happens immediately. It is not enough to **declare** yourselves to be an opposition. For the time being the democrats (be they social, liberal, constitutional, or Christian democrats) do not have the strength, resources, or, ultimately, the political experience to actually **become** an opposition. By shunning potential allies they stand an excellent chance of not being around long enough to build up their support.

I realize how unpopular the thesis I am defending currently is. But I am convinced that the only road ahead is the road of compromise, mutual concessions, and an accepting and sober analysis—an accounting, if you like. Now that "unreasonable alternatives" to perestroyka have already been formulated it would be suicidal to let it fall into the wrong hands.

History has left us no other opportunity to rise to an existence worthy of a great people. And none of us will be forgiven if it turns out that we missed even this last chance and kept on talking, arguing, and offending each other.

Deputy Views Draft Law on USSR Languages

90UN1582A Moscow VETERAN in Russian No 17 25-29 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by S. Angapov, deputy from All-Union Veterans' Organization, member of the Commission of the Soviet of Nationalities on National Policy and Interethnic Relations: "A Country Without a Language"]

[Text] In the next few days, the Supreme Soviet will hold a second reading of the draft law "On the Languages of the People of the USSR." The increase in national self-consciousness placed the problem, in which a narrow circle of specialists was involved until recently, at the center of critical political discussions. The yearning to preserve the language of their ancestors and to protect its beauty and merit has become a starting point for many people of a political awakening and the beginning of participation in the renewal of our society. For others, however, passionate speeches about the preservation and revival of national culture have become a Trojan horse in which they rode into popularity and public recognition. In order later, now on the horse, to conduct other discussions: concerning the imperial policy of Russia and the fact that their republic and people can become themselves only after seceding from the USSR structure.

The first discussions in the Supreme Soviet of this draft law showed how symbolic it is. In fact, many speeches were remote from the problems that were within its jurisdiction. All social practice of recent years and the entire spectrum of critical problems that inflamed some republics were present during the review of the future law.

Article 5, which defines the legal status of languages, became the epicenter of parliamentary discussions. Its current edition proclaims that Russian is the official language of the USSR. It "is used as means of official international intercourse in the conduct of national functions. In the conduct of inter-republic functions, the official language of the USSR is used as a means of official interethnic intercourse, together with the state languages of the Union and autonomous republics." Further—"in the determination of the legal status of languages, no infringement is allowed of the right of citizens of the USSR to use their native language and other languages of the people of the USSR in various spheres of state and public life."

It would seem that these provisions are democratic and take into account the sociopolitical practice of the country. But it is also these specifically that were interpreted as articles of a propaganda nature that could be evaluated "as interference of the Union SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] in the rights of sovereign republics."

And so it turns out that the question of whether there should or should not be a single official language in our state is a question of the future of our country. For the reason that if a Soviet state really exists today, and if the concept "the Soviet people" is not fiction or an empty sound, then naturally it should have a single language.

I get the impression that at times we deputies argue in different languages. Undoubtedly the official and state languages are interconnected. But fundamental differences also exist in these concepts. For example, the state languages of the union republics cannot fulfill the functions of an official language in the army, communications, transportation, and in certain other spheres, but the main thing, in my opinion, is that they cannot be the language of interethnic intercourse for the people of our country. Our enterprises, factories, and plants, wherever they might be located, are organically interconnected by a thousand threads, and they constitute a single economic organism, which also requires a single language for economic intercourse, if it can be put this way.

All of these matters are such obvious truths that it is difficult for me to understand where the starting point for discussions and talks is regarding infringement on the sovereignty of the right of independent states—the union republics.

Perhaps some have doubts that the law artificially creates privileges for the Russian language, which has fulfilled and, I hope, will continue to fulfill the functions listed above? Privileges for a language which is among the five most widespread in the world? As early as the first discussion of the draft law in the Soviet of Nationalities, I proposed: Let us hold the first national referendum. We have good sociology institutes, which will be able to develop questionnaires that, on the one hand, are simple and clear, and on the other hand take into account the opinions of all nations and nationalities. And then the people themselves will say which language must become the official and national language.

I have no doubts about the results of such a referendum, although, during the reading, deputies were found who looked for a pretext here as well to continue to drive a wedge between the Russian and other people. Severely criticizing the interrelationships that developed through the fault of the national administrative-command system, they forget entirely the specific positive role of the Russian people in the development of the economy and the culture of other peoples of our country.

I do not conceive a native Buryatiya without my Russian comrades who in the 1930's voluntarily left Moscow, Leningrad, and Sverdlovsk to help us Buryats build our own industry in the remote Transbaykal. In one of the publications in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, N.A. Nazarbayev, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, wrote: "If people do not lose their sense of objectivity, then the increase in the economy, the formation of a large industry and its mastery, the development of culture, and the erection of bright cities—all of this—would have been impossible without the fraternal help of Russia." This was with respect to talk about mother countries and colonies.

But now, regarding doubts and whether there is any need at all for a law "On the Languages of the People of the USSR." You see, many republics have already fixed the status of state languages. The practice of our joint life, they say, was served by the Russian language even without this law....

Last fall, I journeyed in a USSR Supreme Soviet delegation to Moldavia. The whole left bank side was on strike and demanded a suspension of the action of the law adopted on 27 August by the Moldavian Supreme Soviet. In addition, in the general opinion of the residents of left-bank Moldavia, the strike had a purely political character, and not an economic character. There was one demand—the Russian and Moldavian languages must equally be considered state languages.

I am firmly convinced that our voters will follow very attentively the fate of the draft law "On Languages of the People of the USSR" and the positions of their own deputies while it is being considered, because this legislative act concerns the fate of every person.

AIDS Prevention Law Effective 1 Jan 1991

PM1105140590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 May 90 Morning Edition p 2

["USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution on the Procedure for Bringing the USSR Law 'On the Prevention of AIDS' Into Effect"—IZVESTIYA headline]

[Text] In connection with the adoption of the USSR Law "On the Prevention of AIDS," the USSR Supreme Soviet resolves that:

1. The USSR Council of Ministers should be instructed to set up a government commission to combat AIDS in the USSR under the direction of a deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and give it the task of organizing and implementing measures in the fight against AIDS in the USSR.

2. The government commission will elaborate in 1990 a State Program to Combat AIDS in the USSR, envisaging, above all, questions of material and technical supply, scientific research finance, and enlightenment and moral education of the population.

3. The USSR Council of Ministers will adopt the requisite measures to develop international cooperation geared to preventing and limiting the spread of infection by the human immune deficiency (AIDS) virus.

4. Union republic Supreme Soviets, in order to ensure that the present law is effective and to protect citizens' lives and health, should be instructed to establish criminal liability for improper professional conduct by medical or pharmaceutical personnel and for the disclosure of medical secrets.

5. The preamble to and Articles 1, 4, and 5 of the USSR Supreme Soviet Decree "On Measures to Prevent Infection by the AIDS Virus" dated 25 August 1987 (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR, 1987, No. 34, p 560) should be regarded as no longer in force.

6. The USSR Council of Ministers should be instructed to determine within three months measures to provide special protection for people infected by the human immune deficiency virus or suffering from AIDS.

7. The media should increase responsibilities in the matter of the moral education of children and young people.

8. The present law shall be brought into effect on 1 January 1991.

[Signed] A. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.
The Kremlin, Moscow, 23 April 1990.

Law Published

PM1105130990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 May 90 Morning Edition p 2

["USSR Law on the Prevention of AIDS"—IZVESTIYA headline]

[Text] Article 1. USSR citizens and foreign citizens and stateless persons living or residing on the territory of the USSR are entitled to have a medical examination to establish infection by the human immune deficiency (AIDS) virus, including an anonymous one. Health care organs and institutions are obliged to ensure that the examination is safe both for the person being examined and for the medical personnel.

Article 2. Those who have been examined in accordance with the procedure laid down by this law and have been found to be infected by the human immune deficiency (AIDS) virus will be informed by health care organs or institutions by letter of the need to observe measures to prevent the spread of the disease and of criminal liability for knowingly placing another person in danger of infection or for infecting another person.

Article 3. USSR citizens and foreign citizens and stateless persons living or residing on the territory of the USSR are obliged, in line with a decision by health care organs and institutions, to undergo a medical examination if there are sufficient grounds for supposing that these people are infected by the human immune deficiency virus.

If infection is established the aforementioned people will be subject to preventive observation.

The rules of examination and preventive observation are laid down by the USSR Ministry of Health in accordance with the provisions of the present law, and they must be published and must be available for perusal.

Article 4. People whom health care organs or institutions have decided to subject to medical examination or preventive observation are obliged to appear at a health care organ or institution if summoned by letter.

USSR citizens, and stateless persons permanently resident on the territory of the USSR who have no valid reason for failing to turn up for examination or preventive observation will be taken, with the prosecutor's approval, to health institutions by the staff of these institutions with assistance, if necessary, from militia organs in the places where the aforementioned citizens live or reside.

If the person under examination disagrees with a decision by a health care organ or institution he can appeal to a superior health care organ or to the court.

Article 5. If foreign citizens or stateless persons refuse medical examination or preventive observation they can be expelled from the USSR in accordance with Subparagraph 2, Paragraph 1 of Article 31 of the USSR Law "On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the USSR" dated 24 June 1981

Diplomatic staff of foreign diplomatic missions and consular institutions and other persons enjoying diplomatic privileges and immunity on the territory of the USSR can be examined for infection by the human immune deficiency (AIDS) virus only with their consent. The USSR Ministry of Health will first coordinate with the USSR Foreign Ministry any proposal that such persons should undergo examination.

Article 6. It is a criminal act for a person to knowingly place another person in danger of infection or to infect another person with the human immune deficiency virus.

Article 7. Medical staff and other persons who, in the course of their work, acquire information about medical examinations for infection by the human immune deficiency (AIDS) virus and their results are obliged to keep this information secret.

Article 8. USSR citizens and stateless persons permanently resident in the USSR have a right to medical and social assistance in the event of infection by the human immune deficiency (AIDS) virus. They will be given free travel to and from the place of treatment and also free medicines for treatment in outpatient conditions. Parents or persons in loco parentis are entitled to stay with children (up to the age of 14) in hospitals, to be released from work for the duration of the stay, and to be paid a temporary disability allowance at their place of work.

Other benefits can be established by USSR and union republican legislation for people who are infected by the human immune deficiency virus or who have AIDS.

Dismissal from work, refusal of employment, refusal of admission to medical or educational establishments, refusal to admit children to preschool institutions, and any infringement of other rights or restriction of the legitimate interests of such people solely on the grounds that they carry the virus or have AIDS are not allowed, just as the infringement of the housing and other rights and legitimate interests of the infected person's friends and relatives are not allowed.

Article 9. USSR citizens who have been infected as a result of carrying out medical procedures are given pensions in accordance with the procedure laid down by USSR and union republican legislation.

Article 10. Infection of medical or pharmaceutical personnel when carrying out their work is regarded as an occupational disease.

[Signed] M. Gorbachev, president of the USSR.
The Kremlin, Moscow, 23 April 1990.

AUCCTU Plenum Reopens in Moscow

LD1405081990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] The eighth plenum of the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions [AUCCTU] has resumed in Moscow after a break. The main items on the plenum's agenda are a draft declaration on the formation of a confederation of Soviet Trade Unions, the formation of a new central trade union organization, and a decision on procedures for electing delegates to the forthcoming 19th Congress of USSR Trade Unions.

Backs Draft for Trade Union Body

LD1405214190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1629 GMT 14 May 90

[By TASS correspondent Igor Agabekov]

[Text] Moscow, 14 May (TASS)—The expansion of independence of regional and industry-based trade unions in the course of perestroyka in the USSR and the emergence of independent trade unions in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic and other republics has raised the question of the need to create a new all-Union trade union center. The eighth plenum of the

All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions [AUCCTU] which ended here today was devoted to discussion of this matter.

Participants in the plenum endorsed a draft declaration on the formation of an all-union trade union center and a draft for the organizational principles of its activities, which will be submitted to the 19th congress of the country's trade unions planned for October of this year. Whether the new trade union center is to be a confederation or a federation of trade unions is to be decided at the congress. (Both titles are so far left in the draft).

The documents note that the confederation (federation) of Soviet trade unions is a voluntary alliance of the federations and other associations of the trade unions of the republics, which unite with the aims of coordinating and amplifying their actions to protect the rights and common interests of working people, of mutual support in achieving their common aims at an all-union level, and of consolidating the country's trade union movement.

Participants in the plenum spoke in favor of drafting and adopting a law on trade union rights without delay.

Speaking at the plenum, AUCCTU Chairman Gennadiy Yanayev stressed that in conditions of sociopolitical tension and economic instability in the country, the biggest mass public organization should resolutely conduct its policy of protection for working people, and where necessary should act as a constructive opposition both to union and to republican governments.

Consequences of Loss of Empire Cited

904A0347A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 26 Apr 90 p 2

[Interview with Russian economist and essayist V.I. Selyunin, member of the editorial board of NOVYY MIR, by Lithuanian economist Kiastutis Jaskeliavicius, date and place not given: "If Imperial Ambitions Are Abandoned;" first paragraph is newspaper's introduction]

[Text] Vasiliy Selyunin is a well-known Russian economist and essayist and a member of the editorial board of the magazine NOVYY MIR. He was virtually the first one to reveal the truth about the paradoxes and the mess of the existing economic system on the pages of the press. Kiastutis Jaskeliavicius, an economist from Vilnius, is also known to Lithuanian readers as the author of many interesting articles. Today we publish a conversation between the two colleagues.

[Jaskeliavicius] Vasiliy Illarionovich, one-sided and even distorted information on the events in Lithuania which the Union newspapers and central television have been serving up has terrified unsophisticated readers. What has Lithuania thought up—splitting the Union? What is your assessment of the restoration of Lithuania's statehood?

[Selyunin] A small public organization which was created by the late Andrey Sakharov in his time and which is a certain breeding ground of ideas, the "Moscow Forum," exists in Moscow. Despite only 16 members belonging to this organization, 20 persons from it have become deputies—17 deputies of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet and three of the Moscow Soviet. So, we asked four deputies to go to Vilnius and familiarize themselves first-hand with the events unfolding there. Upon their return, Viktor Sheynis discussed his impressions at a meeting of the "Moscow Forum." This was, as they say, information from the horse's mouth. The fact of restoring your independence is your opportunity, which was taken advantage of on time. This is what my impression is.

I believe that the situation was favorable. What do we, the Russians, need in this situation? Taking into account our long-term interests, Lithuania and other republics that will want to become free and secede should have such an opportunity. This should happen. As a result of the breakup of the empire, a community which is absolutely new for us should emerge. Something similar already exists in Europe; I mean the Common Market which has consolidated Western Europe much closer and better than our Union in 70 years. Our borders are secure, laws are in effect, new laws are written, but internal ties are lacking, and this is our problem.

[Jaskeliavicius] Don't you think that these ties between the republics, especially economic ties, will survive naturally?

[Selyunin] No, these ties will not survive naturally. At present, everything is being done to turn us into hostile states. This is done by the central authorities. This is why Gorbachev's position is unclear at present. I do not see that affairs are being deliberately pushed toward martial law, confrontation, toward forcibly scattering your parliament. This would signify the end of perestroyka in both the country and the world. I do not think that this is in Gorbachev's interests. It turns out that Gorbachev must send to Lithuania his "signals:" Don't worry, we have not abandoned you, we are doing everything possible. This is one of Gorbachev's positions. The other position is that, after all, he is a realist. Judging by his speeches, I feel that the trip to Lithuania impressed him tremendously. He understood that there is no turning back over there. I do not think that he is prepared to use repressive measures. His position is to let time work on it. I am going to issue threatening edicts but, of course, they are not going to obey. Meanwhile, the people will get used to the idea that nothing can be changed by then.

[Jaskeliavicius] However, we do not just have manifestations here; paratroopers are marching. What is your assessment of this?

[Selyunin] This is my assessment. This means that Gorbachev's position—to let time work on it—is not that strong. Won't he outwit himself? This is what I am afraid of all the time. Apparently, everything is sound and reasonable, but he may fail to control the situation, and the military may present him with some accomplished facts. A mutual mystification of sorts is getting under way. Gorbachev is writing that we will not permit it, knowing firmly that we will, and others are taking this as encouragement for a creeping occupation. As it were, everything is hanging by a thread. This is why our president is playing with fire, and the danger of him outwitting himself is very great.

[Jaskeliavicius] What if we look further into the future? How do you imagine mutual relations between Lithuania and the Union, possibly, Lithuania and Russia, in the long run? After all, we should be thinking about a model for such mutual relations right now.

[Selyunin] Indeed, we should be thinking about this now, right away. The Baltic area is a marvelous testing ground for fine-tuning new market ideas. As they say, every cloud has a silver lining. In essence, what would change? A border would appear, but this would not be the kind of border where they would search you for any reason at all. Liberalized travel procedures would be established. Travel would be liberalized to the degree it is in Western Europe. We should not put in any cordons in the meaning of customs frontiers. As far as consumer goods are concerned, they would be protected by your currency. There would be some kind of currency exchange, the rate of which would emerge in some manner. A market would determine real ratios. People would go on traveling freely as they have before. Economic ties and settlements among enterprises are the most important point. If I were your government I would not insist on economic ties with the Ukraine, Russia, and other republics being established at the government level. The Union is no more, the empire has come to an end, and nothing will save it now. It is necessary for Lithuanian enterprises themselves to enter the external market, including that of Russia, and to sign contracts themselves. When the market is in operation it is not all that complicated. They buy where it is cheaper and sell where it is more expensive. For example, oil and gasoline may be purchased at lower prices in Russia, so let us buy it there. What has the government of the republic got to do with it? Its only function is to collect taxes. Meanwhile, settlements are accomplished bypassing the government, as is the case throughout the world.

[Jaskeliavicius] Vasiliy Illarionovich, what is to be done about debts? Who owes whom and how much? There is a lot of discussion concerning this at present.

[Selyunin] We have talked about this a lot with Estonian Academy member Mikhail Bronshteyn. A zero option should be adopted. Nobody owes anybody anything. Otherwise we will not sort it out. Given our distorted prices, it is just impossible to calculate how much things cost. We will get utterly confused in the course of this.

[Jaskeliavicius] Yet another question arises: Who is to be the recipient of the debts?

[Selyunin] Correct, this is yet another riddle. Who should the debts be paid to? To the Union? To the central government? Or to each republic separately? Secondly, there are human lives as well. After all, the number of victims and human lives destroyed may be determined. However, who will put a price on the life of a person? So, we take a pencil, but who will do the calculations? Who do we give the pencil to? To Maslyukov? To Gorbachev? Who will pencil in the price of a human life? I believe that it is criminal to even discuss it.

Thirdly, how are we to take into account what Lithuanians and other peoples have built in other republics? How is the labor contributed by Lithuanians to be evaluated? No, there is only one way out—the zero option. Under the zero option, it turns out that everything built on the territory of a Union republic belongs to it. Economic ties could be established then, and a market, the great unifier of the peoples, would go to work. Complex issues remain in conjunction with military facilities. If we create a professional army, military bases could be cut back. A small professional army is exactly what the goal of the Democratic Platform is. However, even if the military bases were to remain it would be without any interference. Ports are a complicated issue, not the military ones, of course. Besides, maintaining military vessels there just does not make sense. At issue are merchant vessels and the ports of Klaipeda, Ventspils, and Tallinn. If we establish contacts with the world both of us will need them. However, I believe that their status can be agreed upon.

[Jaskeliavicius] Vasiliy Illarionovich, I believe that it would be interesting for the Lithuanian readers to know: What is your prediction for the economic development of Lithuania? After all, political passions will calm down sooner or later.

[Selyunin] I would like to note several aspects of the matter. First of all, regarding intimidation to the effect that Lithuania will not cope alone. While visiting a fuel-equipment plant, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev argued for the advantages of a unified national-economic complex. The plants of Dnepropetrovsk or Saratov will not deliver something to you. I think otherwise. The economic situation of Lithuania should not worsen after its secession from the Soviet Union unless, of course, the situation is destabilized deliberately. Secondly, taking into account the uneven development levels of individual Union republics, it is altogether impossible to imagine proceeding toward the market with closed ranks, in a single file. After all, such differences do exist. If the Baltic area needs gasoline or metal it will sell meat to Russia, and no all-Union stocks will be required for this purpose. On the other hand, a system in which everything depends on you rather than on someone else will start working very quickly. After all, everything depends on work. The quality of products will also improve. The market is cruel. If you want to trade with the West you will produce goods at a European quality level.

[Jaskeliavicius] What is your assessment of the economic sanctions recently applied by the central authorities, and your forecast of the situation in conjunction with the blockade measures?

[Selyunin] Their impact undermines our future. It looks like we are deliberately urging the Lithuanian Republic and giving it a cue for contacts with the West. I do not know what arrangements you will make, but there is a surplus of, for example, metal in the Western market. Luxembourg or, say, Belgium produce metal and do not know what to do with it. They may also supply metal on credit. However, whatever for does Russia need this? Ultimately, the blockade will turn against Russia itself.

One more consideration. Having gotten mixed up in the blockade the Union will slow down the pace of its economic reforms. Their progress is too slow to begin with.

[Jaskeliavicius] The USSR law on procedures for the secession of Union republics from the Union has been adopted. What is your assessment of the law?

[Selyunin] This is what the general rule should be in this instance. The more concessions are given to the republics seceding from the Union, the more significant the propensity to unite and the stronger the centripetal forces will be.

[Jaskeliavicius] Is this to say that you are in favor of encouraging secession from the Union?

[Selyunin] I would be glad if the Union did not break up. However, reality is such that the empire has perished, and nothing will save it now. We should be thinking about post-imperial development. We definitely have to go through this breakup period. It is one thing if we adopt laws which indeed provide for the freedom of secession. Here it is, conditions are set forth, feel free to leave. In this case, the republics think about preserving the existing economic, cultural, family, and other ties as they leave. These issues are discussed, and everything proceeds normally. However, if we set fierce conditions and adopt a law which could be more fittingly called a nonsecession law we thus urge action without authorization rather than on the basis of the law. After all, if a nonsecession law is adopted, life will pass it by. It would be much better if life were to proceed in keeping with a secession law. Everything is made very difficult in the law adopted. For example, I do not understand why two-thirds of the votes need to be secured. This suits Lithuania. However, you would act egoistically if you accept a referendum on such terms. You will leave anyway but the Estonians will not. A simple majority of votes is accepted in world practice. If 50 percent plus one person want to secede this means they there should be a secession. Later, a regular dialogue is carried on. What is to be done about a minority, how are its rights to be safeguarded? This is also a very important issue.

Besides, the procedure itself is made very complex, and the concept of the consent of other republics is veiled. Take, say, a transition period. It should be ensured as much as possible. There are a lot of unnecessary things piled up in the law. After all, the longer a preferential regimen lasts, the stronger the ties between the former Union and a separated republic become.

[Jaskeliavicius] Here is my final question. You are very popular in Lithuania. This conversation is going to be published in a Russian-language newspaper. What would you like to say to your compatriots?

[Selyunin] This is what I would say. We, the Russians, are people who are very easy to get along with. Perhaps we have many shortcomings. However, one should get along with the people among whom one lives. Don't think that you are going to be second-class citizens over there. It is us in Russia who are second-class citizens, which is clearly seen when foreigners from the West or from some "underdeveloped" country come to us. There are hotels and seats in the restaurants, there is everything for them, and everything for us is at the railway terminal. Everything for us is second priority. The Russians are not going to be second-class citizens in Lithuania. Those who work hard, know how to save, and take care of their families and of themselves are not going to live less well. My dear compatriots, do not assume that if, having given in to this foolish propaganda at the rallies, you follow the loudmouths a garden of Eden awaits you elsewhere. Nobody is expelling you from Lithuania, and nobody will. I dislike USSR Supreme Soviet Deputy Kogan from Estonia. However, speaking at a session on one occasion he said something reasonable. This is approximately how it went: "People from Transcaucasia came here, and you were not able to receive them. I would like to see what is going to happen here when people from the Baltic area arrive." Dear people, do not give in to a provocation. Really, over there it is not going to be better for you.

Moscow Police Chief on Crime, Drugs, KGB

AU1305162390 Vienna NEUE KRONEN-ZEITUNG in German 13 May 90 pp 28-29

[Report on interview with Moscow Police President Petr Stepanovich Bogdanov by Michael Jeannee in Vienna on 9 May: "Perestroyka Is Not Good for Me"]

[Text] The chief editor had waved the suggestion away. "Regardless of Gorby and glasnost, even you will not manage to interview the Moscow police chief!" This was on Tuesday [8 May]. On Wednesday at 1100 in the morning, Petr Stepanovich Bogdanov (62), police president of the Soviet capital and USSR deputy interior minister, received me. Informally, casually, and—fully informed.

"We know you, Mr. Jeannee," the interpreter of the police chief translates with an expressionless face, while the black Tatar's eyes of the deputy minister glittered with amusement. "We know you very well. We have asked questions about you. But do not ask whom and what came out of it. Because this is a police secret...."

With this we have already come to the point, Mr. President. For decades the Soviet Union had pretended that there was no crime. Practically no information about crimes in Moscow, a city with nine million inhabitants, reached the West. Drugs, youth gangs, organized crime—a big secret. What is the situation really like?

I admit: I did not have much hope for real information, regardless of Gorby and glasnost. But already the first sentences of the Soviet official make me prick up my ears in surprise.

"First of all, I would like to say: You are absolutely right! Until Gorbachev, crime in my country was considered a... state secret. This led to an official ostrich policy. Gangs, drugs, and mafia are incompatible with the principles of socialism. Thus, these criminal excesses were denied, against better knowledge. Now we are getting the bill for this. Because, no matter whether this sounds absurd, the underworld was well prepared for perestroyka, while we—I mean the police—are still having difficulties. In other words: The new democratization and liberalization in the Soviet Union benefits the criminals. The existing criminal structures and the logistics of the underworld are working in full swing. Since the onset of perestroyka, crime has increased rapidly. From his point of view, perestroyka is not good for me as head of the police. I mean for my work. For a better understanding, I will give you an example: Three years ago, hundreds of thousands were released from the prisons in the course of an amnesty. Tens of thousands of these people immediately went underground again. The result: An increase in the crime rate by 40 percent...."

Am I mistaken or did the police chief's interpreter really pale? Tovarich Petr Stepanovich, however, cannot be held back. "And then we have another problem. In view of the skyrocketing crime, our laws are completely outdated and inefficient. The same goes for the method to combat crime. The result: The criminals, in particular the organized ones, are always some steps ahead of us. An example: While we, the Soviet police, first of all have to learn and understand what 'laundering money' means, the big bosses are industriously 'laundering.' And their criminal empires are growing and flourishing. Of course, we are in the process of creating new laws and strategies. But... this requires time."

As one... eh... knows, your country has an extremely efficient police unit, the KGB. Why do the "normal" police and the KGB not cooperate in view of the situation you have just described?

Now I am not mistaken anymore—the interpreter has turned deathly pale.

"But we do. In particular since I myself worked for the organization you mentioned a few years ago. Thanks to this cooperation, we keep the situation somewhat under control, even though it is very dramatic."

Which crimes are the greatest problem for you? And could you give a few figures?

"Of 54,474 registered crimes in Moscow (1989) far more than half were thefts and break-ins. Robberies of banks, post offices, and postmen delivering money orders are not quite as frequent as in New York or Chicago, but they are all the more brutal. Several dead at a single robbery are not rare. The drug problem is—still—our slightest concern. Two thousand drug addicts and the seizing of only 62.5 grams of hashish, 97 kg of poppy straw [Mohnstroh], and 1.2 kg of raw opium show this. But, as I said, our main attention goes to the mafia-like blackmail gangs. Real 'rackets,' structured and organized in line with the American examples. In order to efficiently combat these people, President Gorbachev recently increased our budget by several times its original amount."

Petr Stepanovich Bogdanov in Vienna: Perestroyka live and tangible. Who would have imagined this....

Five Kg of Heroin Seized at Moscow Airport

PM1405152390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 May 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Drugs Discovered"]

[Text] On 11 May at Sheremetyevo-2 Airport customs officials seized more than five kg of heroin illegally in transit via Moscow to a country in Eastern Europe. The drugs were discovered in a traveling bag with a false bottom.

Materials relating to the case of smuggling have been handed over to investigation agencies.

Shortage of Medicine Examined

90US0882A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 18, 5-11 May 90 pp 2-3

[Interviews with USSR medical industry officials by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondents I. Konchakova and V. Romanenko; dates and places not specified: "Medicine By The Teaspoonful"]

[Text] **From year to year the editors witness a perennial increase in the letters about the worst of shortages—the shortage of drugs. Some of the letters are full of pain and despair, others speak of fully justified indignation and anger. All of them are asking one and the same question: "When will it end?"**

ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondents talked to representatives of various organizations responsible for the production, supply, and import of drugs.

M. Grigoryev, head of the department of cooperative trade and interbranch relations of the USSR Ministry of the Medical Industry:

[Grigoryev] Seventy plants of our ministry produce 95 percent of all drugs. The remaining five percent are manufactured at factories of other ministries.

Our pharmaceutical production is a miniature reflection of the entire people's economy. Every year we produce 45,000 tons of various chemicals needed to make drugs; we produce 40 kinds of antibiotics, 6,000 tons of vitamins (the requirement is 30,000 tons), 3,000 types of packaged drugs, and 6 billion ampoules.

[Argumenty I FAKTY] However, our domestic production can satisfy our drug needs only by 40 to 45 percent.

[Grigoryev] There are plenty of reasons for the tragic situation in our pharmaceutical industry. In the past 12 years we did not develop domestic production but increased imports of drugs from the socialist countries from R300 million to R1.2 billion a year. Thus we delivered a profit of over R3 billion to our partners, which they invested in the development of their own pharmaceutical industry. We invested R1 billion in our own industry. Our manufacturing facilities need about 50 percent more adequate equipment.

Starting in 1977 all government decisions on the development of the medical industry remained on paper. There were plans to build, expand, or reconstruct 39 plants but only 18 of them had work done on them in 1988-90. Another reason is that the local soviets either refused to accommodate or stopped the construction of 23 pharmaceutical plants. For that they used ecological reasons which were not well-justified in every case.

We do not have any scientific norms of drug consumption per person. Our norms are set according to the amount of money allocated for drugs by the USSR Ministry of Health.

Our country has practically no money for the research without which no further development is possible. The United States spends $60 billion on drugs; while only five percent of this sum is spent directly on the drug production, the rest of the money goes for research, marketing, and so forth.

In 1990 R27 billion was allocated for our health care, including drugs. The spending on research should be increased tenfold at least. We also need major hard currency allocations to re-equip the pharmaceutical industry and to establish genetic engineering facilities, of which we now have none. Unfortunately, the other day the USSR Ministry of Finance categorically denied an increase in research financing to the Ministry of the Medical Industry, as well as any temporary hard currency privileges.

Another reason for our unbelievable backwardness in this respect is, I think, the fact that the people who should have resolved the drug crisis due to their positions simply did not know about it. These people received their treatment at the fourth main administration of the USSR Ministry of Health, where they were given imported drugs.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Is it possible to increase the drug production?

[Grigoryev] The Ministry of the Medical Industry ensured that starting in 1991 the USSR State Planning Committee would finally maintain the balance of drug needs and their supply sources in terms of value.

The regulatory commission on drugs should complete its work in the first quarter of 1990. Then we will know which drugs we do not need to produce any more and in their place we will increase production of more efficient drugs.

We were allocated some hard currency for the purchase of raw materials and equipment. In the nearest future the government will make a decision on the construction of four pharmaceutical plants with an R1 billion production capacity each. The first plant is supposed to start operation in January 1994.

We also hope that the conversion that started in defense industry enterprises will accelerate.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] The countries of Eastern Europe are our main foreign drug suppliers. The political situation there is changing at an incredible speed. Can that affect drug imports?

S. Nosov, first assistant general manager of the all-Union association "Medeksport":

[Nosov] I do not think so. These countries receive 70 percent of the total amount of hard currency that we spend on importing drugs. Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria remain our largest suppliers. Imports will increase by 20 percent compared to 1989. We also expect larger imports from India, FRG, and Finland.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] How can you then explain the absence in our pharmacies of the Polish, Bulgarian, Czechoslovakian, and East German drugs that are in such high demand?

[Nosov] Unfortunately the terms of the contracts are not strictly observed and the drugs come to the territory of the USSR with great delays. There are some problems with domestic drug shipments also. In December of 1989 Aeroflot, for instance, refused to carry our shipments from Moscow, which has more than 50 percent of all storage facilities there, to their destination points. They told us they have too many shipments. However, they are prepared to do it if we pay them in hard currency, but the Medeksport cannot afford it. Delays in the railroad shipments became almost a norm.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Our domestic pharmaceutical industry produces 3000 drugs. We cannot satisfy our needs for 1100-1400 of these. Who determines the needs for drugs, and in what way?

A. Apazov, general manager of the "Soyuzfarmatsiya" association:

[Apazov] This is done according to the requests of medical institutions and pharmacies. Unfortunately, we can satisfy them only by 70-80 percent so far. However, in 1989, after a long period of time, the percentage increased to 85. This happened because at the end of the year the government allocated an additional 500 million in hard currency for drug purchases. (Moscow was given 36 million.) As for the requirements for certain types and kinds of drugs, we satisfy these by 20-100 percent.

The USSR Ministry of Health approved the methodology for calculating the distribution coefficient. It is based on the sick-rate indicators reported by health care institutions, on the figures of drug sales for the previous year, and on the numbers of the population.

These coefficients are discussed at a meeting of the corresponding commission, they are approved by major specialists—cardiologists, oncologists, psychiatrists, etc. Then they are approved by the head of the pharmaceutical administration.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Many agencies have their own pharmacies. On what principle are they supplied with drugs?

[Apazov] They are given drugs according to the distribution coefficient defined for each organization. In 1990, for instance, it is one percent for the third administration of the USSR Ministry of Health, 2.2 percent for the pharmaceutical administration of the USSR Ministry of Health, 0.08 percent for the KGB, 0.06 percent for the Ministry of Internal Affairs, etc.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Who sets the drug prices and how is it done?

[Apazov] The Ministry of the Medical Industry sets wholesale prices and the Soyuzfarmatsiya sets the retail prices. On the average retail prices are 30 percent higher than wholesale. The price formation system is imperfect, of course.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Does it happen that filling a combined drugs order changes due to unforeseen circumstances?

[Apazov] Of course it does. For instance, we planned an increase in purchases of imported drugs for the treatment of cardiovascular diseases and tuberculosis as well as antibiotics, corticosteroids, etc. for 1990 because the USSR State Planning Committee allocated 10 percent more hard currency to us than in 1989. However, we had to buy analgesics instead because of stoppages at the chemical plants producing raw materials that we use to make analgesics at the plants of the Ministry of the Medical Industry. All in all in 1990 we will purchase and import 750 various drugs.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] What, in your opinion, are the shortcomings of the current drug supplies system?

[Apazov] First of all, we need to improve our price formation. We need a state system of medical insurance that will help to regulate drug allocations. Huge pharmaceutical plants are unprofitable, the factories should be small and flexible. However, another the problem arises then: Who will be responsible for the supplies—manufacturing or trade organizations? We think it should be the manufacturers. But in general the pharmaceutical industry should have a master.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] How is Moscow supplied with drugs?

T. Borisenko, deputy head of the supplies and sales department of the Moscow city association "Farmatsiya":

[Borisenko] Muscovites make up 3.2 percent of the total population of the country. The distribution coefficient for drugs and medical equipment in our city is six percent. The supplies order for the given year is compiled a year and a half ahead of time according to the orders of the USSR Ministry of Health. And that is no good, because when we are planning our purchase orders we have no idea of how much money we will be given in that year. The trade turnover in Moscow facilities makes up 30 percent of the total turnover of the association.

Many health care facilities in Moscow treat people from other cities, and as they leave the facility they buy drugs in Moscow. All the visitors and people travelling through our city also buy drugs in Moscow pharmacies. For instance, 70 percent of all drugs sold in the area of the three railroad stations are bought by people from other cities. About 40 percent of all drugs sold in Moscow are taken out of the city.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Our readers complain that they cannot buy drugs with prescriptions from other cities.

[Borisenko] It must be somebody's local decision. There is a USSR Ministry of Health order that any prescription is valid in any part of the USSR. The only exceptions are prescriptions for narcotics or their equivalents and also discounted prescriptions. Any pharmacy of a Union republic will issue free or discount drugs to the disabled and war veterans.

Industrial Reorganization Conference Opens

LD1405081790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] An all-Union scientific, practical conference on the theory, practice, and prospects for the development of new forms of associations, enterprises, concerns, and consortiums opens in Leningrad today. It is organized by the State Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers on Economic Reform, in conjunction with the Academy of Sciences and a number of institutes. The conference will be attended by the heads of state associations spanning a number of different industries and by well-known economists and officials working in different industries.

Baltic Fleet Employee Stole Guns for Crime Gang

PM1105140390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 11 May 90 First Edition p 6

[A. Vlasov report under "Incidents" rubric:. "Submachine Guns for Private Use"]

[Excerpts] Astrakhan— They operated mercilessly, not stopping at anything. There were seven in their gang. The instigator was I. Grabovetskiy, former employee of a Baltic Fleet ship armory. Instead of ensuring the safekeeping of weapons, as laid down by his service duty, he cobbled together a gang of criminals who perpetrated the theft of six submachine guns with 24 full magazines and a pistol from a military unit.

A meticulous search led military prosecutor's office investigators headed by Lieutenant Colonel of Justice N. Goncharenko to Astrakhan Oblast. This was where Grabovetskiy had gone to ground, according to preliminary information. [passage omitted]

During a long interrogation which had been planned in great detail the criminal gave way slowly, but nonetheless retreated step by step under the pressure of irrefutable facts. After the exposure of his involvement in the theft of the weapons he confessed to the murder of a cabdriver. In the end not one of his accomplices escaped retribution.

Former Politburo Member Kirilenko Dies 12 May

LD1405171790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1643 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 14, (TASS)—Andrey Kirilenko, holder of an all-Union personal pension, died on 12 May 1990, at the age of 83, following a grave illness.

From the beginning of the Great Patriotic War he was a member of the Army Military Council, and then the representative of the State Defense Committee at an aircraft works. During the years 1962-1966 he was first deputy chairman of the RSFSR bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, and in 1966-1982 he was secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Between 1957 and 1961 he was a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Presidium, and from 1962 a member of the CPSU Central Committee Presidium. Between 1966 and 1982 he was a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo.

Correction to Gorbachev Congratulates Award Winners

LD1405160890

The following correction pertains to the item entitled "Gorbachev Congratulates State Award Winners" published on page 51 of the 30 April Soviet Union DAILY REPORT:

Page 51, column two, paragraph two, only sentence make read: A decoration of the military rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union was awarded to Dmitriy Timofeyevich Yazov, that of Army General to Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareyev, and that of Admiral of the Fleet to Konstantin Valentinovich Makarov. (correcting rank awarded to Gareyev to "army general").

Economic

Ryzhkov Visits Plants; Discusses Economy

904A0338A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK in Russian No 18, Apr 90 p 3

[V. Drozdov report: "Boldness and Balance"]

[Text] The "Saturn" Plant manufactures various goods for the large army of anglers, and the Petr Alekseyev Factory, woolen and wool-blend cloth. Whereas the main customers of the first enterprise are men, those of the second are women. However, despite the dissimilarity of the product and its different targets, the customers' complaints against the collectives of the enterprises are identical: There should be far more of these commodities in terms of both quantity and selection. For example, "Saturn" plant director Ye. Stepenin observed that trade representatives annually put in applications 10 times in excess of the plant's capabilities. The factory is also far from satisfying its customers' requirements.

Each enterprise has devised its own strategy for consumer demand. The leaders of the "Saturn" Plant are close to completing negotiations with companies of the United States and Finland on the establishment of the joint production of a number of commodities, while the revival on a modern basis of Moscow's oldest fine-cloth factory is linked by its director, N. Yatsenko, with an acceleration of the modernization of the old shops and the acquisition of new equipment.

These accounts of the enterprise leaders were of short duration. The main discussion took place not in offices but in the production shops. And it was a question here not of the organizational and production problems acutely confronting the enterprise collectives but of social problems. And this was natural inasmuch as it is mainly women who work at the two enterprises. The workers spoke about an improvement in work conditions and housing, service and medical assistance problems. But, still, the main question was the same: What will happen with prices?

It was with this that the conversation between N.I. Ryzhkov and team leader L. Yanysheva in the shop manufacturing spinning and bamboo rods began, and this question was heard in various versions in all the shops of the enterprise and in the "Varshava" movie theater auditorium. And this is understandable. People's anxieties and worries about how we will be living tomorrow can by no means be put down as purely "women's" concerns. It is now troubling everyone in the country.

Answering numerous questions, the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers observed that the country is literally saturated with every conceivable rumor concerning the impending consequences of the actions in the sphere of price policy. A variety of talk is making the rounds to the effect that the government has abandoned its program supported by the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies and that it intends resorting to market "shock therapy" on the basis of a blind copying of the Polish experience.

But it is not merely a question of rumors. The AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions] recently addressed a statement to the government maintaining that transition to the market would lead to an uncontrolled price explosion, increased inflationary processes, mass unemployment and, in consequence, a decline in the living standard of the absolute majority of the population.

So what is, in fact, the government's position? N.I. Ryzhkov emphasized: "In the transition to controlled market relations our position is firm: The government must pursue a bold, but very balanced policy. We have always adhered and will continue to adhere to this line. All proposals connected with a pricing reform will be made public and submitted for the people's judgment and will be discussed in the USSR Supreme Soviet."

Speaking of the active work which is being performed currently in connection with the reform of pricing, the head of the government said that the main concern is not allowing a surge of inflation. The government does not support the radical-left proposals concerning the introduction of total price freedom. It is anticipated that state regulation in the pricing sphere will extend to certain types of industrial-engineering products and basic foodstuffs. Simultaneously with the envisaged price increases, a system of compensation and income indexation will be introduced to guarantee the population, primarily its needy strata, social protection against the revision of prices and to maintain pensions, grants, benefits, and wages at the necessary level.

Speaking in the "Varshava" movie theater, the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers made a brief analysis of the present state of the economy and described the arterial paths of its further development:

"What is the situation today? It is an economy with an excessively heavy structure of production, obsolete capital, archaic production relations, a dilapidated administrative-command system of management, an as yet imperfect economic mechanism, and a clearly expressed cost-no-object management. The present economy is characterized by a lack of motivation in the workers for highly productive labor and a distribution system which has globally extended not only to the sphere of material production, but the consumption sphere also.

"How do we view the new aspect of the economy? It must be socially oriented toward man and flexible and responsive to his requirements and the requirements of S&T progress. It must contain all the necessary components of man's strong motivation to efficient labor and, what is most important, man's social protection.

"The route toward such an economy runs via a state-controlled market toward which we began to move consistently and persistently as of 1987. We need to organize matters so this transition will be as smooth as possible and in order that we prevent shock upheavals in the national economy, in social life particularly.

"This transition will have to be accomplished in several stages. We need first of all to accomplish all that has been scheduled by the state plan for the current year. How we arrive at the market will depend on this: under conditions of recession or under conditions of stabilization. It will subsequently be necessary to do everything possible to ensure the optimum legal support for the transition to the market.

"Price reform is to be carried out, financial and credit policy changed, tax reform implemented, producer goods and consumer and financial markets organized, and the appropriate transformations in foreign economic activity effected in the 1991-1992 transition period. And, what is most important, we must in this period engage the entire mechanism of legal and economic protection of the population on the basis of the necessary social safeguards."

Abalkin, Shatalin on Market Economy Transition

LD1305223790 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 1900 GMT 13 May 90

[Text] Professor Leonid Abalkin, the economist who is also a deputy prime minister, has said that one of his prime concerns is the country's transition to the principles of a market economy. I hope to see the program for this published soon, said Professor Abalkin. We are absolutely clear about the type of economic model we are going to use, the manner in which it should function and what shock absorbers we shall use. But we lack a workable plan for the transition, said Leonid Abalkin.

Professor Abalkin did not think that unemployment was unconquerable. Redundancies in the production sphere were inevitable, he told a TASS correspondent, especially at unprofitable enterprises, and about 1 million workers were told that they were redundant. Abalkin said that to deal with this problem the country needs a new retraining program.

As for the governmental plan for the transition to a market economy, Leonid Abalkin's colleague Professor Stanislav Shatalin, who is on the Presidential Council, told a Radio Moscow reporter the following:

[Begin Shatalin recording in Russian, fading into superimposed English translation] It has to be better socially substantiated with all the consequences assessed better than they have been so far. What the nation faces is a rise in the prices of quite a few goods. We've discussed what forms and amounts compensations to the lower income groups should be. I think that the well off can do without such compensation. It is they who will lose out for a year or two or three, but the nation must be prepared for the adoption of a market strategy. We'll have to be honest, wise and we'll have to reason with the nation. Differing opinions will be voiced by our media and what we have to be very careful about is distinguishing between the principles of a market economy and those governing mandatory state regulation of economic activities. If we cope with our job, we'll have such a program by September. [end recording]

Abalkin Cited on Economic Reforms, Perestroyka

LD1105173090 London MORNING STAR in English 11 May 90 pp 4-5

[Unattributed interview with Leonid Abalkin, chairman of the Commission for Economic Reform; date, place not given: "Pushing Ahead With Perestroyka"]

[Text] [Question] How do you appraise the current economic situation in the USSR and its impact on the course of reform?

[Abalkin] It is a fact that the Soviet Union's economic situation has been deteriorating over nearly the last two years.

This especially applies to the consumer market, the budget deficit, and monetary circulation as a whole. There is a growing discontent with the course of the reform. Social tensions are intensifying.

Things could certainly be simplified if perestroyka could be effected piecemeal, that is, if we could start with the economy, complete the reform in three to four years, and then shift over to the political system and ideology.

However, history rules out any such sequence. Perestroyka can only proceed in all directions simultaneously.

Now a few words about some fundamental provisions of the reform and its concept.

First, the reform is a radical one. This is no face-lifting of a dilapidated building but a pulling down of the administrative-command system and its replacement with a qualitatively new model for the social economy.

Second, the economic reform can only be effective in conjunction with changes in the political sphere of life.

Third, the reform concerns the very foundation of the economic system.

It is designed to renovate the entire totality of ownership relations. Fourth for all its profundity and dramatic change, the reform aims not at replacing socialism with any other system but at renovating it. A socialist choice is the choice made by the people and it operates as a criterion for selecting forms and methods to be used in renovating economic life as a whole.

Now about suggestions from the "left" and "right."

I think that calls for effecting the reform at one fell swoop are downright unrealistic.

As regards a nostalgic yearning for a return to the past, this is acquiring ever increasing numbers of supporters under the impact of the mounting difficulties.

These people are not confined to the so-called "apparatchiks."

However, a return to the outdated methods of the administrative-command system would lead to a standstill in social development.

Any progressive movement has its choices, and they need to be thoroughly weighed up and wisely selected. But there are no alternatives to perestroika, a sweeping economic and political reform.

Renouncing the course of perestroyka amounts to renouncing the future.

A few words about the dangers of "left-wing" and "right-wing" extremism.

They tend to disunite forces and set different social strata and groups against each other.

I'm far from thinking that in so doing everyone seeks to fish in troubled waters.

But such actions logically lead to a poisoning of the social atmosphere and represent a kind of ecological crisis of the social environment.

The existing difficulties are exacerbated by the fact that the public does not yet fully understand the problems of the present stage. It is rather conservative and, as often as not, rejects anything new.

[Question] What is the essence of the government's programme for surmounting the current crisis?

[Abalkin] The immediate and priority move under this programme is to arrest the mounting negative processes in the economy.

The government is working vigorously and firmly. On its initiative, the USSR supreme soviet adopted a resolution on tax levers designed to control pay rises.

Amendments were introduced in the law on the socialist state enterprise. The importance of consumer goods was considerably increased.

Important measures to revitalise the economy were set forth in the plan for social and economic development and the budget for the year 1990.

All these are urgent priority measures.

More sweeping and massive changes of a strategic character are to be implemented in the early 1990s.

In essence, they will be designed to effect a shiftover to the socialist market.

In expanding the market, we've got to create a system of economic regulators and introduce anti-inflation measures.

These will include a profit taxation system. It is also planned to set up bodies of fiscal control, taxation and price inspection, an antimonopoly committee and other similar structures.

Settling the entire totality of these problems will make it possible to approach the third stage of the reform approximately by the year 1993.

In that period the new economic mechanism should start to yield economic and social returns.

It should be emphasised that the government's programme is not a product of armchair reflections, but an open programme taking account of experience accumulated, scientific recommendations and the suggestions of people's deputies.

Effecting a drastic cut in the state budget's deficit from R120 billion to 60 billion is now a priority task.

We are proceeding on the basis that any increase in spending is only possible if it is accompanied by a growth of real, not paper, revenues.

[Question] How is the budget deficit to be overcome?

[Abalkin] By using a fundamentally new method in the economic practice of the country.

Taking account of world experience, the state is to issue 15-year bonds covering the entire amount of the deficit.

These will be securities guaranteeing five per cent interest and distributed through the banking system among enterprises, organisations and crediting institutions.

Bonds (also with five per cent interest) are to be issued for the population. They will be able to be realised without time limits.

Such a dramatic cut in the state budget deficit can only be achieved by the most rigid saving of resources.

The matter at issue is above all reduction in wasteful capital investments, and in expenditure on defence and government.

This cut is not being effected to the detriment of the rights of enterprises to make investments out of their own funds but through holding up investment by the state itself.

Centralised capital investments are being reduced by a third.

The portion of the national income meant for current consumption and non-industrial construction (of housing, schools, hospitals, etc.) is to rise by five per cent.

The structure of industrial production is to undergo dramatic changes. Thus, production of the means of production is to rise by 0.5 per cent, while production of consumer goods is to rise by 6.7 per cent.

[Question] What does the government intend to do to stabilise the consumer market?

[Abalkin] First we are to expand resources for the consumer market. Drawing on a variety of sources, this year's retail trade is to reach R435 billion, which is a 10 per cent increase.

Second, we are to adjust the population's monetary demand.

Unless monetary payments (wages, etc.) are placed under control, even a considerable growth of consumer goods may be insufficient to soak up the extra demand generated.

Therefore taxes have been introduced on enterprises to adjust the growth of their wages' fund. In order to stimulate the supply of consumer goods, the consumer industry is exempt from this wages tax.

Measures are also being designed to attract the population's monetary incomes into the funding of production or the solution of social tasks.

These include the issue of bonds and other securities, more sales to the population of individual houses and state-owned apartments with a right to inheritance, a greater share of cooperative housing construction and land-leasing.

It is also planned to issue interest-free loans to the population which guarantee that after a certain period of time they can be used to purchase specific commodities, e.g. cars, furniture, household appliances and so on.

[Question] Even in the early 1990s people expect to see more and better goods on sale and a higher standard of living. Will these hopes come true?

[Abalkin] Overall, an enhanced standard of living can only stem from growing economic effectiveness.

To agree to an inflated deficit is criminal.

But to carry on reducing the funds needed to expand and modernise production (as we are doing as a temporary measure in the plan for 1990 to boost production of consumer goods) is out of the question. Consequently, there is only one answer—to increase efficiency and to work better. Both the scope of and the deadline for implementing social programmes should be made directly dependant upon growing efficiency.

[Question] You head the state commission for economic reform. What role does it have to play both in the government and in the very process of reconstructing the national economy?

[Abalkin] The commission has to ensure the drafting of government decisions on relevant issues, provide expert assessment of the suggestions advanced and, lastly, within the terms of its competence, to take final decisions on the problems of restructuring the system of government.

It is no secret that, previously, decisions were reached without, as often as not, proper consideration of the possible economic and social consequences. Public opinion was also disregarded. Now with the help of experts we are making practical use of a situational analysis, that is, a study of the possible consequences of the decisons taken.

[Question] Do you believe the reform will succeed?

[Abalkin] Believe or not believe—these are notions science and politicians do not operate with.

What counts here is a realistic approach and a programme of action, both of which there are.

The success will depend on whether or not the government has the resolution to carry out the decisions.

Of equal importance for the success of the reform is the dramatic changing of the social and psychological situation in society, regaining the people's support and their belief in the ability of the country's leaders to curb the development of negative processes and extricate the country from a critical situation.

We need to reach general consensus and acknowledge the danger of rocking our common boat.

Silayev Appears on 'Topical Interview' Program

LD1305094390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1747 GMT 11 May 90

[From the "Topical Interview" program]

[Text] [Voznesenskiy] Greetings, comrades. Appearing today in the "Topical Interview" series is Ivan Stepanovich Silayev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, chairman of the Council of Ministers bureau on machine building. In accordance with the established tradition, the subject will be the way the national economy of our country has been working in the past month.

[Silayev] The month of April was somewhat unusual in that it contained more working time than April last year, almost two days more taking account of the decision that was adopted. There were grounds to calculate that these two working days would make it possible to have a palpable addition to the volume of production. The results of the work of industry as a whole indicate that we, as a result of that addition, practically maintained the same volume of output as last year. If one speaks about the average output per 24 hours, this was below 100 percent, unfortunately. Here we must think about the future. It is one thing, say, to tackle questions of transferring to the interests of creating the appropriate comforts for leisure and it is another thing as to what result this will bring us in the economy. Statistics indicate we are losing out here.

All the same, this is not the most important thing. The most important thing is the processes which we are not managing to stabilize inspite of all our efforts. These are processes of shortcomings at an organizational level, the further fall in discipline in all areas, and in the area of contracts, in particular. The level of deliveries in accodance with obligations is also somewhat lower than the past period.

I must say there are two or three positive aspects and in the first place I would speak here about the increase in the output of consumer goods and domestic equipment. I am not going to cite a lot of examples. I have in my hands here diagrams we have prepared and I would like to use their example to show the ongoing dynamics. [Video shows Silayev holds up bar graphs]

This one shows the rate of increase in the production of video-recorders. This looks very impressive—over 250 percent. This should not get anyone carried away, however, as the base was virtually zero. Industrial output of this equipment has begun really from zero.

Sewing machines' output in April was 116 percent and a quite confident increase in production is under way.

As to vacuum cleaners, there was a slight dip in February, but as you can see, in March and particularly in April there is also a good dynamic here. The level is 118 percent.

Further, here, for washing machines. There was some standstill or even some sort of dip in March but in April as you can see it was quite energetic, over 116 percent. We are confident this dynamic, particularly with regard to washing machines, will energetically move forward.

Thus, one can say today that machine builders, and in this case the main suppliers, both defense and nondefense, are generally increasing the rates. On the average, in April both complexes ensured an increase in production of goods, not in rubles but I mean in actual range of goods which I have in the main listed. That is more than 120 percent. But 130-136 [percent] is needed. Here, of course, very much work is needed from the labor collectives to reach those rates. With those rates we can say that if not in this year then next year the problem will not be where to get hold of a television or where to get hold of a washing machine but the question will then be about the range and choice and quality of production and technical level.

[Voznesenskiy] Ivan Stepanovich, all the same, we consumers will evidently react with more respect and feeling to such a concept as percentages when, on going into a shop, we see that these percentages are backed up by real output, when we see it on the shop shelves. Up to now, unfortunately, to speak in what is now generally accepted language, the shop shelves are empty. This evidently indicates the process of improving the monetary system of our country, the process of bring about a balance between the masses of money and goods, has, unfortunately, not yet acquired the necessary force.

[Silayev] You are quite right but, all the same, I would like to stress that against the background of the former growth rates in the output of consumer goods of somewhere from 8 to 10 percent per year we now have a certain 20 and more. Of course, no rates will save us if we do not stabilize the monetary mass and bring it into line with the volume of output of industrial production.

That is why I would like to dwell on that issue, taking account of your question. I have in my hands here some tables and I will comment on them in a moment but I would like to say that in spite of a small decrease in the rate of increase in wages—that is the main source of the population's income—we managed to bring it down a bit, from 8.8 percent last year to 7.2 percent this year, annual rate, in the first quarter.

If one compares this with the increase in volume of output or compares it with labor productivity, then there has been no real change. This is shown by the tables I have in my hands. Along the horizontal we have the months. Let me remind you we have data for three months. The vertical indicates the rate of increase in wages. So you can see that in March there was some small reduction in the rate of wage increases but when we speak about labor productivity, this section of the bar chart, we see that it has fallen much more than the rate of wage increases. Therefore, we do not yet have any grounds to say that any changes have taken place. The only thing that can be said that we have managed to sharply slow down wage rises in industrial and construction design institutes. There, let me remind you, pay rose by 40 percent there but this year, according to the results of the first quarter we have a reduction compared with last year's level of five percent. That was a most unusual circumstance to have such very severe efforts. This is, unfortunately, as the saying goes, just one swallow, which does not make a summer. I have shown you the overall results.

[Voznesenskiy] Understandably, in a short interview one cannot describe the development, or the problems of all branches of the national economy or even the basic ones. But perhaps you could speak about that complex whose work is of greatest interest to the population, the work of the social complex.

[Silayev] On the subject of the social complex I have already spoken, at the start, of the positive changes that have taken place in our country in April in the production of consumer equipment. One can include that in the positive balance. As far as concerns such very important branches working on consumer goods as light industry, I would say here the output of fabrics, knitted goods, footwear, including children's, has remained at the same level as January-April last year. Regarding the output of the majority of foodstuffs there has been some increase but a very insignificant one. For some of them, vegetable oil, meat and tinned meats the volume of output has decreased by 3-5 percent.

In the first quarter 11.5 million sq.m. of housing was built. This would seem to be quite a lot but it is 12 percent of the annual plan. As this is a quarter of the period, this is far from 25 percent. Here one must simply say that we still have the chronic disease of builders—all of them including specialized branches and own-resources builders—to do everything by last minute rush, to move everything toward and even to plan for a one-year period to complete everything at the end of the period. So, of course, builders have some work to do here regarding putting housing into use and handing it over to the population in a more even manner.

Serious and intensive work has been conducted on other aspects of the social problems and social programs, too. In the first instance I would like to cite the discussion of pensions in the Supreme Soviet. This is a very major program—the government reported that the projected cost would be R36 billion. As a result of clarifications and very active discussions the Supreme Soviet adopted in its second reading a law on pensions costing R41 billion. This is, of course, a very strong program. It is undoubtedly correct and timely but naturally the question arises for the government as to which directions we should move in order to provide this program with the appropriate funds. The main source is to raise the efficiency of work, to raise the level of responsibility.

[Voznesenskiy] Ivan Stepanovich, recent months have shown how contradictory and complicated our social situation is, how many views there are which are literally opposed to each other, how much intolerance there is in society at the other person's views. Evidently, at this time, those events which unite people are to be particularly cherished. I think that the 45th anniversary of our great victory is one such event.

[Silayev] Our people hold sacred everything connected with their heavy, exhausting, but just war for independence. The government specially examined the question of celebrating this glorious anniversary. A decision of the Council of Ministers was issued on measures to celebrate the 45th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War. Great concern was displayed towards those who forged the victory at the front and in the rear. The state continues to treat with great respect those who participated in the Great Patriotic War and those who worked behind the scenes.

[Voznesenskiy] Ivan Stepanovich, there is, with every passing year, an increase in the importance of, let me call it, the ecological side of the programmed social development of our society. Is it possible to say that, as in life, the importance of this issue is being raised within government activities, too?

[Silayev] Yes, of course it is. I would like to start here by saying that last year the Supreme Soviet instructed the government to draw up an ecological program, an integrated ecological program. I would like to inform you that at the end of April the government, at a special meeting of the presidium, discussed this question very carefully. There was examination of a program drawn up with the participation of scientists, with the participation of enterprises. It is a major, large-scale program. One can separate out, I would say, three sections which are very important. The first section says that much can be done today simply by putting things into proper order and not permitting any negligence, sloppiness, or very often irresponsibility, and the Ufa incident can be given as an example of this. That is, many questions can be put right on the spot today by introducing discipline and responsibility of enterprises and, of course, of the managers of enterprises for treating the environment too arbitrarily. That is the first thing.

The second thing is that, naturally, it is necessary, and this is taken into account in the program, to go in for major reequipping of existing, operating enterprises with the appropriate traps and filters. This is a very major program and it requires great efforts, in the first instance from designers and producers of the corresponding equipment. It must be said that this is not cheap.

Thirdly, it is a matter of creating new technologies and new equipment which would make the functioning of the most complicated plants absolutely safe for all spheres of the environment.

[Voznesenskiy] What progress is being made with this program?

[Silayev] This is what is happening to the program: It has received support in principle. Instructions have been given to complete its elaboration with regard to the fact that it will be implemented in the new economic conditions and there were certain shortcomings in this respect. A period of one month has been set. Then there will be another discussion on the results and then it will be put forward for discussion by the Supreme Soviet.

I would like to say here that this programme will not be cheap. Judging from the experience of Western countries which tackled these problems more successfully and earlier than we did, there is an increase in costs. The cost of capital expenditure is raised by up to 40 percent especially when things are being made anew. But here I simply call on the managers of enterprises, of industries and of regions, to find the funds for this. This should be a priority. Indeed, if I am speaking about priorities in the national economy, about state priorities, then the most important priorities are foodstuffs and ecology and one cannot stand aside.

[Voznesenskiy] Ivan Stepanovich, I think that the success of this program and its implementation will be ensured if the ecological aspects of it are linked most closely with the economic ones—in such a way that the protection of nature in the process of the further industrial development and so on would be advantageous, economically advantageous. Of course, Ivan Stepanovish, the solution of many problems of social life, as has always been the case in history, including the history of our country, must be found in the sphere of the economy and in the accelerated and, most importantly, in the efficient development of it.

April was characterized by the fact that public opinion all the more frequently and perhaps all the more deeply turned towards a regulated market. What path has the government traversed in this connection?

[Silayev] You are undoubtedly correct, Lev Aleksandrovich, the chief problem being examined by the government, in the month of April, in particular, was the drawing up of a program for the transition to a regulated market. There were three meetings of the Presidium devoted to this in April. Among the participants in these meetings were economists, industrialists, and suppliers. In general a large selection of the most varied types of specialists was invited to take part in the all-round discussion of this problem.

You know that our material was twice discussed at the Presidential Council. After that there was another meeting. And the last one was on 30 April, on the eve of May Day. We once again reviewed all the questions, including the problems connected with the balancing of materials in the national economy in 1991 and in the long term, too, but 1991 is very important for us. It will be the the most complicated year when we are to introduce [words indistinct] elements of the market economy with, of course, the regulating influence of the state.

Another object of special attention and special concern to us is that we understand we need to have the suport of our society and our people. We stress this in particular: How are we to protect particularly the low paid strata of the population—the students, pensioners and invalids, people on fixed incomes—how are we to protect them from the possibly complicated problems which may arise during the transition to the regulated market. We understand this full well and we are conducting an all-round approach to this in order to avoid major disruptions and mistakes and to obtain, so to say, the support of the population and to introduce this.

[Voznesenskiy] Of course, without such support all of this work will not be successful. Here one needs all the people to help with the quest, with their efforts and their support. Thank you for your address. All the best, comrades.

April Economic Figures Indicate Marking Time

PM1405101190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 May 90 Morning Edition p 1

[V. Romanyuk article under the rubric "Statistics and Our Commentary": "How the Country Worked in April"]

[Text] According to the current data available to the USSR Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics], for the first time since the start of the year there was, in April, no overall fall in the volume of industrial production. On the contrary, it grew by 0.4 percent. However, on the whole the situation has not changed for the better over the first four months: Some R2.1 billion (0.7 percent) less industrial output was produced than in the same period last year.

Nor are there any grounds for optimistic assessments of last month's working rhythm. April 1990 had one more working day than April 1989, and we worked another day on top of that. Let us be blunt: The average daily indicators in April 1990 were 4.4 percent worse than in April 1989. And all this means that even though we approached the end of 1989 with a reduction in our growth rate, we have covered one-third of 1990 without accelerating the rate but actually seeing it fall.

Needless to say, the two extra days provided a certain boost at continuous-cycle enterprises (machine building and light industry). But extensive factors took their toll again. If we are trying to record long-term positive trends, so to speak, we should cite above all the stabilization of the situation in the Transcaucasus. In April Azerbaijan's industry even exceeded last year's level by 1 percent. This, of course, is not enough to rectify matters: The fall in industrial output as compared with January-April 1989 was 18 percent in that republic, 9 percent in Armenia, and 8 percent in Georgia. A certain fall in output volume occurred in Lithuania (by 2.8 percent in April compared with April last year). The difficulties associated with restricting shipments of fuel and a number of other types of output from neighboring republics are starting to have an effect there.

Shipments of output and the fulfillment of the state plan are important indicators of the state of technological and production discipline. One-third of the year has been covered, and the state orders for main-line diesel locomotives has only been 27 percent fulfilled, with the corresponding figures being 24 percent for electric locomotives, 28 percent for bottled-gas driven trucks, 29 percent for electric motors for domestic machinery, 31 percent for programmable metal-cutting machine tools, and 31 percent for tires for agricultural machinery, synthetic ammonia, and potash fertilizers.

The state of consumer goods production merits special consideration. A program of emergency measures envisages increasing their output by R60 billion this year (as opposed to an ordinary increase of R17 billion per year). And although the stores continue to be empty and growth rates are half the level planned by the program, there have been real improvements in this sphere. The conversion under way in defense sectors is geared above all to the production of technically complex items. Thus, in the first four months of the year production of washing and sewing machines has increased by 17 percent compared with the same period last year, with the corresponding figures being 14 percent for color TV's, 11 percent for radio receivers, and 9 percent for tape recorders and vacuum cleaners. Output of cars has increased to a lesser extent—6 percent—bicycle output is up by the same amount, while motorcycle output is up only 5 percent.

But it seems that changes will still be a long time coming in light industry. The growth in this area compared with last April was 3 percent. That is the pace of the stagnation years! Many kinds of fabrics recorded either a drop in the meter length produced or growth of around 0.5 percent. Production of knitwear increased on the whole by the same 3 percent (only 2 percent for children), while hosiery output increased by 6 percent (5 percent for children). Footwear production was just 1 percent higher—and even then the two additional days in April have to be taken into account.

Now to turn to the group of specially monitored [kontroliruyemyy] everyday goods. The increase in the first four months of the year was 11 percent for irons, 8 percent for cameras, 11 percent for domestic soap, 9 percent for toilet soap and synthetic detergents, 3 percent for school notebooks, 4 percent for aluminum cookware, 5 percent for men's socks, and 6 percent for children's tights. As we can see, none of the rates is staggering. Moreover, the plans formulated by the enterprises themselves for a number of items—synthetic detergents, aluminum cookware, tights, and notebooks—have not been fulfilled. And the drop in output has continued for certain everyday items. Thus, production of razor blades fell by 7 percent in January-April compared with the same period last year, with the corresponding figures being 14 percent for wooden pencils, 8 percent for cigarettes, and 1 percent for toothpaste.

The food stores are not brilliant either. Admittedly, 2 percent more whole-milk products were produced in January-April than was the case a year ago, butter production was up 6 percent, and output of sausage products was up by 1 percent. But production of meat fell by 4 percent, vegetable oil by 3 percent, and canned fruit and vegetables by 4 percent. And this despite the fact that production of equipment for food sectors increased notably, which was convincingly demonstrated by the exhibition at the USSR Exhibition of National Economic Achievements. It may only have been at an exhibition, but the equipment did make an appearance, and we consumers are entitled to ask: Where's the output?

V. Tolkushkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Goskomstat, with whom we discussed these problems, advised that the statistical workers are involved in collecting a huge volume of specific figures, and there is little time left for more in-depth analysis. For instance, it would not be out of place to analyze the state of production by "related areas" [v svyazke]: Production of tape recorders has increased, but how many cassettes have been produced for them, and are there any batteries? The statistics are not interested in this. There is another problem—the link between monopoly production and shortages. There is only one enterprise in the country producing sewing machines, just one producing domestic air conditioners, and two producing razor blades. As long as this situation lasts statisticians will have to go on recording problems.

As we can see, April provided no particular reason for gratification. One-third of the year is behind us, but no results of structural perestroyka or the involvement of a mechanism of emergency measures are visible as yet. We continue to mark time and are even slipping back in certain areas. And it is becoming more and more obvious that we will not move forward without radical reform. But here too we are losing time, since the market economy cannot be switched on as if to order. It will be necessary to create an entire highly complex market infrastructure, including commodities and capital [fondovyy] markets, labor and securities markets. And each of us should be able to become the owner of means of production and to buy in the market goods that are currently distributed by quotas. We must tackle all this forthwith.

Editor Proposes Way Out of Economic Crisis

904A0348A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 19, 9 May 90 p 1

[Chief Editor's Column; chief editor is Fedor M. Burlatskiy: "Candidly About a Worrying Matter"]

[Text] Our generation remembers full well the grim, hungry war years. Then the collapse and inflation. Then the slow climb up from the abyss. It then seemed that the most difficult part was behind us. But these were illusions. The victory over the enemy did not lead to a surmounting of the food and commodity crisis. The system reproduced it again and again.

The people are now agitated. Rumors about impending price increases are rocking the public consciousness. No matter whom one speaks with—a writer, scientist, cab driver or housewife—they all talk about the same thing. How will we live? Is there no other solution?

The Polish words—shock therapy—are in circulation. One either recovers from the shock or dies. Who or what does this mean? The economy? The people? The authorities?

Such an upheaval is, perhaps, possible in Poland. One nation. Unity around "Solidarity." One religion. Trust in the government. But with us? Do we have the same conditions? And by what right would a new experiment be mounted? From whom is consent for shock treatment being sought?

Many questions, few answers. We either need to explain everything and show that ultimately things will be better (when, for whom?) or we need to weigh the options once again.

It is being said that there is no alternative. The national debt has assumed astronomical proportions. The discrepancy between supply and demand is catastrophic. There is virtually no growth in the production of food and industrial commodities. It is believed that if we raise prices and pay more to the producers, the kolkhoz [collective farm] members and light industry workers, we will have everything. The shelves will be groaning from too many commodities. Is this right?

The first question concerns legality and moral law. It is not the people who are to blame for the present economic crisis. It is the state, the leaders, the government officials. Not the present ones even, more those of the past. It was these government officials who so planned the economy throughout the postwar years that a huge proportion of the national product went on missiles, atom bombs, tanks, and submarines. There is now no one to whom to sell them even. It was these officials who so planned "A" and "B" that heavy industry came in for more than two-thirds. It was the officials who imposed and preserved a system in agriculture and light industry that made it unprofitable to produce foodstuffs. It was they who squandered gold, oil, gas, wasting them on purchases of grain, which can be produced at home—just give the land and water to the peasants. Why, then, should the people pay?

But a crisis is a crisis, and a solution needs to be sought regardless of who is to blame for it. The more so in that Stalin and Brezhnev cannot be raised from the grave, and their proteges have already quit or are quitting the scene. What, then, is the alternative?

I have discussed this question with the top authorities in the country and abroad. With Nobel Prize winner John Galbraith and with Daniel Bell in America, with Professor Ohita, author of the "Japanese miracle," in Japan, with members of the Council for Economic Reform in China and with the authors of profound economic experiments in Yugoslavia, Hungary, and other East European countries. All of them, Galbraith particularly, said with one voice: You cannot raise the price of bread, butter, sugar, salt, cereals, tea, and other basic necessities. You cannot harm the poor. Houses, machinery, gold items, furs are another matter. Price increases here would hit the well-to-do.

But such prices increases are not a solution of the problem. They would not do much. What, then? There are various possible solutions which have already been put to the test by many countries in a period of crises.

First, a freeze on personal savings. This means that each adult citizen is accorded an equal right to spend on the purchase of items over and above his wages some such annual amount as R1,000, say (to be calculated). Issue checkbooks for this amount and sell commodities only in accordance with this. As far as the money in the "money boxes" is concerned, it would be sufficient to change the color of the large denomination notes in order for all the black market holders' millions to be turned into mere paper. As the commodity supply increases from year to year, the total amount of the checkbook would grow, and when supply matches demand, these books would altogether wither away.

This reform was successfully implemented in Holland, in the FRG and in a number of other countries immediately after the war. And had stunning results. So, then, why not discuss the possibility of its use under our conditions? The more so in that in this case there would be no danger of an explosion of social discontent. There would be sufficient basic foodstuffs and industrial goods for everyone, and all strata would be placed in equal conditions of inevitable restrictions.

Second, encouragement of the investment of capital in the production of foodstuffs and industrial commodities. It would be necessary to establish a high rate of interest (12-15 percent) on money invested in the stock of enterprises of light industry and agriculture (kolkhozes, cooperatives, family farms). Special banks would do the financing. Minimum tax rates on investments in production and enterprise might also serve this end.

Third, opening the way for the investment of foreign capital. Anyhow: joint ventures, concessions, credit, free trade zones. The experience of such countries as Brazil, Argentina, South Korea, and Spain has shown that an underdeveloped economy cannot overcome its lag without reliance on developed countries.

Fourth, switching gradually to world prices on the domestic market. But without petty stratagems. While raising the price of high-quality food and services as wages grow, it would be necessary accordingly not only to compensate this in income but also sharply lower the prices of industrial commodities.

And, finally. We need to study the experience of Yugoslavia and Poland on transition to a convertible currency. They are no richer than we. Why, then, is this possible for them, and not for us?

In other words, we should not now be seeking simple solutions, as was the case in the first postwar years. It is necessary to ponder again and again and assemble the best minds—national and foreign—discuss things in the USSR Supreme Soviet and confer with the people. For only victory is good enough for us here.

Economic Conference Opens in Leningrad

LD1405202290 Moscow TASS in English 1923 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] Leningrad May 14 TASS—By TASS correspondent Irina Zolotareva:

"The economic situation in the country has reached the critical mark when it is necessary to mobilise all intellectual potential to find a way out of the crisis," Leningrad Party Chief Boris Gidaspov said in his opening address to participants in the national conference devoted to the development of new forms of production associations—concerns, associations and consortiums.

Prominent Soviet economists, members of the government economic reform commission and the heads of enterprises are taking part in the conference.

Before becoming a party functionary, Gidaspov headed the first Soviet concern Tekhnokhim. Three years earlier he had had to defend the need for such an association in front of the country's leadership. Now the concern has become the country's biggest intersectoral association uniting all chemical enterprises and relevant research institutes in Leningrad.

Following this example, 25 joint stock societies, 17 concerns, 80 consortiums and 207 associations were established in the Soviet Union. They produce more than R25 billion worth of goods.

The aim of the national conference is to sum up the accumulated experience and work out recommendations for the development of research-and-development and production associations, new to the Soviet Union.

Ob River Grain Transport Opens

LD1305212590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 13 May 90

[Summary] The Altay rivermen have opened water lines for transporting grain along the Ob River. They have to transport 10,000 tonnes of grain of last year's harvest. It is planned to empty all the depots near the river before July, to prepare them for the new harvest.

Military

Tashkent Military, Muslim Leaders Discuss Call-Up

LD1505011190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2019 GMT 14 May 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] [Announcer] The first meeting of leaders of the Staff and Political Directorate of Turkestan Military District with dignitaries of the spiritual administration of Moslems of Central Asia and Kazakhstan took place in Tashkent today. It would be interesting to know what issues the military and religious figures are discussing.

[Correspondent M. Ganiyev, identified by screen caption] The main subject of discussion is the spring call-up of young people into the Army. We know that desertion and evasion of military service have become more than just isolated cases. At the moment everything is normal as far as the call-up in the central Asian region is concerned. However, as Mufti Mukhammad-Sadyk Mukhammad-Yusuf said, the call-up of sick young lads into the Army is alarming, as is the rising number of Uzbek soldiers who die, principally in construction units.

These are the sorry facts: There were more than 400 zinc coffins last year. And about 100 coffins have already arrived in the republic from units so far this year. They are not allowed to be opened; Muslim burial rites are thus violated, giving rise to anger among the people. This is one of the basic reasons for political tension here today. The forces which are seeking to grasp political power are using this misfortune for their own aims. Just think: The principal participants in the bloody conflicts and riots in Fergana, (?Parkent), Dushanbe, and other regions of the country are young people, those being called-up, vocational technical college pupils, and students. And the mothers, mullahs, military commandants, and political workers have agreed on joint action to combat the causes of desertion, evasion of service, dedovshchina [hierarchical system of bullying in the army], and the death of soldiers in peacetime. [Video shows uniformed military and civilians seated around table; Mufti Mukhammad-Sadyk Mukhammad-Yusuf is addressing the meeting]

Baltic Republics

'Compromises' Necessary on Baltic Independence

LD1405110790 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 13 May 90

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] Following Lithuania's decision to restore independence, the other two Baltic republics, Estonia and Latvia, have followed suit. However, unlike Lithuania, its neighbors rule out the possibility of severing the 50-year old links with the USSR overnight. So Estonia and Latvia have envisaged transitional periods during which the interests of these republics will be harmonized with those of the center.

Nonetheless, the decisions of Riga and Tallinn run counter to the USSR Constitution and to the recently passed legislation on the procedure for seceding from the USSR. In addition to this a significant part of the population in Estonia and Latvia is opposed to their parliaments' decisions.

All this fuels fears that the economic sanctions that have so far been in effect against Lithuania alone may spread to its neighbors. Incidentally the leaders of the three republics have practically been considering the possibility of economic integration and taking other steps in retaliation to a Moscow blockade.

However, trade war methods will hardly benefit either side, but will more likely hit hard on the Balts and on the market of the country as a whole. Consequently some other means, political included, should be searched for to settle the conflict.

But for this compromises are essential, both from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and from the center. Many observers, those in the West included, believe that the three Baltic republics should freeze their independence restoration acts for some time. Nor should Moscow link the start of negotiations with Vilnius, Riga and Tallinn to demands made in the form of ultimatum.

In short, compromise solutions are indispensable. (?And) one should not be afraid to lose his face by taking reciprocal steps towards each other. In the long run it's the interests of ordinary people living in all republics rather than ambitions, maybe justified, that must be given prime consideration.

Baltic Deputies Urged To Join Economic Debate

LD1405125890 Vilnius Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] A message to deputies of the Supreme Soviets of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia has been received. The message was signed by (Arkadiy Murashov), executive secretary of the Interregional Group of Deputies. It says that on 21-22 May Nikolay Ryzhkov, USSR Prime Minister, will submit to the USSR Supreme Soviet a number of legislative bills on making economic reform more radical and setting up a regulated market. The Interregional Group of Deputies calls on deputies of the Baltic states to take part in discussion of these documents.

Tensions Remain High in Baltic Republics

LD1505114390 Moscow World Service in English 1100 GMT 15 May 90

[Excerpts] Tensions remain high in the three Baltic republics, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, which unilaterally proclaimed independence. [passage omitted]

In Estonia the staff of several plants and factories staged meetings of protest and condemned the republic's illegal secession from the USSR. They warned the Estonian leaders that they reserve the right to demand that the republican parliament be dissolved and urged the Supreme Soviet to resort to presidential rule in Estonia.

In Latvia's capital Riga the United Council of Labor Collectives called for starting a political strike today. The council also wants to form parallel government bodies in Latvia.

Lithuanian Antiblockade Commission Meets

LD1505105790 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 15 May 90

[Excerpts] Two meetings were held in the Council of Ministers today: of the antiblockade commission and of the Council of Ministers. It was noted at the antiblockade commission that the power crisis is getting worse. [passage omitted] Virtually all gasoline has been sold to the public, but small quantities will be sold to those owners of individual transport who failed to obtain their 30 litres. [passage omitted] It was discussed at the meeting that according to a decision of the government antiblockade commission, the supply of food products to the USSR has been reduced. Therefore, the government antiblockade commission (?has decided to increase the sale of meat and milk products). The inhabitants will be able to purchase an additional 2000 tonnes of meat and 300 tonnes of cheese. A small quantity of meat will be sold as [word indistinct]. This will include 300 tonnes of smoked sausages and 500,000 conventional tins of canned meat. [passage omitted] Lithuanians should not be dissatisfied that the increase of meat and milk products in the shops is not being felt. In view of the fact that there has been a shortage of these products for several years, it is impossible to breach this within one month.

This measure means only a first step in taking care of the affairs of Lithuania's residents.

Prunskiene Holds News Conference, Discusses Visit

LD1405204190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1900 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] [Presenter] Today a press conference was held at the Lithuanian Republic Council of Ministers. Republic and foreign journalists met with the Lithuanian republic's Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene; Deputy Prime Minister Romualdas Ozolas; Minister of Trade Albertas Sinevicius; and Rimantas Kurtulis, general director of the department for economic relations with foreign countries.

Kazimiera Prunskiene discussed her visit to Canada, the United States, and the West European countries and her meetings with leaders of the states in those areas. She characterized the reasons for the visit as both political and economic. The direction that Lithuanian affairs will take, especially currently, when they are considerably complicated, will depend not only on how wisely we act, what decisions we are adopting internally and with respect to the Soviet Union, but also on what position the world holds toward us, stressed the prime minister.

Thus, meetings with the leaders of major countries have provided an opportunity to present our position and future intentions authentically and to obtain a very definite clarification of how our present actions and further intentions fit in with interests of those states, their comprehension of what is transpiring in Lithuania, what the relations between Lithuania and Moscow are, and to incorporate Lithuanian affairs into other states' foreign policy toward Lithuania and the entity of their interests.

Following this, Kazimiera Prunskiene, Romualdas Ozolas and the other press conference participants answered numerous questions by journalists. At this time, the press conference is being carried on Lithuanian television.

Interviewed on Talks in Paris

PM1405151690 Paris LE MONDE in French 12 May 90 p 3

[Sophie Shihab report: "An Interview with the Lithuanian Prime Minister"]

[Text] Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene, who had talks lasting one hour with President Francois Mitterrand in Paris on Thursday 10 May, after meeting several Western leaders including George Bush and Margaret Thatcher, gave an interview to LE MONDE in which she expressed her "disappointment" with her interlocutors' cautious attitude on the question of Lithuanian independence.

President Mitterrand, who is due to meet with Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow on 25 May "does not want to be a mediator and I do not think he attaches much importance to Lithuania during his talks" in the Kremlin, Mrs. Prunskiene said after their meeting. "But I think that my explanations will help Mr. Mitterrand to continue his help in the search for a solution," she added, seeking the right word to avoid using "mediation" or even "participation." The message sent by Mr. Mitterrand and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl to the Lithuanian leaders on 26 April had given them hope of the possibility of internationalizing the question of their independence. The message asked them to "suspend the effects" of the 11 March declaration of independence to allow negotiations between Moscow and Vilnius.

"I explained to President Mitterrand," the prime minister added, "our intention of accepting this proposal, giving practical effect to some of the details, notably the spheres in which the USSR's interests must be safeguarded like defense, borders, guarantees to Soviet citizens who will continue to live in Lithuania, or the distribution of property. But, to do that, we need international guarantees and the West's support, because if we suspend the implementation of the laws which have been passed, Moscow will be able to interpret that as a return to the situation preceeding the declaration of independence and that is unacceptable to all Lithuanians."

Mrs. Prunskiene, who is 46 years old, and has been prime minister since the independence vote, was rector of the Vilnius higher institute for the training and retraining of economists. She was the first leader of Sajudis, the Lithuanian independence movement, to enter local government as deputy prime minister in charge of the economic reform in July 1989. Her Communist Party card enabled her to "become acquainted with the West" before perestroyka, but she handed it back in February after helping in the Lithuanian Communist Party's split with Moscow at the end of 1989. The Lithuanian Communist Party is still led by Lithuanian Deputy Prime Minister Algirdas Brazauskas, who, speaking in Switzerland on Thursday, had no hesitation in condemning some "hasty measures" which accompanied the declaration of independence. Mrs. Prunskiene merely stressed that, as a government member, she had to accept compromise and "act in a more flexible way."

"But, to do that," she hurriedly added, "our independence must have an international guarantee—a word which my interlocutors did not really like. We are disappointed by the position of all the governments which talk so often of their refusal to recognize the annexation of the three Baltic states (by the USSR in 1940—LE MONDE editor's note) but are in no hurry to accept the logical consequence—recognition of our states." Mrs. Prunskiene, who also had meetings on Thursday with Jacques Chirac, Francois Leotard, and Laurent Fabius, stressed that "many politicians are more understanding" than government members. The root of the problem, according to her, is that "the West is lagging behind in its understanding of developments in the USSR. It thinks that the threat to Gorbachev comes from the reactionary forces like the old Politburo, and so forth.... It does not see the qualitatively new situation created by the entry of reformist forces into parliament, especially local parliaments. These forces do not pose a threat of destabilization, they want dialogue and compromise, as we do. And, above all, the Army is loyal to Mr. Gorbachev, and I see no possibility of it overstepping its role and imposing decisions. Most of the officers based in Lithuania do not want any conflict with people who are their neighbors. And the general who told the press this week that he wants presidential power established in Lithuania is a rare exception," she said. The fact remains that "consultations between the superpowers are under way on the Lithuanian question" and that the initiative taken by Mr. Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl—with whom Mrs. Prunskiene is due to meet in Bonn on Friday, —"made it possible to win over other governments to this line too, especially because we have managed to formulate our line in accordance with that letter which is a positive step," the Lithuanian government chief said.

But, in her view, the ball is now in Moscow's court and it is "keeping silent and maintaining the blockade." "I hope," she added, "that Mr. Gorbachev will make a decision this month." The prime minister had said in London that Lithuania's crude oil reserves will be exhausted by 25 May. The Lithuanian port of Klaipeda from which exported Soviet oil leaves, is being adapted to receive oil tankers, and the work could be completed by July, according to Mrs. Prunskiene. "I think that the strongest reason of state could not prevent economic sanctions against the USSR if it decided to prevent an oil tanker from supplying us with what we had bought, given the financial guarantee of the former Lithuanian government's gold which is still kept in France," she said.

Brazauskas Sends Open Letter to Union Communists

LD1405120690 Vatican City International Service in Lithuanian 0330 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] Foreign press agencies are reporting that the Lithuanian Communist Party Secretary Brazauskas has addressed all Soviet Union communists via an open letter.

In the letter he writes: The economic blockade imposed upon Lithuania will not break Lithuania and it will not incline it toward the Soviet Union. It is unfitting for a civilized nation, which the Soviet Union considers itself to be, to employ force.

Troops at History Institute 'To Introduce Order'

LD1405151590 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1300 GMT 14 May 90

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] It appeared that the opposing forces had quieted down somewhat, however, only briefly. Today, staff workers of the Lithuanian History Institute of the Academy of Sciences, who had reported for work, were greeted once again by MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] soldiers, under orders from director of the Social-Political Section of the Institute under LCP/CPSU [Lithuanian Communist Party/CPSU] Central Committee, Konstantinas (?Surblys), to introduce order. Lithuanian History Institute of the Academy of Sciences and the LCP Archives under the LCP Central Committee issued a statement. Let us read it.

[Announcer] We quote: Currently, Kostas (?Surblys) along with the USSR troops have even further increased psychological pressure at the Archives and the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences Institute on the staff members working there. A definite threat is being posed to the republic's national treasure and the protection and inviolability of the complex Lithuanian Archival Fund section of unique documents of great scientific significance.

We, the scientific workers of the Lithuanian History Institute of the Academy of Sciences and the Lithuanian Communist Party's Archives, under the Lithuanian Communist Party's Central Committee, strongly condemn the actions of Konstantinas (?Surblys) as the individual in charge of parachutists deployed in our offices. End of quote. [passage omitted]

Report on Lithuanian Economic Situation

PM1205163690 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 12 May 90 p 4

[TASS report: "Illusions and Reality"]

[Text] Vilnius—The situation in Lithuania has now become heated not only in the political sphere, but also in the economic sphere. And this is primarily due to the fact that the actions of the republic's new Supreme Soviet patently run counter to the hopes and aspirations of ordinary people and strike savagely at their vital interests.

Even in parliament itself, a demarcation of political forces has been taking place recently, between supporters of more reliable links with the Soviet Union and adherents of rapprochement with Western policies. Apparently the emergence of such disagreements was prompted by the trip by K. Prunskiene, chairman of the republic Council of Ministers, to Canada, the United States, and Britain. "Sajudis" political leaders pin great hopes on this tour by the "amber" lady. In the mass media the trip is represented as a triumph in the recognition of the so-called independent Lithuanian state.

All the same, however hard the political "emcees" of the new Lithuanian leadership try to convince the people of the correctness of their choice, reality speaks for itself.

Today the republic already has some 12,000 unemployed. Many enterprises are not working at full capacity. Thus last week virtually no output was produced by the Alitus refrigerator plant or the Panevezys, Pavenciai, Kedainiai, and Marijampole sugar refineries. The "Silialis" television manufacturing ship at the Siauliai television plant is at a standstill. There are major interruptions in deliveries of construction materials.

Yes, the republic government is seeking a way out of the existing situation. For instance, workers at enterprises and other organizations are being sent on unpaid leave or offered work in cleaning up the forests and improving the amenities in the territories. But these short-term measures, in the opinion of V. Kardyalis, first secretary of Siauliai Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU) Gorkom [city committee], could result in a social explosion in the near future, because people do not trust V. Landsbergis.

Nonetheless the leaders of the newly elected parliament are still lavish with their assurances and promises. Thus at a press conference at the Supreme Soviet it was stated that Lithuania has stocks of minerals—iron ore, oil. These figures, for instance, were cited: According to preliminary data, natural stocks of oil in the republic total 160 million tonnes. It was also reported that the drilling of oil wells has already begun. Yet any sensible person realizes what oil extraction will cost the republic's population, if this really happens in Lithuania.

Of course, for all the complexity of the problems now occurring in Lithuania, it must not be forgotten that a considerable proportion of the republic's population still supports the policy of separation from the Soviet Union. It is only a pity that many ordinary Lithuanians are not fully aware of the most important point in V. Landsbergis' policy—to put Lithuania on a capitalist footing. They are reassured and lulled with sweet promises of a better life in the event of Lithuania's secession from the USSR. And there are those who sincerely believe in and hope for economic aid and support from the West. Both the Supreme Soviet deputies and the media never tire of repeating this.

It is true that some "sops" are coming to Lithuania from abroad. Why is this happening? This question was perhaps answered clearly and aptly by Professor V. Lazutka, first secretary of Vilnius Lithuanian Communist Party Gorkom, speaking at the founding congress of citizens' committees of Lithuania:

"It is because the 'Sajudists' are the first to try to 'breach' the bastion of the worker-peasant socialist state, they were the first to start to carry out the restoration of capitalism—political, for the time being—in one of the republics, and they were the first to eliminate workers and peasants from the republic Supreme Soviet."

One must agree with this view. The policy of V. Landsbergis and his adherents is indeed aimed at bringing about the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

And how, for instance, can you assess one of the recent laws adopted by the Lithuanian parliament—"On the Restoration of the Rights of Persons Repressed for Resistance to Occupying Regimes," where real defenders of the fatherland are placed on the same footing as occupying forces, criminal elements, and gangsters?

According to party veteran P. Lukasiavicius, a member of the revolutionary underground in Lithuania, today they are rehabilitating the bourgeois Lithuanian nationalists who at one time served Germany's intelligence services well and supplied them with cadres for the training of spies, saboteurs, and terrorists, who were sent to the Soviet Union. These are the people who cooperated closely with the fascists in the war years. And finally, there are the nationalists who, in the postwar years, killed soviet and party workers, Soviet Army servicemen, and border and internal troops and perpetrated cruel reprisals against those who supported soviet power in Lithuania. More than 25,000 people, including old people, women, and children, died in peacetime from their bloody crimes....

Why did the Supreme Soviet need to adopt this law on the eve of the victory festival? I think it was in order once again to reaffirm its unfavorable and negative attitude to the Soviet Union and to try yet again to blacken it in the eyes of the world public by representing it as an invader (!?) with regard to Lithuania and the Lithuanian people.

The Supreme Soviet apparently also needed this law in order to consign to oblivion the gains of soviet power in Lithuania and the republic's considerable achievements in the political, economic, and cultural sphere in those years.

"Landsbergis and his entourage are doing everything to erase from people's memory, especially the young generation's memory, the events of the forties and fifties—the period when many thousands of true Lithuanian fighters gave their lives for a better life for their working people"—that opinion on this law was expressed by Nikifor Kondratyevich Kondrashov, a veteran of the struggle for soviet power in Lithuania in 1944-45 and an indigenous inhabitant.

Lithuanian Supreme Council Proceedings Viewed

90UN1640A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
18 Apr 90 p 1

[Article by A. Gasyunene and V. Butkus: "Political Audacity Should Give Way to Political Wisdom"]

[Text] Yesterday a letter from Prime Minister K. Prunskiene to USSR President M. Gorbachev and N. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, was published yesterday in the republic's newspapers. This message continued the dialogue on the subject of possible negotiations and answered a warning that deliveries would be halted of those types of products that can be sold on the foreign market for freely convertible currency.

This theme also commanded general attention at yesterday's session of the republic's Supreme Council. After V. Landsbergis' report on the political situation, a heated debate developed on the subject of the letter from the president of the USSR and the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and of the draft of an official response to it from the Lithuanian parliament.

From the very beginning of the deputies' discussion two positions could be discerned. Ch. Stankyabichyus, deputy chairman of the republic of Lithuania Supreme

Council, the first to speak, gave a serious legal analysis based on documents of historic importance adopted in 1918-20 and 1939-40. In recent years their legal essence and jurisdiction have been analyzed so deeply and thoroughly that the majority have interpreted their meaning and sense in exactly the same fashion. But Ch. Stankyavichyus and a number of the other deputies examined the current political and economic situation in Lithuania for the most part using the legal aspect of these documents, which have already become history.

It may be that this is a coincidence, but there was no connection made in these speeches from those 50-70 year old events to the present day, to what concerns the people of Lithuania most today. Yes, the speeches contained analysis, firmness, and irreconcilability of position, but somehow there was no sensation of the alarm and concern of the voters whose interests the deputies represent in parliament.

A. Zhalis and E. Tomashevich were the first to express these concerns, grounding themselves on a specific analytical situation in their districts.

A. Zhalis, for instance, noted that the answer to the letter of M. Gorbachev and N. Ryzhkov should be broader and more specific. In particular he proposed that the following terms be included. The republic of Lithuania guarantees normal conditions for the stationing of USSR Armed Forces, who will remain on its territory for a fixed period of time, and its own army, to be created in the future, will be subordinate to the interests of the countries of the Warsaw Pact. It was also emphasized once more that in its conduct of economic policy our government intends to take the Soviet Union's economic strategy into account and conduct a search for ways to broaden mutually profitable ties in that realm. And in the third place it was affirmed that those people who wish to remain citizens of the USSR are guaranteed all their rights stipulated by the law, including their social rights, and that we are prepared to discuss the question of compensation for housing and immovable property for those who wish to leave Lithuania.

After that V. Chepaytis brought out another facet of the problem in his speech.

"We cannot look for compomises on issues concerning the Act on the Reestablishment of the Lithuanian Independence or interpret it so that it is convenient for our neighbor," said the deputy. "We answer to those who elected us believing that we would not falter when difficulties arose. We answer to the Latvians and the Estonians and to our own countrymen around the world who now look to Lithuania."

There were one or two other speeches taking the same or approximately the same position, and it began to seem that the discussion itself might end in an impasse. But the floor was given to V. Berezov, who expresses the position of the independent Lithuanian Communist Party. His opinion and his critical view of some of the rulings of the Supreme Council became something of a turning point in the parliamentary discussion. In particular he said:

"It is no secret to anyone that at the present moment we find ourselves on the threshold of the introduction of presidential rule and economic blockade. If such a regimen were introduced, it would return us to our previous position for an indeterminate time, destroy the rudiments of a multiparty system, limit our press, etc."

S. Pirozhkov, a deputy from Sneckus, approached an evaluation of the economic situation from the position of a careful analysis. But the data he presented, reflecting a noticeable slump in the republic's economy, did not convince everybody.

Thus, the wish to work out a consensus and to seek an exit from the impasse tilted the balance in favor of the other side. The conflict of opinions and positions became more and more heated. E. Bichkauskas, the Lithuanian government's representative in Moscow, gave a new direction to it.

In his speech he emphasized that now the most important thing is to get Moscow to sit down with us at the negotiating table. Considering the processes that are now taking place in the Soviet Union, this is not so simple. At this moment we are at the "forefront" of international politics, and our carefully considered actions will influence to a great degree what the entire world will become in the future and whether we will return to the times of the "Cold War." As a result, the great responsibility which rests on us should prompt us to put aside all ambitions and emotions. Later E. Bichkauskas proposed that the Supreme Council add to its ruling, in particular, the following terms: For the period of consultations on conditions for negotiations with the USSR, to halt implementation of the Act on the Reestablishment of Lithuanian Independence until 1 May; to adopt no legislative acts requiring bilateral agreement during that period; to propose to the Government of the Soviet Union that for the aforementioned period it renounce the use of any forcible measures in relation to Lithuania; and to send an authorized delegation to Moscow for negotiations.

The audience listened attentively to Ch. Yurshenas. At first glance he left the subject somewhat, subjecting a number of parliamentary decisions to analysis and calling some of them mistaken, including the recall of USSR people's deputies from Moscow. A man with the experience of a political observer, he focused attention on the adequacy of information. Without breadth and deep understanding of all incoming information, and ruling out selection to please this or that position, one can lose contact with the realities of the day.

Despite all the variety of opinions, the speech of Academician E. Vilkas was unexpected for many. He mentioned that when he was speaking at one of the sessions of a commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet, he accidentally insulted those present with an incautious word. He was unhappy about it afterward. Each must always remember the value of a deputy's word as he ascends the high tribune.

Yes, humanity and morality are the measure of everything. They also determine political wisdom, which must prevail over political audacity. Deputy K. Antanavichyus, chairman of the Social Democrat Party, took this position. He said many bitter words about the lack of tolerance of the deputies and the democratic guidelines in the first weeks of the parliament's work. So it happened, according to him, that several deputies who had their own opinions found themselves in isolation and became "unreliables."

"How tormentingly painful when proposals created with labor and anguish are not even discussed and are received as hostile to the interests of Lithuania," he said. "The problems we are solving, connected with the future of our people and our nation, are exceedingly serious, and therefore we do not have the right to rely on the absolute opinion of this or that deputy, or of this or that group."

The discussion is still not over. In the argument over opinions and positions a common decision is being formed. Such a situation requires courage and a civic stand, which should prevail over ambition and hasty decisions.

Lithuanian Foreign Minister on Foreign Policy

LD1205140690 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 11 May 90

[from the press review]

[Text] Speaking about the foreign policies of Lithuania we can only use either the past tense or the future tense. As long as there is no independent Lithuanian state there can be no talk of its foreign policy. The weekly ATGIMIMAS carries reflections of the Lithuanian Foreign Minister Algirdas Saudargas on what our foreign policies ought to be. It is (?sufficient) to go beyond the borders of the republic of Lithuania, and we shall have either to cross the checkpoints guarded by military units or we shall not feel that we have come to a foreign state. The aim of the policies directed to both the east and the west is that those borders should be guarded by Lithuanian frontier guards. And that is possible to attain only through negotiations. Such talks will have to be held between Vilnius and Moscow but the Lithuanian foreign minister considers that other countries should at least be active guarantors because the Lithuanian issue is not an internal problem of the Soviet Union. The problem must be settled against the European context and not only in the East.

In the same issue of the weekly ATGIMIMAS the chairman of the Lithuanian Parliamentary Commission for Foreign Affairs, Emanuelis Zingeris, states that there is a large conflict with the Foreign Ministry of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is building up a wide spectrum of diplomatic measures against Lithuania. Longstanding acquaintances and communications channels are used to create an unfavorable image of Lithuania in other countries. Through its diplomatic missions the Soviet Union often puts presssure on influential public figures abroad not to receive delegations from Lithuania. Under the influence of these diplomatic missions very cleverly construed articles appear in the press belittling the importance of the developments in Lithuania and the defaming its leadership.

Paper Reveals Soviet Army Food Consumption

LD1205154290 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 11 May 90

[From the press review]

[Text] The independent newspaper 'RESPUBLIKA' give statistical data on how much food the Soviet Army troops stationed in Lithuania use. The situation is paradoxical. For 50 years Lithuania has been supplying food to the Soviet occupiers and even now that Lithuania has proclaimed itself an independent state we continue giving the Soviet Army soldiers, KGB people, and workers of the military industry food, which is better and cheaper than what the citizens of Lithuania get. By a decree of the Council of Ministers, Lithuania had to give part of its own food products to Moscow, which distributed them among definite addressees like the Ministry of Defense, enterprises of military industry, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and so on. Everything is scrupulously weighed up and distributed to the finest detail. Here's an interesting fact: The military people pay for meat half the price that the civilians do. The author of the article suggests that the food taken out of Lithuania should be returned or that its price should be put down at the Kremlin steps when it comes to weighing up who owes whom.

Pro-CPSU Klaipeda Committee Activity Reported

PM1405083990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 May 90 First Edition p 1

[Report by correspondent Captain Second Rank V. Gromak under "Direct Line" rubric: "Workers Joining Party"]

[Text] Klaipeda—A few days ago I. Bremkauskas, first secretary of Klaipeda City Committee [gorkom] of the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU), handed over party membership cards to Sergey Petrovich Gadyuchev, chief of a production preparation department bureau at the experimental ship repair plant, and Galina Grigoryevna Bogodel, an engineer, and a candidate membership card to her son Andrey Bogodel, a lathe operator.

"It is painful to watch the party organization in our shop falling apart before our very eyes," Galina Grigoryevna said, "and our ideals crumbling away. I finally took the decision to join when L. Stratalovich, secretary of our shop party organization, resigned from the CPSU because he was afraid of difficulties...."

In her application G. Bogodel wrote: "I want to join the party because the humiliations and insults heaped on the CPSU have painfully wounded my pride. I have always regarded communists with respect, and I believe in the renewal of the CPSU. I hope that only true communists will remain in it...."

According to a statement by V. Polegoshko, chief of a sector of the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU) gorkom, the situation in the city party organization is stabilizing. Much work in establishing primary party organizations has been done. In Klaipeda some 6,000 communists currently occupy the positions of the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU). However, many are as yet undecided. They are waiting for the CPSU congress. The gorkom is working hard in the city. A voluntary editorial office, headed by D. Yelbert and S. Shataylo, has been set up at the gorkom and has resumed the publication of the communists' newspaper.

Article on Union-Lithuanian Economic Ties

904A0319A Moscow EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN in Russian No 16, Apr 90 pp 4, 12*

[Article by EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN special correspondents M. Panova, P. Korotkov, and V. Maleyev: "Political Impediments to Economic Decisions, or How A. Brazauskas Asked Moscow for Money"]

[Text] We have been trying to understand the nature of rumors spread in the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] about the supposedly unilateral severance of economic ties with it by the enterprises of other republics. For example, S. Rimeikis, the just elected director of the chief enterprise of the Sigma Association, returned to this topic many times in a conversation with us.

Why is there this apprehension? After all, out of 600 suppliers of the plant from other republics, only one, from the city of Izyum in Kharkov Oblast, sent an official refusal to make deliveries, and even in this case for a reason which, unfortunately, is all too common in our economy—the contract was canceled due to the lack of materials.

Our other interlocutors were likewise unable to point out instances of other republics severing economic ties with Lithuania for political reasons. Minister of Finance R. Sikorskis observed with regard to the cases of delayed payments for deliveries that this is our usual lack of discipline in settlements.

Certainly, the unstable political situation which has emerged in the republic after the declaration of independence is the reason for the rumors. The Soviet Union is proclaimed to be "someone else's" state. Despite the Constitution being violated by the republic itself, it is for some reason the decisions and actions of the Union Government that are mistrusted. Besides, not only is the necessary information lacking, as EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN already reported in the previous issue, but many facts are deliberately distorted, events are covered in a biased manner, and their genuine meaning is frequently passed over in silence.

For example, let us look at the meeting of the Supreme Council of the republic on 3 April. Describing the economic situation of the republic, Prime Minister K. Prunskiene noted, among other things, that the Soviet Union has changed without warning the settlement procedures for interrepublic deliveries. They are now performed in a centralized manner through Moscow. Due to this, settlements are delayed for 15 to 30 days. Supposedly, the republic has lost some suppliers because of this. To be sure, the prime minister immediately corrected herself: "More precisely, this has caused them to be dissatisfied."

Incidentally, both economic managers and rank-and-file economists in Lithuania told us about delays in settlements. It was given to understand, sometimes bluntly and sometimes by way of hints, that this is happening because of Moscow's interference after the declaration of independence. Meanwhile, slower settlements mean late transfers of funds to the enterprises and, consequently, delays in the payment of wages. In a word, when it is interpreted in this manner the tone prompts one to rush to a protest meeting immediately.

It goes without saying that objective information and clarification are badly needed under the circumstances. K. Prunskiene, one of the active framers of regional economic accountability, knows better than anyone else the history of this issue. It would appear that she should be the one to provide explanations. However, she did not.

Therefore, what actually happened, what caused this decision, and how unexpected was it?

Actually, settlement procedures have been changed not in order to undermine the economic independence of the republic but pursuant to previously adopted laws. Let us recall that on 7 February a resolution "On Priority Measures for Implementing the USSR Law 'On the Economic Independence of the Lithuanian SSR, Latvian SSR, and Estonian SSR' in 1990." It was adopted jointly by the USSR Council of Ministers and the governments of the three Union republics.

A transition to the economic independence of the Lithuanian SSR called for specialized state banks to be transformed into regional commercial banks and be transferred to the jurisdiction of the republic. In keeping with the practices used throughout the world, correspondent accounts were to be opened in the republic office of the USSR State Bank for credit and settlement services to the clients. In this case, no delays in settlements would have occurred.

However, despite an agreement in principle, this was not done in the Lithuanian SSR. This is why on 23 February, that is, half a month before Lithuania's declaration of independence, the Central Administration of Operations was created in Moscow by an order of the Board of the USSR State Bank which performs settlements for inter-republic deliveries.

Now about the surprise. Negotiations on this issue were conducted on many occasions prior to the March events. As we were told by A. Voylukov, deputy chairman of the Board of the USSR State Bank, Lithuanian specialists came to the State Bank many times and promised to speed up the opening of such accounts in the republic. However, nothing has changed so far.

For a long time, Lithuania led other Union republics in developing the economic reform and switching to a market economy. This movement has now been brought to a halt by the illegally erected barriers of political decisions. When we tried to make arrangements for a meeting with A. Brazauskas, he told us frankly that there is virtually nothing to discuss; republic economic accountability is being canceled.

The unlawful political decisions adopted by the Supreme Council of Lithuania are bringing about economic autarchy, economic isolation of the republic, and... the curtailment of market relations. At the aforementioned meeting of the Supreme Council, K. Prunskiene noted: The merchandise and currency imbalance in the republic has increased.

There has been no improvement in the consumer market, despite reminder-notices saying that many goods which are on display in every grocery and general-merchandise store are sold only to the residents of the republic. In the first quarter of this year, increments of currency in circulation turned out to be higher than planned. In other words, above-the-plan emission of currency occurred, which is very dangerous in any economy.

Former Lithuanian SSR Prime Minister V. Sakalauskas raised the alarm for the first time. As early as 7 March, he sent a telegram to the USSR State Bank requesting its permission for the additional emission of R150 million in cash. It was expected that this money would suffice until the end of the quarter and the accruing debt would be subsequently repaid. However, the situation got virtually out of control, especially after the republic's declaration of independence.

The movement of the deposits of the populace in the savings banks on the territory of Lithuania is instructive. In January and February, the increment of deposits amounted to R69 million, whereas by 16 March it fell to R60 million (that is, an outflow of R9 million within 15 days). In the following two weeks, the savings accounts "shed" as much as R70 million! Therefore, not only was the increment of deposits attained previously, in the first two months, "eaten away," but their residual even dropped by R10 million compared to the beginning of the year.

It should be mentioned that a sizable share of these funds was not spent for purchasing goods in the republic, and for this reason did not return to the bank coffers. A considerable proportion of the funds was either held by the populace or ended up in other republics in the shops or as deposits. In essence, this was a politically motivated flight of currency.

Once again, they had to ask Moscow for cash reinforcements. We can imagine how reluctant the new government was to do this! This time, such a telegram to the USSR Council of Ministers was signed by a deputy prime minister, A. Brazauskas, rather than the prime minister: "We request permission for additional above-the-plan emission of R100 million in the first quarter. The total will come to R250 million, taking into account the amount previously received. The main reason is above-the-plan issue of reinforcements to the savings banks in March which will amount to about R250 million for the quarter."

We asked the USSR State Bank: "Were there delays in the transfer of these funds?"

We were told: "No. The issue was handled in a regular manner. A day or two only were needed in order to determine precisely the economies in other republics which could be reassigned to Lithuania."

It would appear that in the existing situation all measures should be taken to reinvigorate the economy, reinforce the consumer market, attract cash to the bank coffers, and thus weaken inflationary trends. But this is not the case! Political barriers are once again erected in the way of the necessary economic decisions. The government of the republic has, in essence, refused to sell on its territory the bonds of the non-interest-bearing merchandise loan worth a total of R155 million. This means that in 1993 the population will not be able to purchase goods in short supply, such as TV sets, videocassette recorders, refrigerator-freezers, and so on worth that much. After all, the bonds of this loan are issued in conjunction with such merchandise.

The following fact is also instructive. Quite recently, economists and people's deputies from Lithuania, including the esteemed K. Prunskiene, repeated tirelessly that the economic independence of enterprises should be the foundation while advocating republic economic accountability and the development of market relations with other regions of the country. What about now? By now, the freedom of enterprises has already been restricted. The government of the republic has adopted a resolution which forbids the free shipment of products manufactured above the contracts signed and mandatory orders by the enterprises beyond the borders of the republic. The newly created Ministry of Material Resources will manage these products in a centralized manner. It was also resolved to set up customs checkpoints not only along the border with Poland but "with the Soviet Union as well!"

In our first report, we already mentioned that all enterprises reporting to the Union were declared to be subject to the jurisdiction of the republic. Thus, the previously adopted law on the economic independence of the Baltic republics was nullified unilaterally. Meanwhile, pursuant to this law the Lithuanian SSR was to be given 30 Union enterprises. Quite understandably, the transfer of Union enterprises may only be discussed after the return of Lithuania to the situation existing before 10 March. After all, pursuant to the Law on Economic Independence, the republic was to manage independently production potential accounting for between 60 and 70 percent of its production beginning as early as this year. It is likewise beyond a doubt that a resolution of all issues which would be in the interest of the republic and the Union as a whole and would not slow down the pace of necessary economic transformations and a transition of the economy to market arrangements could be found in the course of moving toward political independence on a strictly constitutional basis, by lawful means.

....On the surface, life in Vilnius goes on quietly and at its own pace, as usual. However, you encounter the signs of change all the time on the streets, in the shops, in the factories, in ministerial offices, and in the parliament. You also notice that not all the people have gotten used to them and endorsed them. Besides, it is impossible to sever the present from the past overnight, since the one fades into the other. For example, ask how to get to the Supreme Council of Lithuania, and some will tell you: Go along Gediminas Avenue, whereas the others will tell you as before—along Lenin Avenue. They are still not used to referring to the State Planning Committee as the recently created Ministry of the Economy. Not all the people refused to refer to the Supreme Council of the republic of Lithuania as the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR. Instead of the customary word "comrade" you get to hear and read "esteemed." The Lithuanians themselves say sarcastically: "Is this not a transition to the form of address 'mister?'"

Tension mounts beyond the facade of peace in everyday life. Confrontation in political decisions cannot last long. Wisdom must prevail. Ill-conceived and hasty political decisions exacerbate the economic situation which is difficult to begin with.

Presidential Decrees on Latvia, Estonia Issued

PM1505121190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 May 90 Second Edition p 2

[Text] Decree of the President of the USSR on the declaration by the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] "on the restoration of the independence of the Latvian republic."

The Supreme Soviet of the Latvian SSR adopted on 4 May 1990 a declaration "on the restoration of the independence of the Latvian republic." It proclaimed the Latvian parliament's declaration of 21 July 1940 on Latvia's entry into the USSR to be without legal force. At the same time it speaks of renewing the effectiveness of a number of articles of the Constitution of the Latvian Republic of 1922. This declaration, which was adopted by the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet, is in violation of Articles 70, 71, 73, and 75 of the USSR Constitution, and also of the USSR law of 3 April 1990 "on the procedure for resolving issues relating to the secession of a Union republic from the USSR." It runs counter to the legitimate rights and interests of other subjects of the Soviet Federation and to the USSR. The Constitution of the Latvian SSR which provides, in particular, for the holding of a referendum on the republic's secession from the USSR, is also violated with its adoption.

On the basis of points one and two of Article 127-3 and Articles 74 and 173 of the USSR Constitution, **I resolve:**

That the declaration by the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian SSR of 4 May 1990 "on restoring the independence of the Latvian republic" be declared as without judicial force from the moment of its adoption. [Moscow TASS in Russian at 1825 GMT on 14 May adds: "[Signed] M.S. Gorbachev, President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Moscow, the Kremlin; [dated] 14 May 1990]

Decree of the President of the USSR on recognizing as invalid the decision of the Estonian SSR "on the state status of Estonia." The Supreme Soviet unilaterally, without consulting the people of the republic, and ignoring the economic, political, cultural, and legal relations which have been established in the USSR, on 30 March 1990 adopted a decision "on the state status of Estonia," which regards the state authority of the USSR in Estonia as illegal. Thus, Articles 2, 70, 71, 73, and 75 of the USSR Constitution, and the law of the USSR "on the procedure for resolving matters relating to the secession of a Union republic from the USSR," have been violated.

On the basis of points one and two of Articles 127-3, 74, and 173 of the USSR Constitution, **I resolve:**

To declare the decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR of 30 March 1990 on the state status of Estonia invalid from the moment of its adoption;

Secondly, to regard as illegal any actions of state bodies and officials, and also citizens, carried out on the basis of the decision indicated. [Moscow TASS in Russian at 1825 GMT on 14 May adds: "[Signed] M.S. Gorbachev, President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Moscow, the Kremlin; [dated] 14 May 1990]

Report on Estonian Supreme Soviet Session

LD1505114590 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1700 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] This morning in Toompea [in Tallinn] the fifth session of the Supreme Soviet of republic of Estonia continued. It adopted an address to the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Congress of People's Deputies.

Point 6 on the agenda was discussed: the rendering of practical assistance to northeastern Estonia, this being an ecological catastrophe area.

Taking into account the great significance of the subject, and also the fact that the present draft document requires amendments, it was decided to hand the materials over for elaboration to the commissions on the environment and the economy. [passage indistinct]

Thereafter, rules for the temporary governing of Estonia were due for discussion. Marju Lauristin proposed—in the name of the working group—to postpone the issue. The situation has meanwhile changed so much [passage indistinct] has been implemented in the Supreme Soviet law on symbols. There is [passage indistinct] for discussion within the working group itself and in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Deputies voted in favor of Marju Lauristin's proposal.

Thus the fifth session of the Supreme Soviet had come to an end. In the afternoon, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet met in Kadriorg [in Tallinn]. The sixth session of the Supreme Soviet will open tomorrow [passage indistinct].

Estonia's Ryuytel Terms Gorbachev 'Progressive'

LD1405223290 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 1630 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] Sovit Union—Arnold Ryuytel, supreme representative of the Estonian republic, expressed in an interview given to a CZECHOSLOVAK PRESS AGENCY's special correspondent his gratitude to Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel for his open attitude toward Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and their problems. Ryuytel went on to show in the interview that his view about Mikhail Gorbachev was different from the view held by Vytautas Landsbergis: While according to Lithuania's supreme representative Gorbachev is now almost a politician of the past, the Estonian supreme representative considers the Soviet president to be progressive.

Savisaar Interviewed on Road to Inependence

AU1505093290 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 14 May 90 pp 168-172

[Interview with Estonian Premier Edgar Savisaar by Hermann Orth; place and date not given: "This Was Colonial Policy"]

[Text] [Orth] Mr. Premier, at a time when a stymied [blockierte] Lithuania is heading for a crisis, Estonia has abolished the term "Soviet Republic" and the red state flag. Why are you pushing on with the separation from the Soviet Union?

[Savisaar] It is the same process now taking place in Germany: the liquidation of the consequences of the war in Europe. So far, World War II has also ended for us. All states that existed in Europe before continued to exist in postwar Europe; only we three Baltic states no longer existed—three former members of the League of Nations. Europe may have forgotten this, but we did not do so.

[Orth] You are getting the reputation of disturbing detente in Europe....

[Savisaar] This is simply a joke; it reminds me of a cartoon in a West European newspaper in which the Poles, Czechoslovaks, and East Germans are gloriously marching to freedom, while three poor fellows follow them with their eyes through the bars of a cellar window. These three little fellows are Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. If their wish to get out of the cellar labels them as troublemakers, well, then we are troublemakers.

[Orth] The difference is precisely that, in contrast to Poles and East Germans, the three want to withdraw from the USSR.

[Savisaar] The point is not a secession from the Soviet Union, because we never entered the Soviet Union. We were occupied and annexed.

[Orth] The pressure from the Baltic republics has consequences that go beyond their own interests. For example, the unilateral Lithuanian declaration of sovereignty also affects the relations between Moscow and Washington. Why are you still in such a hurry?

[Savisaar] Our peoples feel that our progress is still too slow. We understand that Europe is interested in stability and peace in the Baltic states. It is not our objective to be a source of sensational reports for the world press. However, can you envisage peace and stability in the long run, without taking the will of the Baltic peoples into account?

[Orth] President Gorbachev also accepts the right to self-determination in principle. But why are you impatient at such a risky time? What Soviet reactions did, for example, the Lithuanians expect?

[Savisaar] I think that they planned to force Moscow into one of three possibilities: either recognizing Lithuania's sovereignty, suppressing Lithuania by violent measures, or getting the Lithuanians to rescind their declaration of sovereignty by other means. Moscow preferred the third variant.

[Orth] The Balts lay themselves open to the accusation that they endanger perestroyka in the Soviet Union, East-West relations, and the stability in Europe.

[Savisaar] We endanger the order defined by Helsinki in 1975 and which reminds us very much of the Vienna Congress of 1815. What was negotiated in Helsinki took, above all, the great powers' interests into account.

[Orth] You went yourself to Moscow for negotiations. To whom did you talk?

[Savisaar] Last time to Gorbachev and Rhyzkov, but those were not negotiations. Many of us spend much time in the Kremlin as USSR people's deputies and establish contacts with leading personalities in Moscow this way. We are quite at home there, we also know the strong and weak sides of the masters in the Kremlin. Last year, I was the deputy chairman of the People's Congress commission that had to evaluate the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Its chairman was politburo member Aleksandr Yakovlev, with whom very close contacts were, of course, established.

[Orth] Do you conduct an real dialogue with Moscow, and do people actually listen to you?

[Savisaar] Yes, we even get a response. However, Moscow is a big city and people there have very differing views. Some would prefer to send tanks here, where as others are on our side.

[Orth] Where does Mikhail Gorbachev stand?

[Savisaar] He takes the most difficult stance, namely one that is between those two camps.

[Orth] Do you have the impression that the decisive people in the Kremlin are ready for talks on the independence of the Baltic republics?

[Savisaar] This readiness is certainly greater than two years ago, yet it is obviously not great enough. People in Moscow are always ready for negotiations when they feel that they have to negotiate.

[Orth] Against their will?

[Savisaar] They did not want to negotiate with the miners of Vorkuta, but they were forced to. My Polish colleague Tadeusz Mazowiecki was not exactly received with great enthusiasm, yet he was received.

[Orth] Do you have the impression that, personally, Gorbachev would accept the independence of the Baltic republics?

[Savisaar] I certainly consider him to be a man who is able to learn a lot. For example, within a two year period, he also changed his attitude concerning the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

[Orth] The first Soviet leader to grant freedom and introduce democracy must be disappointed particularly with the Balts, who turn their backs on him and run away. Can you understand this?

[Savisaar] It is the Balts that have a right to be disappointed. Here, people say that whatever we get from Moscow arrives too late and is insufficient. In 1987, we raised the issue of economic independence. Had it been granted to us in 1988, our people would have been most satisfied and happy. However, we attained this objective only in 1990, and actually only half of it. Therefore, this concession has neither been a success nor impressed the people—and it even failed to yield any economic results.

[Orth] In your country one expected the annulment of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact on the occasion of its 50th anniversary, at least by admitting that those there were in fact such secret supplementary agreements.

[Savisaar] Yet this did not happen and this was the point at which the people started to break away. On 23 August 1989, the people formed the Baltic human chain to recall the pact and the resulting occupation. Three days later we were completely surprised by an arch-conservative reaction: A declaration of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, which most sharply rejected events in the Baltic republics, and which warned that this development was seriously threatening the fate of the Baltic peoples.

[Orth] Was this when the Balts turned their backs on Moscow?

[Savisaar] The result of this threat is that the process of independence in the Baltic states has become irreversible.

[Orth] Moscow wants to conduct talks only on the basis of the new regulations on the right to secession from the Union. Yet Lithuania rejects this. Is it of advantage to your common objective when each of the three Baltic states pursues a course of its own?

[Savisaar] Our main direction is the same, we have only opted for different means, even though the difference is only marginal, which is not bad at all. After all, Moscow is a major bureaucratic apparatus and nothing confuses a bureaucrat more than being confronted with differing demands and procedures. It is more difficult for him if everybody uses a different tactic.

[Orth] Yet Estonia is prepared to negotiate within the framework of the new regulations on secession, is it not?

[Savisaar] Our deputies in Moscow did not participate in the discussion and adoption of this law. First, this law does not refer to us, because, from the point of view of international law, we never joined the USSR, and, second, this law is most undemocratic, because it states that it is necessary to hold a referendum, which must be even carried out separately in areas with settlements of compact ethnic groups that speak a different language.

[Orth] You are afraid that you will not get the necessary two-thirds majority for independence?

[Savisaar] In Estonia, 40 percent of the people speak another language—mainly Russian; most of them live in northeast Estonia and would perhaps vote differently from the majority of the Estonian population.

[Orth] Thus, the Russians in northeast Estonia could establish an autonomous area, which remained linked with the USSR—is that your concern?

[Savisaar] This is possible.

[Orth] And therefore the immigrants, even if they have lived in Estonia for a long time, should not be permitted to participate in a referendum?

[Savisaar] There is the question of why these 40 percent who speak another language are still here. Until after the war, Estonia was a one-language country. Then a purposeful policy was pursued to downgrade the Estonians to a minority in their own country—this was a colonial policy.

[Orth] Perhaps many immigrants also prefer Estonia's independence.

[Savisaar] The chauvinist groups among the Russians in Estonia are already losing importance. At their rallies one can see this clearly; there are increasingly fewer participants. The Russians must understand that they are faced with the decision of resisting independence and carrying over the past problems into the future Estonia or following a common path together with us and being the builders of a new Estonia together with us. If one builds a house oneself, one does not feel so uncomfortable and frustrated as in a block of flats.

[Orth] Then you need not fear the referendum.

[Savisaar] Even if the referendum on independence had a positive result for us, the final decision is made by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies in Moscow. It has more than 2,000 deputies, but we are represented only with about 50 deputies. We do not have any chance at all there. Therefore, this law on secession is understood as a law on non-secession from the Soviet Union in our country.

[Orth] If the three Baltic republics become independent, Moscow will lose an important security zone at the Baltic Sea, which was a reason for the annexation of 1940. What do you have to offer as a compensation?

[Savisaar] The security aspects are already losing their importance. Europe is moving into the direction of a world without borders. The Scandinavian countries are even speaking of a demilitarized or at least nuclear-free north. Of course, we cannot and do not want to forget the security interests of our neighbor. We could reestablish the 1939 defense treaty, which set down exactly the number of Soviet bases and of the stationed troops. In the FRG, too, their are foreign bases and foreign units.

[Orth] With the Baltic states, the Soviet Union loses seven percent of its industrial production, including monopolized enterprises and key productions. How do you want to compensate for this loss?

[Savisaar] We are always accused of owing things to Moscow, that Moscow has invested a lot of capital here, and of always causing costs. Well, if they get rid of us, this would make things easier, would it not?

[Orth] This is a polemic argument.

[Savisaar] We do not want to cut off economic relations; on the contrary. Geographically, we are Russia's neighbors, we cannot shift ourselves to another place on the earth. We think that we will remain deliverers for the Soviet Union and also consumers of those products which have been imported from Russia so far. However, the exchange of goods should take place at world market prices.

[DER SPIEGEL] Then fuels—oil and coal—which you are importing from the USSR will become more expensive and you will get less money for your consumer goods.

[Savisaar] Today Leningrad and other Soviet areas get our electricity far below prime cost. Everything will end in a balance. In any case, our independence would certainly not entail the severing of economic relations.

[Orth] Estonian industry is still in Moscow's hands, the military is subordinate to Moscow. What means does the mouse have to enforce its independence from the bear?

[Savisaar] What speaks in our favor is the will of our people, which also counts something. Second, there is international law. Even though in their actions the big states sometimes forget, there is an international ban on using violence. Third, there is the support by the Russian democrats and the common will of all three Baltic states—in contrast to the first half of the century, which was one of the reasons in 1940 that it was so easy to pick us off one after the other.

[Orth] Do you expect claims on territory by Poland?

[Savisaar] In the talks with Solidarity representatives, it became clear that Poland is not interested in that. In this respect, there is not the slightest problem between Poland and Lithuania. Estonia, too, lost territories after the war: on the other side of the Narva and south of Lake Peipus. We do not make any claims to get these severed areas back. Such demands would lead into a dead end, as the situation in Transcaucasia, in Armenia, shows.

[Orth] Do you expect the multination Soviet state to disintegrate soon anyway?

[Savisaar] I do not think so. If one thinks of the political law of nature of inflexibility, the Soviet Union is far from disintegration. The Baltic states are a matter of their own. The developments here cannot cause a chain reaction.

[DER SPIEGEL] Do you expect support from the West? Should President Bush focus on the Baltic question during his meeting with Gorbachev at the end of May?

[Savisaar] In our country many people put their hopes on the West, but the Baltic question must be solved, above all, in the Baltic States. Everybody knows that the policy of the superpowers is largely free of moral considerations. But if the West wants to help, it should help Lithuania now. We measure the words and deeds of the West by its behavior in the case of Lithuania. However, the internal development of the Soviet Union, the democratization in Russia is decisive for us. If we have a totalitarian neighbor, we can be as independent as we want, but our fate will still hang by a silk thread.

[Orth] What do you expect—when will the three Baltic states be independent?

[Savisaar] There are so many uncertainties and processes, which are beyond our influence; one cannot make any forecasts. Were you able to imagine the speed of German unification? In history it is often the case that the things which seem unreal to us, suddenly become reality.

[Orth] This sounds cryptical, almost a bit resigned.

[Savisaar] Do you think that we would dedicate our life to a hopeless cause?

[Orth] Mr. Premier, thank you for this interview.

Estonian Name Change Evokes Protests

PM1405153990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 May 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Working People Protest"]

[Text] Tallinn, 11 May—The Estonian Supreme Soviet's decisions regarding state emblems have certainly aroused a mixed reaction within the republic. Let us recall that the Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] supreme organ of power resolved to invalidate the name "'Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic,' put a stop to the use of the Estonian SSR's coat of arms, flag, and anthem as state emblems, and introduced into effect the articles of the Estonian Republic's fundamental law of 1938...."

A considerable number of Estonia's inhabitants supported these government decisions.

But at the same time there is a large group of people who opposed the decisions. Rallies were held at a number of enterprises—the "Volta" Plant, Tallinn's I. Lauristin Machine Building Plant, and others—at which the participants approved the initiative taken by the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet people's deputies who called for the convocation of a congress of deputies of all levels who advocate the unity of the Soviet Federation with a view to pooling the efforts of all local self-management bodies and labor collectives to defend the constitutional rights of USSR citizens resident in Estonia.

Here, for instance, are extracts from the political declaration adopted by participants in a rally held by the "Elektrotekhnika" Science and Production Association collective today: "We demand that the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee urgently examine the laws adopted by the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet. We express complete support for the Committee for the Defense of Soviet Power and for its steps to guarantee the rights and interests of Estonian SSR citizens who do not want to sever their ties with the USSR, including a political strike throughout the Baltic region...."

The rally's participants said that in proclaiming the title "Estonian republic" the Supreme Soviet has once again unilaterally stated the Estonian SSR's de facto secession from the USSR.

The rallies' participants elected delegates to the congress of people's deputies of all levels who advocate the unity of the Soviet Federation.

Estonians Polled on Politicians' Popularity

LD1505101190 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 0700 GMT 9 May 90

[Text] The least favored politician in Estonia is Yevgeniy Kogan: this was the conclusion of the questionnaire conducted by the Mainor [bureau] in the second half of April. Even if Kogan enjoys the support of 32 percent of the non-Estonian population, nearly half of the non-Estonians—48 percent—and almost all Estonians—96 percent—are against him. There is no opposition of this magnitude against any other politician active in Estonia. Once one adds up the opinions of the Estonians and non-Estonians, then there is most support for Arnold Ryuytel [chairman of the Supreme Soviet], followed by Vaino Valjas [chairman of the Independent Communist Party of Estonia], Edgar Savisaar [prime minister and one of the leaders of the People's Front], Marju Lauristin [deputy speaker of the Supreme Soviet and one of the leaders of the People's Front] and Endel Lippmaa [minister without portfolio responsible for talks with Moscow].

Apart from Kogan, the least popular were also Vladimir Yarovoy [chairman of the Presidium of the United Council of Work Collectives], Igor Shepelevich [member of same Presidium] and Pavel Panfilov [in charge of the group of deputies for equal rights within the Supreme Soviet].

Altogether 994 individuals were questioned. The table of the politicians' popularity has been published in today's PAEVALEHT.

Riga Radio Carries 14 May Latvian Supreme Soviet

Procedural Matters Discussed

LD1405092290

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 0757 GMT on 14 May begins a live relay of the Latvian Supreme Soviet session in Riga.

Reporter Peteris Tabuns speaks about the non-election of the new internal affairs minister last Friday, and about Army officers crowding around the session's hall, exhibiting the Army's strength and their displeasure at an independent Latvia, with people asking them whether this is their job; also about the threats of a strike.

At 0805 GMT the presidium is not yet occupied, and Tabuns conducts interviews with three lawyers/

politicians, with opinions expressed that a plenary session should be a quorum with half the deputies present. They also discuss and interference with the Supreme Soviet's work.

At 0811 GMT Gorbunov opens the session.

At 0813 GMT a count of deputies shows 179 present.

At 0814 GMT Gorbunov announces that no special incidents have occurred in the republic. He mentions the Baltic leaders' meeting in Tallinn and an incident at 1040, which they have to discuss with Army representatives.

At 0816 GMT Godmanis speaks about the interior ministers' position; about continuing talks in Moscow, which had been started by the previous government; also about internal affairs matters. Godmanis had also talked with Bakatin. Godmanis does not have another candidate in place of Skudra; this question will be delayed until Wednesday.

At 0820 GMT Alekseyev, speaking in Russian, asks about composition of the republic's delegation for Moscow talks.

At 0825 GMT Godmanis replies to a question about delaying for two days the approval of Skudra.

At 0827 GMT Gorbunov reads a letter in Russian, from the Baltic Military District about service and alternative service, and says that this has also been discussed with Yazov.

At 0831 GMT Lagzdins asks whether this would begin discussion; Repse says that the alternative service question is deliberately being delayed because of the spring call up in progress.

At 0833 GMT proposals are made concerning replacing Latvia's representative in Moscow, and another concerning alternative service; it is also stated that alternative service should be included on the agenda, and also that the voting procedure at the Supreme Soviet should be discussed.

At 0839 GMT Alekseyev says that so long as they are USSR citizens and under its Constitution some matters cannot be discussed.

At 0840 GMT Gorbunov and others discuss agenda questions.

At 0843 GMT Plotnieks thinks that the session should not react to events outside. They should continue with government matters. He proposes that an alteration to the Constitution should be made for the parliament to be quorate with just over half of the deputies present.

At 0845 GMT Dimanis says that no civilized country's parliament requires a two-third presence.

At 0848 GMT Gorbunov summarizes the proposed agenda.

At 0851 GMT a vote on beginning the debate is adopted with 95 in favor. Agenda items on the finance minister, chairman of the Supreme Court, and state arbitrator are also adopted.

Quorum Matters Viewed

LD1405115390

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 0854 GMT continues its live relay of the Latvian Supreme Soviet session in Riga.

Discussion continues on various aspects of the agenda by many speakers.

At 0905 GMT changes to Articles 100 and 97 of the Constitution are approved, with 129 votes for, 47 against.

At 0908 GMT a proposal on military service is approved with 126 votes in favor.

At 0910 GMT other items on the agenda are approved by 159 votes in favor.

At 0916 GMT a vote is adopted on a permanent representative in Mosocw, with 97 votes in favor.

At 0923 GMT Deputy Endzins reports on some changes to the Constitution. He says that changing Article 100 to not less than half of the deputies present is necessitated by the destructive action last Friday.

At 0927 GMT questions are raised concerning the Constitution, the independence declaration and the 1922 Constitution, and last Friday's events.

At 0933 GMT a break of 29 minutes is announced.

At 1000 GMT reporter Tabuns notes that there were now fewer Army men outside.

At 1003 GMT Gorbunov opens the proceedings, and the debate on the constitutional changes continues.

At 1008 GMT Einers Repse speaks about accusations of minority rights not being considered, explaining how democracy works elsewhere, how opposition could become the majority by way of elections. The minority faction should not operate destructively, he says, but should, instead, criticize and prepare for the elections.

At 1012 GMT a Russian speaker proposes allowing eight deputies to speak, not six. At 1014 GMT the six-speaker proposal is adopted, with 98 votes for; the Russian speaker's proposal is rejected, with 66 in favor.

At 1017 GMT Dimanis agrees that other parliaments work as stated, but there were various proposals from the minority. Regulations should be drawn up. The minority faction has not acted destructively—the others had. They prevented a mistake being made. They should be able to work together in harmony, he says.

At 1020 GMT Mucins agrees with Dimanis, but says the two-thirds requirement is impossible, although there should be a provision for a minimum number of votes for adoption of decisions.

At 1023 GMT a Latvian speaker, Plotnieks, talks about his observations in the United States, and about stability of parliament in the West, repeating his proposition concerning Article 100. He proposes a change to Article 97 on the adoption of decisions by more than half the total number of deputies, but changes to the Constitution and ratification of treaties with the USSR and other countries by two-thirds of the total.

At 1037 GMT Ulme thinks that the working group's proposals should be adhered to. The opposition's situation should be specified. There is not a civilized situation. Also, the Greens' interests should be considered, but, most importantly, the basis for successful work should be established.

Alternative Service Debated

LD1405120890

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 1040 GMT continues its relay of the Latvian Supreme Soviet in Riga.

Rikards quotes from the 1922 Constitution concerning the necessary majority when voting, referring these to the present-day situation. He agrees with Dimanis that reglations should be worked on, but this would take time. He proposes that the commission's draft be adopted.

At 1044 GMT there are some procedural questions; Gorbunov suggests that, as the proposals overlap they should turn to the next question.

At 1048 GMT Jundzis reports on alternative service instead of military service for inhabitants of Latvia who do not wish to serve in the armed forces. He gives details of these proposals—generally a three-year alternative service—on various articles of the draft law. He also proposes the deletion of corresponding Criminal Code articles. His proposal embraces the question of compulsory military service of Latvia's inhabitants and desertion.

At 1102 GMT a Russian question is asked concerning citizenship, and Jundzis replies that since the citizenship issue has not been settled, they are therefore talking about inhabitants of Latvia.

At 1107 GMT Jundzis describes choice of serving in the forces as a USSR citizen; but with regard to choosing alternative service, religious, pacifist or other reasons do not apply.

AT 1104 GMT Gorbunov regrets that military representatives are not participating in this very important discussion. He then mentions nine deputies who want to speak in the debate. Gorbunov says that constitutional changes will be voted on after the lunch-break, and on the alternative service—tomorrow. But Repse is afraid that tomorrow there will not be enough deputies present.

At 1124 GMT Batarevskis, the first speaker in the debate, talks about the damage done to the environment by the Army, and proposes removal or restriction of the Army.

More on Debate

LD1405144390

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 1302 GMT resumes its relay of the Latvian Supreme Soviet session in Riga.

Gorbunov opens the sitting after the break, and speakers in the debate on alternative service continue.

At 1308 GMT Geidans mentions that there are enough military men present to render this debate quorate. He says quite a number of young men, unable to bear military service, are awaiting a judgement. It is bad enough for zinc coffins to be returned with Russian youngsters, youngsters should be able to serve their country in other ways.

At 1312 GMT (Yagupets) proposes cancelling several Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic laws in connection with alternative service.

At 1318 GMT Zeile mentions that some speakers are interested only in the Army. (Roja) says there is a lack of militiamen, but crime is increasing so there would be work for alternative service.

At 1321 GMT a Russian speaker, emphasizes that USSR laws are valid.

Repse mentions several instances where actions by the Army have not been investigated, which suggests that there are criminals in the Army leadership. He describes local instances, such as trampled-upon photographs of soldiers who had died in the Army and crying women, and details about seriously ill fugitive hunted deserters, and about deserters who, essentially, are not deserters. He appeals for the proposals to be adopted.

At 1338 GMT a Russian speaker proposes that an appeal by Georgians be read.

At 1340 GMT Alekseyev mentions the dreadful stories described by Repse. He talks about the military district and border guard district, and says that USSR laws should be observed.

At 1345 GMT Teikmanis appeals to the chairman not to allow the previous speaker, Alekseyev, to speak again, because he had spoken about matters not connected with this debate.

At 1350 GMT the debate is concluded. Gorbunov talks about procedural matters. There are pauses and interjections; Endzins does not immediately respond to provide information—apparently documents are being distributed. While waiting, Gorbunov announces that leaflets are being distributed in the city by the Interfront appealing for a stand to be taken against counterrevolution, and calling the Supreme Soviet deputies political adventurers. With Alekseyev apparently admitting that the leaflets are Interfront's, a commission is appointed with several volunteering to become its members to investigate this, adopted by vote.

Ar 1404 GMT Endzins, chairman of the legislation commission, reports on the proposed Constitution alterations. Gorbunov explains this. There is also a contribution by Jundzis, and some further questions by others.

Minister of Finance Approved

LD1405165590

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 1413 GMT continues its relay of the Latvian Supreme Soviet session in Riga.

At 1413 GMT discussion about formulation of the wording of proposed Constitution alterations continues. Following calls by the minority faction, at 1417 GMT a break is announced until 1450 GMT.

At 1450 GMT Gorbunov resumes the sitting and appeals for deputies to return to their seats.

At 1505 Godmanis proposes a new finance minister, followed by questions put to him concerning financial matters, including the lack of settlement of outstanding accounts of republican enterprises by Moscow.

At 1537 GMT a woman deputy praises the proposed finance minister. Andris Berzins suggests taking previous experiences into account and supports the nomination. Another deputy also mentions the frozen assets in Moscow.

At 1550 GMT, with 145 votes for, 13 against, and seven abstentions (Ilmars) Silins is approved minister of finance.

At 1553 GMT Endzins reports on the wording of proposals concerning Article 61 of the Constitution on the duty of the citizens of the republic of Latvia and USSR citizens permanently residing in Latvia to serve in the Army or undergo alternative service.

At 1558 GMT Gorbunov says that these new versions should be distributed and studied, but that the Constitution should not be altered.

At 1603 GMT a count of deputies is made. By 118 votes for, 42 against, and two abstentions, it is decided to continue work.

At 1604 GMT Budovskis reports that it is proposed to refer the Interfront appeal, and the leaflets distributed by hand and from helicopter, to the procurator, demanding the culprits be found, and asks Alekseyev to explain to the Supreme Soviet. There are some questions followed by discussion. At 1614 GMT a vote on the commission's proposed text ends with 133 for, 20 against, and three abstentions.

At 1615 GMT Alekseyev, in Russian, says that he could not reply today, but everything expressed in the leaflet concerning the Constitution corresponds to reality.

At 1618 GMT a proposal is made to televise tomorrow's proceedings, which is adopted.

At 1619 GMT a break of 15 minutes is announced.

Article 61 Adopted

LD1405172790

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 1646 GMT continues its relay of the Latvian Supreme Soviet session in Riga.

Gorbunov gives the floor to Jundzis in connection with Article 61 of the Constitution. Plotnieks calls for Union republics. Jundzis calls for the USSR. Plotnieks explains his opinion regarding the wording. Discussion on this continues until 1654 GMT.

At 1700 GMT a vote on the commission's wording and the article is taken: 135 for, four against, and 20 abstentions; the law is adopted.

At 1701 GMT it is announced that alternative service and organizational questions will continue tomorrow.

At 1702 GMT the session is closed. It is announced that work will restart at 0700 GMT tomorrow. The relay ends.

Report of 'Scuffles' Outside Latvian Assembly

LD1405132490 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 1129 GMT 14 May 90

[Report by radio correspondent Viktors Rudzitis]

[Summary] At around 0930 a group of soldiers and officers of the Soviet Army had begun to gather on Doma Laukums Square, afterwards proceeding to the Supreme Soviet building, breaking through the ranks of the voluntary public militia and surrounding the side entrance. Scuffles also occurred.

When I myself tried to make a recording, my microphone was grabbed and another soldier from behind pulled me to the ground, trying to kick both me and the tape-recorder. I was not injured although their facial expressions had shown that the next time they would not stop at that.

A little later Anotoliy Gorbunov came out and spoke to them. Army representatives demanded the removal of the voluntary guards, replacing them with militia. They demanded an end to the independence declaration against interference by soviet power into Army affairs. Gorbunov appealed to them to withdraw from the building entrance and it was decided to invite representatives of the soldiers' group for talks. The soldiers attempted to replace the militia, injuring several women and young people.

There was no official information on the results of the talks, but, unofficially, it could be said that a partial agreement was arrived at that the Army must not interfere in the republic's internal affairs, and there is a possibility of further dialogue. It was an independent initiative group's organized action, although Gorbunov said that this was not an initiative but an example of crowd psychology.

Latvian Parliament Elects Cabinet Ministers

LD1405160290 Moscow TASS in English 1544 GMT 14 May 90

[By TASS Correspondent Galina Kuchina]

[Text] Riga, May 14 TASS—The Latvian parliament today approved Economics Minister Janis Aboltins.

The candidate for the interior minister's post was close to approval. However, a protest by the Riga militia, which backed the former minister, and a refusal by the opposition to vote, resulted in the lack of a quorum.

Musician and composer Rajmond Pauls is the most popular would-be minister. He is now enthusiastic about reforms in culture and heads preparations for the Latvian song festival to be held in summer.

Janis Jurkans, 44, as aspirant foreign minister, is a dark horse among the candidates. He is a specialist in English language and literature.

He worked as house painter, rescue seaman and the foreign affairs committee co-chairman at the Latvian People's Front for the past ten years.

The parliamentary group of this public organisation, which enjoys a majority in the Supreme Soviet, handpicked cabinet members by their loyalty to the movement. Jurkans is a Pole, all the others are Latvians.

The homogenic composition of the leadership in Latvia where representatives of 120 people live, provokes discontent among non-Latvians.

Supreme Soviet Chairman Anatoliy Gorbunov promised that parliament would reflect the sentiments of all people populating the republic. Some local lawmakers believe that parliament does not display any desire to conduct a dialogue with various ethnic groups.

Parliamentary leaders politely listen to the opinion of the minority group and then repeat the traditional phrase: "Let us vote". The lack of a compromise leads to tension.

Councillors in Daugavpils, the second largest Latvian city, said that they reserve the right to suspend the operation in the city of laws and decisions which run counter to the Constitutions of the Latvian republic and the USSR.

They sent a letter to President Mikhail Gorbachev.

The flow of letters to the president shows that the republic lacks a mechanism to settle conflicts independently. A dialogue between Latvia and Moscow is important. But a dialogue with various ethnic and social groups inside the republic is much more important.

In the opinion of lawyer Yuriy Bojars, deputy to the all-Union and Latvian parliaments, parliamentary leaders should seek support from Russian-speaking residents when making decisions at the session.

The "iron discipline" which is much stronger than in the previous Supreme Soviet, builds up pressure and decreases the chance for pluralism of opinions.

Labor Collectives Council Calls 15 May Strike

LD1405214190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2019 GMT 14 May 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] [Announcer] On 15 May there will be a strike in Latvia, called by the United Council of Labor Collectives, against the new parliament's decision to withdraw from the USSR.

This strike is a reaction to the very complex political situation in the republic. Under our "Nighttime Conversation" heading, Ninel Kasyanova talks with members of the Equality [ravnopraviye] parliamentary faction, deputies who represent the minority in the Supreme Soviet of Latvia:

[Begin recording] [S.L. Dimanis, identified by screen caption] If the heads of collectives have decided to strike, that proves that they simply had no other way out. They had no other way in which they could express their attitude to parliament's work.

[Ye.N. Yagupets identified by screen caption] Daugavpils has taken the decision to strike, but to strike in such a way that this strike does not affect industrial production efficiency.

[Unidentified woman] It is a warning strike, so to speak.

[Yagupets] It is a warning measure.

[Dimanis] If workers are not in agreement with parliament's decisions they should, in my view, not so much strike as conduct various kinds of political actions and rallies, write petitions, and argue that the kind of decisions that are made without consultation with the public and without consideration of the parliamentary minority's rights, may give rise to a series of acts of civil disobedience. [video shows speakers addressing audience; interviewees sitting round table] [end recording]

Work of Latvian Party Congress Assessed

90UN1581A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 10 Apr 90 p 1

[A. Grigoryan report: "Hoping for a Renaissance"]

[Text] The first stage in the work of the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress, which, while actually a regular congress, in all its parameters deserves the title of "extraordinary," is now complete. The second stage, when the Latvian Communist Party Program and Rules will be confirmed, will take place after the 28th CPSU Congress. Last Sunday resolutions were adopted on the status of the renewed Latvian Communist Party and its top priority organizational and regulatory questions. The newly elected Central Committee was assigned the task of devising a program to extricate the republic and the party from crisis.

Returning to the two days of the congress' work we emphasize once again that the most acute polemic developed about the ways to be used to solve the situation that has developed and about what the party should be in the process of renewal. Strictly speaking this polemic started at the previous congress. Even then it was clear that within the party a delineation of forces was taking place and there were supporters for the different forces, including some diametrically opposed viewpoints. The fact is that several ideological platforms have recently been formed in the Latvian Communist Party, around which the republic's communists have grouped depending on their attitudes toward two closely connected and fundamental issues, namely Latvia's state sovereignty and the independence of the Latvian Communist Party.

At the congress the line of demarcation was finally settled. On one side were the delegates who are convinced of the need to preserve the ideological and organizational unity of the Latvian Communist Party within the CPSU, and the unity of the republic within a renewed federation, and on the other there are those who support an independent Latvian Communist Party in a politically independent and economically independent Latvia that is a legal entity under international law.

Of course, they were not the only extreme views from the palette of opinions voiced at the congress, but they were the dominant ones. There was also speeches containing attempts to find a compromise. And although I believe that few believed in the reality of such attempts, let us consider them in somewhat more detail.

On what basis did those who support an independence Latvian Communist Party propose to look for a common language? The draft Program and Rules drawn up by the Central Committee and submitted for consideration by the congress were their idea of this. But those supporting an independent Latvian Communist Party added four clauses to the drafts of those documents. They had a single intent—to concretize their own positions with great specificity. Specificity and clarity were also achieved by another section of the delegates, who turned out to be in the majority. But that majority, of course, proceeded on the basis of its own convictions. And the vagueness in a number of fundamental points in the documents submitted to the congress was also not dispersed. And first and foremost the answer to the main, priority question: What kind of party are we talking about?

At this point the heat of the polemic reached a critical point on the second day. When the majority rejected a proposal to adopt as its basis a draft program, the minority delegates walked out of the meeting hall. After a brief exchange of opinions the congress continued its work in the great hall of the House of Political Enlightenment. And what about the minority? It headed for the small hall (once again history was pleased to create a symbolic coincidence). There this main thought was voiced: Right from the start the majority had rejected the draft program worked out by the former Central Committee, which has opened up the possibility of reaching agreement. This document (with the addition of the four clauses proposed by A. Chepanis) will be the subject of debate at a congress of those who support an independent Latvian Communist Party.

But let us return to the hall, where the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress continued its work. One of the central moments there was the debate of draft resolutions and decisions adopted by the congress. It is worth looking in more detail at the document that provided for considerable extension of the rights of the primary organizations—the main wing of the party. This problem has become extremely acute. As many people noted, the first secretaries have fallen into humiliating dependence on higher party organs. Now they are being offered much more independence than previously. How? First through direct, secret, and alternative election of leading organs. All the most important decisions will not be reached until after discussion in the primary organizations and giving due consideration to their opinion. In this case, if the latter are unable to succeed in coming into line during the course of debate, party referendums will be held. First secretaries will be given the right to retain half of the party dues received.

There was another event also worthy of mention, namely, the assessment of the activity of the former Central Committee. At first a dispute broke out about whether or not it is in general necessary to provide that assessment if the Central Committee report to the congress is not an accountability report but a political report. Attempts were made to cite precedent in the history of the CPSU, but none could be found. As a result they concluded that the congress itself had the power at its own discretion to decide the question that had arisen. It was decided that the Central Committee activity would be assessed. But precisely how? There were two proposals: the standard "satisfactory" or "unsatisfactory" from earlier times. The choice was the latter.

And why was such a severe assessment given? In the opinion of those representing the majority, it was dictated by the inauspicious results with which the Latvian Communist Party had come to its 25th Congress. The Central Committee was largely to blame for the deepening crisis in the party and for the connivance of those communists who found themselves standing at separatist positions. The Central Committee was criticized particularly sharply for its neglect during the preparations for the elections to the soviets at all levels. As is known, under the conditions of the multiparty system that has virtually taken shape in the republic, from being the ruling party the Latvian Communist Party has become an opposition party. Reproaches were also addressed at the Central Committee for the fact the it had turned a blind eye to the process, and that as a result almost all of the mass media are now in the hands of the Latvian Communist Party's political opponents.

The congress once again showed that the loss of party influence in the life of society has led to serious losses. There has been a marked decline in the number of communists. During the past year or so about 7,000 people have been expelled from or resigned from the party. Of these, more than 4,000 resigned voluntarily. Some 60 percent of those who resigned are Latvians, who made up 39.5 percent of the party organization. This spontaneous withdrawal is proof of the fragility of ideological convictions and confusion, and, as the newspaper PRAVDA emphasized in its account of the congress, of the "littering" of the consciousness with slogans and appeals. One paradoxical fact is that at the same time a whole series of leaders and ideologues in the informal movements and parties, who one way or another are urging the communists to ill-considered decisions, still remain members of the Communist Party and even occupy prominent positions in its apparatus!

And so the first stage of the congress' work is over. It has finally laid to rest the myth from the period of stagnation about the monolithic unity of the ranks of communists. What happened there must be called something else. Perhaps those who counsel for the harsh definition of "split" are right. And the word "delineation" is being loudly heard. But the latter version does leave some hope that the door is not totally closed. In any event, the delegates decided unanimously that in the election of the new Central Committee, one-third of the seats in it will be reserved.

RSFSR

PRAVDA on Gorbachev Frunzenskiy Rayon Speech

PM1405133190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
14 May 90 Second Edition pp 1-2

[Unattributed report: "For Party Unity and Consolidation of Forces of Perestroyka. M.S. Gorbachev's Speech to Communists of Capital's Frunzenskiy Rayon." A centrally located boxed inset reads: "Socialist Idea Is a Fruitful One. Not for Nothing Does It Retain Vast Millions of Supporters Notwithstanding All the Deformations It Has Undergone During Its Implementation in Our Country and Others"]

[Text] It has already been announced that communists from Moscow's No. 4 party electoral district met with candidate delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and the 28th Conference of the Moscow City CPSU organization 11 May in the IZVESTIYA conference hall.

M.S. Gorbachev, president of the USSR and general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, addressed its participants.

I would first like, he said, to thank the communists who represent the party organizations of our district where Valeriy Nikolayevich Baranov and I are candidate delegates to the 28th party congress. I thank you all for your trust and your desire to see us as your representatives at the congress, which is obviously destined to play an important—a very important—role in the life of our party and in the history of our fatherland.

While contemplating this meeting I wondered what I should say to you. Should I set out a program, as is customary now? But I believe that you are aware of my positions. I only want to say that I will not change my policy under any kind of pressures. There is no way back for me. Not only because I have linked my future with this policy and made my choice as a communist and must fully apply all my efforts to this choice. But because we will not find the answers to all the questions that life has raised and that have accumulated in our country throughout our history by returning to the old forms of societal life, the old approaches, the old concepts and views. Answers must be sought by moving forward. I am profoundly convinced of that. What is more, we must now move faster. The situation demands it.

I would like to confirm once again before the district's communists that I am devoted to the socialist idea. This is the guiding idea in my activity. This determines my position as a communist. I believe that, by utilizing the experience we have accumulated, learning from the past, considering the experience of all civilization and all other countries and peoples which live and function alongside us, and by resolving our problems, we will be able to implement this socialist idea today in such a way that it bears truly great fruit for the people and for every individual. With regard to changes in our view of socialism, I see the main change as being to humanize our society, to make it more human through democracy, by involving people in all social processes and by creating living conditions that accord with the principles of social justice and help people realize their own potential. I am not seeking any third way. The socialist idea is a fruitful one. Not for nothing does it retain vast millions of supporters notwithstanding all the deformations it has undergone during its implementation in our country and others. I think we are on the right road. I agree with the critical standpoint held by my rival in this district—Valeriy Nikolayevich Baranov—since I myself am also critically inclined with regard to everything we have done and the way we have lived hitherto. My main conclusion on the results of my own life's experience and political activity is this—we must no longer live as we did in the past, we must change our life. But I want to say once again that life must be changed and restructured—but by realizing the socialist idea. That is the first thing that I would like to say.

Second. I want to acquaint you with my position and my views as to how we must act at the current stage of perestroyka. Here I have the following question, which was asked by Comrade Smirnov, representative of the Ministry of General Machine Building. (Let me take this opportunity to thank this ministry's party organization for nominating me as a candidate delegate to the city party conference). So, Comrade Smirnov voices the idea that the political force which is able to formulate and apply the most precise socioeconomic systems model of our society will have the greater chance of victory in the political struggle under way in our country. The question's author believes that, unfortunately, the events of recent years, the speeches and the articles, indicate that the CPSU lacks this kind of model. At best there are only individual fragments of it, and no one is noticeably involved in developing such a model. Comrade Smirnov believes that this is the source of all our thrashing about, of the inability to foresee the real consequences of many decisions and to react in a correct and timely fashion to the events taking place. He asks the following question: Can you, Mikhail Sergeyevich, really not see the danger in this for the CPSU? After all, the Bolsheviks had a theoretical model of this kind and made very successful use of it....

I would like to dispute this. First, I believe that we must conduct a theoretical analysis of the state of our society and consider the level of its development and maturity both from the viewpoint of the economy and from the viewpoint of intellect, political culture, and so on. Without doubt we must all do this in order to determine the concept of choice, the thrust of our policy, and to set our goals. But I believe that we must find answers to specific questions in life itself.

The whole trouble was that—and I believe this was the biggest mistake, particularly after V.I. Lenin had already realized the need to change the views on which the Bolsheviks had based themselves at the initial stage of revolutionary transformations—an artificial model conceived and born to a significant extent in the struggle between opposing forces was imposed on our society. Society was indeed forced into this model. That is why there was so much injustice and deformation that our hopes of reaching the goals with which we associated the implementation of the socialist idea were unrealized.

I believe that the merit of the CPSU today lies in the fact that it has analyzed this entire path with all its achievements and losses and is now standing firm on the position of Leninist dialectics, the position of reality and consideration for these realities—both internal and external.

This is what has enabled us to correctly determine the ideas of perestroyka and shape the basic directions. And if we do not have a timetable, I am convinced that we do not need one. We need to understand the thrust of the processes, we need goals and bold questing with the participation of the various forces of society. It was for this that we created the atmosphere of democracy and glasnost. We are reforming ownership relations in order, via the new political process in conditions of democracy and glasnost, to render man the main protagonist in all spheres—economy, policy, culture. As the main protagonist he must also advance perestroyka, relying on his knowledge of the real processes within and all the potential of society, and making use of the experience of other peoples. This is also the realization of the formula that socialism is the living creativity of the masses.

A fundamental strategic mistake hitherto consisted in the fact that people were alienated—from ownership, from political power, and from culture. I believe we have drawn the right conclusion from this and have set about involving all strata of society in the processes of revolutionary transformations. Indeed, the entire people are getting involved now.

Thus, we have a concept. But we have not only a concept but also a policy. A policy in the economic sphere, a policy for restructuring our political system and interethnic relations, and for transforming the federation. Last, we have our own view—which has been set out in the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the congress and the new party statutes—regarding the reform and renewal of the party itself.

I think that we should conclude from this that we are moving in the right direction. And in this connection I make a high assessment of everything that has been accomplished during the perestroyka period. We are already a different country now, a different people, and a different party—there is a different atmosphere in society. And we will never revert to the way we were three to five years ago. That is a supreme achievement.

Yes, there have been mistakes, there have been shortcomings—there have been, people can rebuke us for that. But I want to say that we all sincerely wanted there to have been fewer of these mistakes. We did everything for this purpose, but our knowledge and the experience we had available—including the best forces in the party and society—proved inadequate.

Remember how we started the five-year plan and how we started moving toward economic reform. How did we begin? With the experiment at the Sumi Machine Building Association. There were attempts to introduce contracts in Kazakhstan, and Stavropol got involved with this. We were trying things out and seeking new formats. However, all these were just episodes.

But they were the starting point for our quest. Then three to five ministries, later half, and subsequently our entire economy switched to economic accountability and self-financing. But we have not yet reached the point where the entire economy is really operating on the principles of economic accountability and self-financing. We have switched the economy to these principles. But changeover and action are two different things. We still have loss-making enterprises producing R24 billion in losses, while there are front-ranking enterprises whose earnings are taken away and passed on to others.

We are analyzing all this and gaining experience. And let me say bluntly that without the experience we have amassed in the economic sphere, the sphere of the political process, the sphere of democracy and glasnost, and the sphere of interethnic relations you and I would not have produced anything today. This has been a period of quantitative accumulations. We have had to be smarter in working out what had happened in our history, what was good about it, what we could take with us, and what we needed to abandon. But I can in no way agree with those who claim that we are rushing things, that we know nothing, and that therefore we are doomed—because of our lack of a computer model—to further vacillation and hesitation.

We have very many people who are fond of simple solutions. But there are no such solutions. And those who claim that they have definitive answers and simple solutions to all questions, that these solutions will painlessly lead everyone along the only correct path, and therefore call on people to eschew the current leadership more rapidly—such people, in my view, are simply political scoundrels and nothing more. Let me responsibly state to communists and the entire country that these are political scoundrels!

The process of reforming and renewing our society is a historically difficult and highly complex process. Let me say further that we are revolutionaries who are implementing profound transformations in a society which is not yet ready for them. After all, we are used to waiting for orders virtually from the USSR Government about what nail we should use and which one we should hit. We all have a complex about theory, politics, and economic approaches, and we have all grown used to lack of initiative and to accepting the most dreadful leveling. The slightest initiative or the slightest promotion for people on the basis of their talent annoys many people. A farmer from Ryazan spoke at the Central Committee to say that as soon as he showed what he could accomplish in a year if he really worked—that is to say, he increased milk yields to 4,000-5,000 liters—he was branded a Rockefeller. Leaseholders' farms have been burned in Chelyabinsk and Tyumen. This all shows the stagnation of social awareness. And we, comrades, must destroy that stagnation and arouse people through democracy, glasnost, the new position of people, and the use of new mechanisms and approaches.

I believe this process is under way. It is proceeding very quickly and dynamically, it has stunned us all; many people are in a state of shock and confusion, and some people think that it is all a catastrophe and that we are collapsing. There are people who deliberately want to scare others by talking about a catastrophe and claiming that it is allegedly bound up with the policies recommended by our current leaders. The conclusion is clear-- accept our services, they say, and everything will be quite different. Admittedly, they do not reveal what they want to offer us. If we approach matters responsibly then we have not yet seen a single serious alternative.

Let us take a look at things: There is criticism in this country—a lot of correct criticism—and this criticism should be accepted, transformed into policy, and amendments made. That is correct. But I think that everything confirms that we are on the right track. We need to go down that track. Months or a year should now resolve everything. We have reached a point where we have experience, the relevant laws have been passed, and the legal prerequisites have been created. We have gotten smarter and are not scared now to argue about socialism, the multiparty system, glasnost, the market, and so forth.

Although a couple of weeks ago the thought of a market would have literally shocked many people. Journalists "helped" in this respect. It is a typical example of unripe fruit being thrown into a politicized and really "highly strung" society. This leaves people in such a state and produces such an atmosphere that it is hard to keep control of the helm of the ship.

But we are now more prepared to take really major steps. And we should already be taking these steps in the economy and really getting down to things.

We also have experience—both bitter and positive—of reforming the federation, and laws have already been adopted on the restriction of functions, the right of secession, economic independence, and a number of other points which concern our republics' real position. Our elections are over and the system of soviets has been set up. The soviets are undertaking what was previously handled by party organs. A colossal regrouping of forces and redistribution of labor is under way. The party is ridding itself of alien functions and is itself seeking a new social role—and that is the gist of the precongress discussion and the elaboration of documents which we are to conclude at the 28th congress. In other words, in all areas we have reached the stage where everything will really have to be done, and this raises the question of a systematic form for our actions.

It is true that when one thing is done but something else is not done, nothing will come of it. We started with the economy, put forward the idea of acceleration, and intended to move ahead sharply through scientific and technical progress. It did not work—because the economic environment in which we raised these tasks rejects science and scientific and technical progress. We had to realize then that it was necessary to reform ownership relations. We started changing these relations in the economy, but we can see that we can do nothing, since the superstructure is still in place, like a hoop, over us all: We need to destroy this system, but how are we to do it?

Through political reform and through people, since it is already impossible to achieve anything "from above." Otherwise the same fate would befall us as befell all the previous reforms which we started from above. The current reforms had already started sputtering when we set about political reform—but this political reform has gone so far, generated such processes, and acquired such a dynamic that we will not be able to redo everything. Events are running ahead of the movement of society and thought, and we cannot think maturely about everything and transform everything into policy and practice—which is affecting our work. That much is clear, comrades, even to the naked eye.

The question then arises of the backwardness of political solutions and practical steps—that is natural. We are striving to synchronize all these avenues. It has been proposed that one question be taken and resolved and that we then move on to the next; certain people have said that we have opened up many fronts and many directions at once. Incidentally, IZVESTIYA journalists have spoken out on this score too.

We now have a party discussion under way, it is part of the precongress discussion and I would frankly say in a party manner, comrades: Yes, we need a systems approach. But we cannot now focus on just one point. For instance, if we neglect the federation, processes will emerge there which will hamper political processes and economic reform, and stop everything.

Or, for instance, if we neglect the political reform and stop ensuring that the soviets fulfill their role of restoring true people's power in our country, nothing would come of it once again. And that is true of all our work.

Since we are participants in the precongress election campaign we are being asked many questions about the forthcoming 28th congress.

I believe we are approaching an extraordinarily important congress, and we have created definite guarantees to ensure that communists are fully represented at this congress through the new system of delegate elections. Thus communists themselves will have a direct influence on the course of the congress—they are already doing that now—and on the decisionmaking. There is greater confidence that the party will be represented at the congress by those people whom communists trust.

I am not saying that this is a sterile process—look how complex it is. I, for example, am very concerned, and I admit that I, as general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, have even sent a telegram saying that the first stage of the nomination of candidates which is now over has produced a low percentage of working class representation. It was two-five percent—in other words, hardly any workers representatives at all. I consider this abnormal. This is simply a disaster! What has happened, therefore, is that in the elections of USSR people's deputies workers were crowded out, just as they were in the elections to our Russian republic's Supreme Soviet. The workers are of the opinion that the party is not really concerned about the advancement of workers in all areas, including at the 28th congress.

I think that this should be of concern to everyone because we are the party of the working class, the party of working people. Otherwise the congress will not be able to really express all the feelings of the party mass unless it is represented by workers and peasants. In other words, it must properly represent the whole party. There must be a response to this. Nevertheless, I think that in the final analysis when the election campaign is over communists will be represented at the congress by active people and party organizations by active communists, and this gives us hope for the congress success.

I think we acted correctly when we launched the precongress party discussion several months in advance. This gives an opportunity to thoroughly discuss all the problems connected with the current stage of perestroyka and the renewal of society, all the problems connected with the renewal and reform of the party.

It is the case that Valeriy Nikolayevich Baranov leans more toward the "Democratic Platform" while I lean toward the CPSU Central Committee Platform. But I must say that I see quite a few points where our divergences are not ones of principle. Admittedly there are points where those divergences are considerable.

The appearance of this alternative "Democratic Platform" has fueled the discussion and enables us to deepen it and clarify certain questions when discussing what the party should be like: The vanguard, permanently operating in all labor collectives and all spheres of society's life—or a parliamentary party, working mainly to win certain positions and implement its programmatic goals through a certain number of operations and political actions, having nominated its representatives to parliament. I would say that these are major divergences.

The CPSU Central Committee and I myself are firmly committed to the party of the vanguard type. I believe that the party, in changing and reforming itself, should not depart from any spheres and should be alongside and together with all our people, particularly at this important and crucial stage.

Here, too, however, there are coincidences as well as divergences. Yes, in conditions of an incipient political pluralism the CPSU must master the art of parliamentary struggle, know how to run election campaigns, unite with other parties and create blocs, defend its positions, and so forth. In other words, there must be no insuperable barriers like the Berlin Wall here, even though that, too, has now come down.

Or take the discussion on democratic centralism. Yes, this is a question of striking at the party bureaucracy—through improving the party structures and changing the forms of its activity. This is necessary. This, in my view, is a partywide task. Here, too, there are coincidences. The principle of party democratization links both platforms. So there is a major coincidence here. I think that it is precisely this factor which enriches the debate on this question.

But there are also principled divergences. We say: Yes, democratic centralism must allow and presuppose a complete freedom of debate, platforms, alternatives, heterodox thinking, clashes of positions, and comparisons of views. But we are opposed to factions with their own internal structure and internal discipline. Whereas "Democratic Platform" permits the existence of factions of this very kind. I think that had we opted for that path we would have closed our eyes to the fact that some people, in introducing this idea into the "Democratic Platform," are seeking to bring the party down. And if at this historic stage we had transformed the CPSU, this mighty, organized political force which is to help us promote perestroyka and unite people—since in the framework of democracy and decentralization, many things are accompanied by centrifugal processes—into a debating society split by parallel structures, then I think this would have weakened the party and dealt it the most serious blow. And in general this would have meant a split. This, I believe, is the most fundamental divergence.

On all the other questions you can put the emphasis on this point or that, you can hold a discussion. It is a discussion which will help us go to the congress with better considered proposals on the platform and the statutes. I think that this discussion will help to consolidate all the healthy forces in the party and will cleanse and strengthen its ranks.

At this point, comrades, people asked: "Will you raise the question of purging the party of the plutocracy of all shades at the congress?"

I do not think that we should wait for the congress but should use the existing glasnost and democratism to cleanse ourselves of the plutocracy and approach the congress with the cleansing process already under way. Communists must be absolutely clear here, I think. After all, if the party was built into and, furthermore, was itself the nerve center of the command and administration system it will bear the stigma of all the vices of that system. And are we really ignorant of all these patrimonies large and small which we are now trying to destroy? We also know how difficult this is. But we must progress through this stage, utilizing the potential of party democracy. In general it seems to me that in taking this path we will indeed avoid that split in the party and will elaborate the documents which will enable us to consolidate both the party and society.

Is the emergence of other political tendencies and parties possible? Yes, after all we have said that we renounce the monopoly position, we support political pluralism, cooperation, and dialogue with all political currents. And I am sure that we will cooperate and join forces with those whose views are close to ours. Ultimately the fate of the people and the fate of the country are the touchstone on which the position of this or that party is judged.

Thus I have answered the questions raised on this matter. I would like to conclude this discussion by saying that we should not become nervous now but should increase the main offensive, we must resolutely rebuff the reactionaries [retrograd] and those who draw us backward: In general we must resolutely combat all the "fanatics"—on the right and the left.

They have united against the main thing—the policy of perestroyka and its supporters. Remember May Day, the end of the demonstration. That, comrades, was their outburst. And let us not underestimate the fact that this was a kind of signal and a serious one, too. We must see that.

Today I addressed rectors of the country's higher educational institutions; there were 900 of them, it was an important discussion within the framework of the perestroyka processes. We must consider, I said to them, how it was that the banners of the Moscow Voters' Association were carried by the kind of tendencies which it is hard even to imagine at all. At the Moscow Clock and Watch Plant one young comrade approached me and said: "Mikhail Sergeyevich, I belong to the Democratic Union but I am categorically opposed to what these forces campaigned for on Red Square on May Day"....

Clearly, many others who found themselves marching beneath these slogans disagreed with them, too.... The organizers of this action had something else in mind, they were counting on greater things and even asked for a demonstration carrying on until 6 pm; they were thinking of bringing out half a million Muscovites and urging them to storm the Kremlin and the Lubyanka. Let us not oversimplify what happened. There were slogans such as "Down With Lenin!", "Down With the CPSU!", "Down with Gorbachev!" Meanwhile anarchist and monarchist flags flew over this assembly and pictures of Nicholas II, Joseph Stalin, and Boris Yeltsin were held aloft. Just think about what we saw and what we encountered.

But such is the logic. The times are such now, we have approached the stage when everything will really change, no one has any time to spare, and those who are leading and promoting perestroyka will, if they are not resolute and consistent now, lose perestroyka, and they will certainly be exposed to attack from right or left. But the "fanatics" too understand that their time is running out. There will therefore be sharp skirmishes now, and it is necessary to keep cool and resist the pressure of those who are already urging violence and disorder. That is my stance, the one I am taking to the congress, and I set it out frankly for the communists who show their trust in me by nominating me as a candidate delegate.

Here is a fine note, M.S. Gorbachev said with a smile: "Mikhail Sergeyevich, stick with it!" Let us end with that.... (laughter and animation in the hall).

M.S. Gorbachev read out a number of other notes received from participants in the meeting.

Question: How do you understand the statements made by certain people's deputies regarding the destatization of enterprises, that is to say, the selling off of state property belonging to all the people. After all, state property has formed over the decades, and the labor of an enormous number of people has been invested in it. And suppose a small group of deputies decides the fate of socialist property without the assent of all the people? (This question was put by Comrade Belykh from the "Yava" Factory.)

M.S. Gorbachev: The reform of ownership relations presupposes that we open up the opportunity for labor collectives to make use of different forms of economic management. The question of ownership is a fundamental one. How we tackle it will determine how the transition to new forms of economic management will be effected. I believe this was discussed in society in the shape of drafts and then adopted and enshrined in the Law on Ownership—those are, in principle, sound positions which will give us the opportunity to really reform ownership relations. Exactly like the Law on Land.

I see no reason that we should sell off enterprises or land, break everything up within a short period, no.

We must reform ownership relations. I think the most painless way to do this is to create small enterprises and destatize through issuing shares, which means retaining the social bases. While, on the other hand, this will be collective ownership, which will increase the shareholders' interest in the final results of the enterprise's work. We only has to think about how to tackle the question of shares— that is what, it seems to me, worries comrades.

Who, then, is going to buy up our property worth several trillion rubles? Comrades have said that there are millionaires and that they will buy up, exploit, amass capital, and so forth. I think the way will be different. The state, since all enterprises are the property of the people, can find forms based on shares which would make an owner out of every enterprise worker who holds a certain quota of them. And then these shares can be exchanged and issued on the market.

All this has to thought through; we must not frighten ourselves that a process of capitalization of the country and privatization of our public national economy will start up on the basis of such destatization. I believe that labor ownership and individual ownership, cooperatives, and collective ownership will nevertheless prevail in our country, with at the foundation certainly a sound state sector which will serve as the basis for the future development of our economy.

I do not think that anyone can give a clear-cut answer at the moment as to how this process will proceed, we will be searching for ways to promote it.

People say that kolkhozes [collective farms], if we keep them, will not provide the opportunity to realize the potential of the Law on Land. If we keep kolhozes in their present form, yes, they will serve as a barrier. But what prevents our realizing the potential of the law by throroughgoing leasing, contractual, and economically accountable relations and by converting those kolkhozes and sovkhozes [state farm] into cooperatives and cooperative associations? Nothing. Moreover, it is possible that peasant labor holdings will emerge on a kolkhoz or sovkhoz on the basis of land and resources allocated from them. And let this process proceed in precisely the same way that many kolkhozes have embarked on an accessible and understandable route by encouraging now the development of subsidiary farming after increasing by two-three times the area of land allocated to the peasant homestead. They provide equipment and give help in acquiring it, help with seeds, services.... In other words, we should and can give a new breath of life to these same kolkhozes through the new forms.

Nor is the possibility of creating a network of labor peasant holdings on the basis of a loss-making kolkhoz or sovkhoz excluded. This is allowed by the Law on Land, and I welcome it. I now turn to IZVESTIYA's journalistic elite: How much passion, intellectual energy, and strength you and I have expended in severely criticizing collectivization and the forms in which it has been carried out! And we were correct to do so, because this is one of the most serious deformations of the revolutionary transformations carried out since the October Revolution. We have condemned voluntarism, targets, norms, pressure from above.... Let us now look at how we want to reform kolkhozes and sovkhozes and realize the potential contained in the Law on Land. Some propose that kolkhozes and sovkhozes be broken up by force, whether the peasant wants it or not. Let us set up private farms, it is said! In other words, we have to impose again? No!

I believe we must encourage the process of search, and the peasants themselves will achieve the forms of life required. Many representatives of our press and scientists are right when they say that we should do everything possible to prevent anyone creating difficulties and artificial barriers to the implementation of the provisions of the laws on land, leasing, and so forth. This must be fought against. People who want to lease land, a small enterprise, a hairdresser's, a small store, or the like must be given the opportunity to follow that course. Only collective search will ultimately lead us to a rational solution. If, however, we start imposing from above again we will repeat the same mistake. There was collectivization, there could now be leasing with the same voluntarist behavior and approaches. Therefore, while advancing resolutely along the path of the transformations contained in our laws, it is also essential to be buttressed by peoples' wishes and choice.

I am asked about my attitude toward the strike by preschool establishment workers. I think that this problem must be dealt with, and we are doing this.

Another question: Do you consider it essential that the 28th CPSU Congress give a political assessment of the party leaders who have led the country into a dead-end?

M.S. Gorbachev: We already did this at the January 1987 Central Committee Plenum, calling a spade a spade. I think it was a very courageous, serious, and responsible step. The party assumed responsibility for everything that had happened, and a political assessment of Stalin and those who were in charge after him was also given. At the same time we sought to do this objectively. Moreover, I consider that we correctly illuminated and objectively reconstituted the picture, and in pointing out, for example, the role of Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev we noted both the positive things he did as well as the major blunders.

Do I consider it essential to change the structure of the party apparatus in the direction of drastic cuts? I believe that the party must change to match the changes in its role and functions, and its structure will change in connection with this. Many party organizations are already giving up the rayon division, in Leningrad, as you are bound to have noticed, a single organ—a party obkom [oblast committee] and gorkom [city committee]—has been set up. I think that the structure of the apparatus will also change in the light of its new functions, and the trend toward reducing it will be implemented. Some party organizations have already acted in this way, and the money released has been channeled toward tackling party problems—including in some places even introducing payment for the primary party organization secretary for his party work.

This already links up with the idea of a new distribution of membership dues. These questions will be thoroughly discussed at the congress, so let us therefore wait for its decisions, we will act according to what it says.

How do I, as president of the USSR, envision the role and functions of the all-union ministries—the defense complex above all—in the next two-three years?

The role and size of the ministries are already changing, and this trend will be maintained. The more quickly and powerfully market processes gather momentum, the more quickly will the forms of organization of a particular sector or conglomerate of enterprises connected by a chain of responsibilities alter. Let us take the nickel-producing concern existing in our country. Or the Leningrad concerns which have access to the Gosplan [State Planning Committee] and the center, bypassing the ministries. We must be very careful where the defense ministries are concerned for two fundamental reasons. First, we must do everything in the defense complex so as not to weaken or overlook questions of security. We are faced with great work on converting this production. True, there are different viewpoints on this. People say: The sooner the defense ministries cease to exist or decrease in number, the more quickly conversion will proceed. I do not believe this is so. It is a question of a very major shift, and we have gotten away—in time, thank God—from the amateurish approach displayed at the beginning (we used to produce missiles, now let us make saucepans). A major state conversion program is now being drawn up, the very best forces are working, and we are fumbling for the correct approaches.

In the Urals I visited an instrument-making plant. Some 10,000 workers, a skilled working class, very competent engineering and scientific cadres, and designers. As soon as representatives of the Philips Company familiarized themselves with that collective, they concluded contracts with it without delay. For two years this collective has been asking the bank for support and a preferential attitude. And here they will be able to start up joint production with Philips of products which will appear on all the world's markets. The ratio of defense and civilian output is changing abruptly: Today it stands at 63 to 37 percent, but this will be reversed in two and ½ years. And we will obtain products which we now hunt for like imported products. This is just one development, and I have been shown others on which Western firms are ready to cooperate with many of our defense industries. In general, all Western firms are firmly in the hunt for the defense sector, they realize what it is like. Because it is this sector that has ensured parity, which means that there are forces there that are capable of working to a modern standard.

Or, for example, why load aircraft building with something extraneous, when we have nothing to fly in and when there is a colossal market in the world? The Americans have suggested cooperating in building a new passenger airliner for the world market and are ready to provide the motor, the engine, with the Israelis providing the automatics and cabin instruments, and there will be a product which can give us a hard-currency profit of 10-12 billions [currency not specified] over the next few years. That is conversion! We must not destroy what has been created, for that would be the greatest folly, and we must make conscious and intelligent use of everything. The aforementioned Sverdlovsk enterprise is in a grave financial position, and so the bank must come to its assistance, and our legislation must provide for privileges for the period of modernization. And not just for this enterprise. The Uralmash [Urals Heavy Machine-Building Plant] workers put the question like this: We have supplied AvtoVAZ [Production Association on the Basis of the Volga Automobile Plants] and KamAZ [Kama Truck Plant] with complete sets of our own equipment. They are modern enterprises in the same situation, while Uralmash requires modernization. Different starting conditions, and the state must help out and there must be legislatively enshrined approaches.

This is how things stand all over the world. During a period of modernization an enterprise receives certain bank support, a preferential period.

People put this question: What, in my view, will be the position of party organizations at enterprises and, in particular, in the Army and the state security organs when we embark on the real process of a multiparty system and political pluralism?

We now adhere to the viewpoint that party organizations must operate. We shall see what we shall see, but we are not changing this approach now.

Here, incidentally, people ask: Does it not seem to you that the CPSU Central Committee, the Politburo, and other party organs have lost their head and are playing a strange waiting game, while other various political formations, groups, and associations are galvanizing their activity and gradually winning the masses over, so weakening the CPSU's authority?

There is probably a degree of truth in this question, but this is accounted for to a considerable extent by the fact that the political forces mentioned in the note find themselves in different situations. Some hold power, rule, and are responsible for everything, while others, in opposition, merely criticize and seek out shortcomings or exploit real problems and difficulties and speculate on them. As soon as you invite these opposition comrades—let them participate in the work of Supreme Soviet committees and assume functions and real power in order to resolve the questions of which they speak—the picture is at once different, and their positions at once change. On Moscow City Soviet, for example, people were not exactly anxious to find a candidacy for chairman of Moscow Gorispolkom [City Soviet Executive Committee) among representatives of "Democratic Russia," for no one wanted this. Strange? In my opinion, everything is clear. It is simply that life teaches us and puts everything in its proper place.

Life is not a rally. Transportation must function, and bread must be baked. How, for example, are we to rectify the cadre situation at the "Bolshevik" Factory (there is a 40-percent personnel shortfall there)? These questions must be resolved precisely by Moscow City Soviet. This is all Moscow City Soviet business, and Muscovites must feel how things are going—whether there are changes or not. You have only to get involved in the real process of responsibility and then you will see at once who is who. The people of Leningrad spent nine days observing Leningrad City Soviet sessions, and they began to worry: What is going on, what awaits them? In the end Leningrad City Soviet itself took a decision not to relay its sessions. I am not saying this in order to be spiteful, I am saying it with a single purpose: If we are really concerned about the fate of the country, the state, and the people, we will find points of contact and will understand each other, but a dialogue will never come about if people are guided by other interests. In this case everything will boil down to a political struggle. Meanwhile we have reached a stage where it is very important to consolidate forces in order to digest these real, abrupt, crucial changes. And it would be too great a luxury if we allowed the whole of society to be drawn into a confrontation. This cannot be permitted. As regards the other part of this question, I think it is a fair comment and we must act more vigorously.

One more question: Why did all newspapers, including PRAVDA, ignore the birthday of Karl Marx 5 May 1990? This, the writer of the note remarks, attests to a belittling of the role of the classic author of Marxism-Leninism and of the development of the world community. Is indifference to these questions on the part of the party's Central Committee permissible in this situation?

I cannot accept the blame for this or say that precisely this is the Central Committee's position. I hope that I managed to reflect and to demonstrate that position to some extent when we celebrated the 120th anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth, when I delivered the "Speech on Lenin."

I am asked to shed light on my position on the Baltic region. I have already spoken many times on this topic. In the Urals, in my opinion, I delivered an entire report and cited the broad arguments. Nothing in my position has changed. The president and all people at the center have the mandate of the Third Congress of People's Deputies, which, as is known, deemed the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet's decisions illegal and irregular and required the constitutional system to be reinstated and protected. We proceed from this, calling on the reserve, the tremendous reserve of good will and political approaches, but we have many means at our disposal.

People say: Why have economic sanctions been imposed, for this hits at the people? I believe that it is necessary to act so that the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet and the people understand what Lithuania's ties with all the republics and the whole Union are like. This has to be understood in order to elaborate the correct stand. Many among us do not understand the extent to which the human, economic, and cultural destinies of the Baltic region over 50 years and the other regions over 70 years have become intertwined. And if we now start to cut out, dismember, and divide, I am sure that the losses and consequences will be comparable with the damage inflicted on us by World War II. We cannot be divided. We must not divide but reform society and the economy, arrive at a market and at ties, reform the federation, and give a degree of freedom which will enable every people to feel itself the master in its own republic, to preserve its roots, to develop its culture, language, etc. to the full. And so that every person, to whatever nationality he belongs, in any corner, in any republic, feels calm and confident.

The situation in the federation had only to begin to be rocked, and see how this turned out—unrest, losses, and almost civil war. Yes, real civil war, if it had not been for the center's timely intervention in the conflict between

Azerbaijan and Armenia. At the same time many ordinary Armenians and Azerbaijanis have recently been profoundly upset about what has happened, and they have nonetheless retained a reserve of trust, for they lived alongside each other for centuries and decades—but someone needed to make them clash.

It became necessary to raise the question of Nagorno-Karabakh in order to resolve problems which had built up over decades. That is one aspect of the matter. At the time the center adopted a decision which failed to be utilized. Now a section of the intelligentsia which believed it was a question of the revival of the national spirit, and which was there at the inception of this process, has grasped how erroneous it was to urge on this process. Now the intelligentsia has been pushed aside, it is powerless, and other forces are exploiting these processes. I am convinced that if we actively seek to resolve questions of the reform and renewal of our federation, we will manage to untangle all problems, even such difficult problems as this one.

What is my attitude toward the idea of the establishment of a Russian Communist Party within the framework of a united CPSU? A most difficult question. We Russians must be mindful of reality, of the special role Russia has played throughout the centuries and continues to play in the formation and the functioning of our multinational state. At the same time, history is the proof that the Russian people cannot be accused of having abused this role, or their potential and position. Although some people are not loath to hold forth about Russification and so forth. I believe that the Russian people cannot be blamed for this. Even if there were some distortions, it was, after all, our theory which was geared to the swiftest merger of nations. We can see now how far this "theory" was removed from the real processes of life, but it was not the Russian people who put forward this theory. The Russian people have shown throughout centuries and in recent decades that they are a people who favor friendship and cooperation. I must say that we all have this in our blood, we have inherited it in our genes, irrespective of what faith we profess or what political views we hold—we cannot imagine ourselves without the responsibility for this vast multinational state and for its development, strengthening, gathering of power, and exerting a positive influence on the processes taking place in the world. It seems to me that the world too understands the price of a weakening of the Soviet Union, all the more so since within the framework of perestroyka and the new thinking we are exerting a positive influence on the world also by our example of the renewal of society. This is no less important than our foreign policy initiatives.

This does not apply only to politicians. I meet many representatives of foreign countries' working people. I have information at my disposal, and I know what the attitude toward what we are doing is among the broad masses of the people. Very many people are in solidarity with what we are doing.

But let us return to Russia. Certain forces have succeeded in stirring up the Russian people to some extent, in touching them to the quick. Russia has shared everything—its experience, potential, and resources; Russian people set out to develop land in inaccessible latitudes, they helped to create industry in difficult climatic conditions, and took part in its development. They put down roots in these regions, they live and work there. We Russians have perceived this as a normal process, how can there be any talk of "colonizers"?

Some people have started calculating how the national income is divided up, they started adding up resources, raising suspicions, and casting aspersions. Following their example, a number of Russians have now gone as far as to conclude that if we secede from the Soviet Union and set up on our own, we will, in four, or five, or six years, be the most prosperous state in the world.

Comrades, we must be very circumspect when dealing with questions concerning Russia's position. I do not believe that alienation from other peoples and the fate of the Union is taking shape among the Russian people. I am profoundly convinced of this because I am constantly meeting people on my trips, and I see their concern for the fate of the multinational state, their hopes for the transformation of the federation, and the improvement of interethnic relations. In seeking to resolve questions of the republic's economic and political sovereignty and its Communist Party we must be mindful of Russia's role. It has been shaped objectively as a result of a thousand-year-long process, there is no escaping this. In the past there was no Russian Communist Party, but now this idea has taken hold of the Russians, and that's it! It has been decided that it is necessary to convene a conference and discuss everything frankly with the communists. There are many questions. After all, a Russian Communist Party, should it be established, will represent 58 percent of our country's communists.

It is necessary to consider everything, take account of everyone's interests, and establish mechanisms which would preserve the influence and role of other parties. And in the leadership and the Central Committee there must be mechanisms to prevent the dispersal of communists to "national quarters." Otherwise we will lose the great integrating force which a single party represents. Lenin, while favoring federalism in state building because he understood that only on this basis is it possible to unite peoples, resolutely rejected federalism in party building. Therefore let us Russians thoroughly consider the fate of our multinational state and our Communist Party.

Now to the following question: Market relations mean an intensification of the processes of social differentiation. Will the CPSU be able, in conditions of the stratification of society, to express the interests of both its rich and poor strata simultaneously?

The CPSU will remain a party of the working people. You probably know that people in our country have sometimes reacted to such terms as "market relations" and "market economy" like a bull to a red rag. The following notion was widespread: Market economy and market relations mean capitalism. Or at the very least, polarization and stratification. A division into rich and poor. Meanwhile everything will be safeguarded by state regulation. It is planned to make use of material incentives and to encourage initiative. This will lead to differences in incomes, and I regard this as a positive phenomenon because without this our economy will lack dynamism, there will be no spirit of enterprise, no normal atmosphere, no environment in which our economy can develop. However, since we remain committed to the socialist idea, we must find mechanisms of social protection and regulation which will make it possible to take maximum account of all interests and provide guarantees for people, and especially those strata which for one reason or another find themselves in difficult circumstances.

Our society must be a society of social justice. I believe that social justice must include as one of its key elements the encouragement of productive labor and talent—that is, remuneration according to labor. This is the fundamental approach. At the same time it must include the protection of low-income strata, access to education and health care, and the guarantee of a certain living standard. If we do not follow this path, if we take fright, we will all find ourselves back at square one.

People are asking: What are the prospects for the establishment of a genuinely federal state?

I believe that our federation must undergo profound changes. A high level and a great diversity of federal ties, and freedom—these must form the basis of the process of the renewal of the federation. In the very near future a fundamental exchange of opinions is to be held in the Federation Council on the methods and timetable for the solution of the question of giving new content to our federation. I see a succesful solution of this matter in the renewal of the federation, which must, however, be preserved without fail. Any other approach will lead to a clash between peoples, throw us off course, and lead to an endless sorting out of relations.

Another written question: How will relations with countries in East Europe develop, including relations with the Communist Parties? Our relations with the countries of East Europe will change. We intend to preserve everything sound that has been accumulated over the years, while instilling realism into these relations. Primarily by means of basing economic relations on world prices and convertible currency. We stated this at the last meeting of CEMA participants and we will initiate this switch from January of next year. I am convinced that these measures will not only not weaken our relations but will, on the contrary, place them on a firm and sound basis and introduce clarity in many questions. We have established firm contacts between people and I do not believe there is any need to give these up in the new situation, especially since the other side shares our desire to maintain them.

As for relations with the Communist Parties, we have maintained and will continue to maintain relations with all left-wing parties. We are ready to exchange opinions and to conduct a political dialogue with all government parties, as we are doing with all who are prepared to cooperate in questions of security and the development of interstate relations.

There are many problems and tasks to which we have to attend, and one of the main ones is the preservation of human morality, writes A.I. Ryazantseva, a leading economist of the IZVESTIYA publishing house. In her opinion it will not be possible to save the country if we continue to devote so little effort to young people's upbringing. When and how will cardinal changes be finally introduced in the educational system?

At today's meeting with the rectors, M.S. Gorbachev said, we arrived at the common conclusion that a state policy is needed in the sphere of public and higher education in keeping with the current needs. Unless we introduce profound corrections in this policy in the near future, we stand to lose in strategic terms. We must bear in mind that the successes of any state are based on important and profound transformations in the sphere of public and higher education, that is, on a buildup of society's intellectual potential. However, in our efforts to give our economy a social thrust and to overcome the residual approach to culture and the social sphere we have not yet managed, under the pressure of current circumstances, to cope with our plans on this score.

Now that society is entering a new phase of its development, we will resolutely seek to change public awareness and the intellectual level of society itself. That means that questions of public and higher education and of everything connected with this are moving to the fore.

A question from communist Polishchuk: Mikhail Sergeyevich, I would like you to answer the following question in your capacity as the country's president and as a communist: When will it be possible to buy essential goods in Moscow without any restrictions? The situation is getting worse by the day, it is impossible to buy an electric iron, not to mention a refrigerator or a washing machine. I am a baker with 35 years of service. However, my wages do not allow me to buy goods from speculators at two or three times the normal price. The food supply situation is bad, milk is unobtainable after work, and sometimes even bread has run out.

M.S. Gorbachev: You are absolutely right, Comrade Polishchuk. All these questions must be resolved within the next few months and the situation on the market must be stabilized within a year or two. We must also change our attitude toward the food industry. The light and food industries have taken a backseat for decades. We visited the "Bolshevik" Factory. It appears that the plan there is being fulfilled by illegal quota workers.

They are vocational and technical school students from Central Asia and other parts of the country who come for work experience. There is no one to do the job. The wages are lower than the Moscow and the country average, although there are high-intensity [goryachiy] shops. Meanwhile the factory's output is in great demand. I saw what remarkable goods are sold literally for kopeks. For some reason the labor of agricultural and food industry workers is not properly appreciated in our country. In this area radical changes are necessary to ensure that people do not squander bread or any other food products. Anything that is available very cheaply is not appreciated. Therefore there is much that we will have to consider when switching the food industry to a market-economy footing. This will include decisions on what should be kept under government control, on compensation, on social protection, and the sector's free entry into the market. Yet what artists are at work at the "Bolshevik" Factory, what products they create! Veritable works of art emerge before your very eyes.

The whole problem is that we have unbalanced the market and have not yet taken the situation in hand. We have given economic freedom to enterprises and they have started to build up their income, profits, and deductions via prices and to convert nonliquid assets into cash via cooperatives, and as a result of this the market has been flooded with money. Commodity production has failed to keep step with this process. Therefore the gap which existed before has widened. And, to some extent, our alcohol policy has dealt a further blow. "Technical progress" in this sphere quickly adjusted itself and a lot of things suddenly disappeared, beginning with sugar. I have to admit, this is due to miscalculations on our part.

This seems to be everything. I appear to have answered all the questions. I can see that you are very patient. Thank you for your attention. (Applause)

Congress of Russian Deputies To Open 16 May

LD1405105690 Moscow TASS in English 1007 GMT 14 May 90

[By TASS News Analyst Igor Yefimov]

[Text] Moscow, May 14 TASS—The first Congress of the People's Deputies of the Russian Federation, the largest of the 15 constituent republics of the USSR, opens in Moscow on May 16.

A total of 52 per cent of the country's population live in the Russian Federation, which occupies 76 per cent of Soviet territory.

For the first time in the history of the Russian Sovet Federative Socialist Republic, its supreme body of state authority was elected on a multi-candidate basis.

More than a thousand people's deputies are to elect the Russian Supreme Soviet, a permenent body of legislative authority, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, top official in the republic, and form a government.

The congress is being convened against the backdrop of severe economic crisis. The socio-economic ills battering the country are manifest mostly acutely in the Russian Federation. Throughout decades it has helped other Union republics, having turned into an "econonmic donor."

On the eve of the congress, the Economy Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences Urals Division published a review of Russia's economic status. Experts estimated that if Russia traded with other Union republics in world prices, it would have earned an additional R25 billion in 1988 alone (over 30 billion dollars under the official currency rate).

However, Russia does not dispose of its revenue on its own. The centre withdrew 61 per cent of profits from its budget in the same year of 1988 go to develop other republics.

Demographic indicators are alarming. Fifty-eight per cent of families living in the Russian Federation have only one child. From 2,000 to 3,000 villages disappear from the map of the republic annually: old people die, the young resettle in cities, frequently in areas of large-scale construction projects outside the Russian Federation. Some warn about the shrinking of the Russian nation.

True, growing self-awareness in Russia is not devoid of extremes, which is typical of other republics as well. Calls for secession from the USSR or, as a minimum, for the republic's full sovereignty are as common here as in other republics.

Restoring Russia's independence, although differently interpreted was the main plank in the election programmes of almost all contenders for the seat in the republic's supreme body of authority.

Evidently, the motley composition of the deputy corps of the Russian Federation will generate impassioned debates at the congress. Simplifying the situation, one can name the three main political groups.

First, they are those who support the policy pursued by central authorities, their programme and the pace of implementing perestroyka.

Second, there are radicals criticising the centre for the slow pace of reforms, especially for indecision in the transition to a free market. The democratic Russia deputy bloc is related to them.

Finally, the third group rejects what seems to it as "Western recipes" to rebuild the economy and call to take into account Russia's historical traditions. The proponents of this point of view intend to set up the patriotic Russia bloc.

The success of the congress and the future of the Russian Federation and, hence, of the entre union, largely hinge on whether deputies manage to find a common tongue.

Deputies on Procedure for RSFSR Congress

90UN1821A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 19, 9 May 90 p 2

[Article by Ye. Domnysheva under the rubric "Pulse": "Points of Disagreement"]

[Text] The Russian Congress of Deputies opens on 16 May. The preparatory work has been going on for two months, both in the Supreme Soviet Presidium and among the people's deputies. The issues which will give rise to heated debates at the congress have already been clearly delineated. We took three of them and asked RSFSR deputies to comment on them.

1. Must there be a report from the Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Council of Ministers on the RSFSR's political and economic situation?

2. At what stage should elections for the chairman and the members of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet be conducted?

3. Should amendments and supplements be introduced into the RSFSR Constitution?

Tatyana Ivanova, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium (delegated by the presidium to make preparations for the congress).

1. It is understandable that all the deputies wish to familiarize themselves with the position of Russia. But is there any sense in discussing the situation without perspectives and plans for the future? This means that logically it should be linked up with the government's program of action. And just such a report is proposed in the agenda that was recommended by the Presidium. In addition, the deputies are going to have at their disposal data prepared by the Council of Ministers, Gosplan [State Planning Committee], and Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics]. But even the conciliation commission did not come to an agreement on where and when to hear these materials.

2. When should they be elected? The Presidium believes that on this issue we should follow the terms of the existing Constitution; that is to say, at the beginning. The future of Russia and its fate in a federation of Union republics has everyone concerned. Almost everyone is demonstrating a desire for radical change. But will the deputies be able to convey their visions of a way out of the situation for Russia in a few short speeches? We have leaders who have shown their worth. And we should judge by deeds, not by words.

3. The Presidium has proposed creating a constitutional commission which will work on these issues in committees and commissions. But a part of the deputies believe that we can already go beyond the bounds of the Constitution at the congress. We talk a lot about respect for the law. Then let us begin with respect for the Constitution. Although the existing USSR and RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Constitutions do hold back many positive processes. But should this be done without considering the opinion of the people? There have been many objections to the way the chairman of the Supreme Soviet has presented candidates for the posts of representatives of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers, but right now it corresponds to the existing RSFSR Constitution. As for the numerical makeup of the Supreme Soviet, there are constitutional quotas, although the congress has the right to discuss that question and make a decision in advance. But all these are conceptual differences.

Sergey Shakhray, candidate of legal sciences (elected a member of the congress's preparatory commission and the conference of representatives).

1. The report of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium is an account not only for the new deputies, but for the peoples of the republic as well. In addition, it guarantees continuity of power and responsibility of the executive organs for their rulings and the consequences of them. It is important for the deputies to know in what condition they are accepting the republic. A search for ways out of the crisis and for an informed decision on all the other issues on the agenda is possible on the basis of the report.

2. It is simply indispensable to introduce amendments to the Constitution in order to redistribute the personal power of the chairman in favor of the congress itself and the Supreme Soviet, to clarify the principles for forming the chambers, and, very importantly, to put together rules concerning the obligatory (and not just as a rule) continual, professional work of the deputies elected to the Supreme Soviet.

If all the republic's officials are elected immediately after the account of the credentials committee, then we might as well admit that we are viewed as an electoral college. Only after the report and the introduction of amendments to the Constitution should we move to elect the Supreme Soviet and its chairman and deputy chairmen if we are to have a say in who heads the Supreme Soviet.

3. We should increase the number of deputies in both chambers or else the deputies will inevitably split into two groups. The first group will determine policy together with the apparat of the presidium, and the deputies of the second group, who have not become members of the Supreme Soviet or its organs, will remain messengers and suppliants.

If we really wish to divide power into legislative, judicial, and executive, then we need to elect the chairman of the Council of Ministers, the Supreme Court, and the RSFSR Committee of Constitutional Oversight right at the congress.

Formation of Russian People's Party Viewed

90UN1821B Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 19, 9 May p 2

[Report on interview with N. Travkin, USSR people's deputy and representative of the Russian People's Party, by A. Peresvet; date and place not given: "Multiparty Life"]

[Text] The transition from utopia to reality has gone simply splendidly. Right after the CPSU proclaimed its renunciation of the principle of the single-party system and Article 6 of the Constitution was revised, new political formations are appearing in our country almost every week. There are inaugural congresses and conferences, programs and concepts are being worked out, and plans are being published for the creation of newer and newer parties. Are we going to the opposite extreme?

We will not be able to judge in advance.

For now there is no party. There is only a committee to organize its creation headed by USSR People's Deputy N.I. Travkin. And its name is the Russian People's Party. However....

"The name is temporary, until the inaugural congress," N.I. Travkin says in answer to a question of the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent. "The word 'people's' in the name of the party is to show that its social spectrum will not be limited to any single class or level."

[Peresvet] Today in the country so many parties have been created or are being created, and their programs are often so similar that one gets the impression that there are more parties than ideas. Do you have a place of your own?

[Travkin] Our party is a party in the most democratic sense of the word. In this way it distinguishes itself completely from the parties with communist and social democratic tendencies. They posit social justice as their goal, but their method of achieving it is first and foremost redistribution. Our country has already traveled that road to the end, and when they cite the experience of Sweden, I answer that Sweden is halfway there as well. Equitable redistribution leads to an impasse.

Therefore the goal of our party is to create a society of equal opportunities. For each person and each enterprise. And social justice must be provided at a guaranteed level by way of taxes. Everything above this guaranteed level will depend on the success of enterprise: A dignified standard of living for the producer guarantees a dignified standard of living for those who are socially vulnerable.

[Peresvet] Reaganomics?

[Travkin] It is impossible to cite any direct parallels here. The faltering of a healthy market economy is one thing. But we have an impasse, not even a crisis. In one of his interviews Abalkin said as much: We are at an impasse. We must simply be logically consistent: Once we are at an impasse, we must turn around.

[Peresvet] Let us return to the first question. Does it not seem to you that many people have assimilated this same thought very well and taken the road of creating a multitude of small parties and associations? But 40 barking puppies are no substitute for a single elephant. The guarantee of democracy is not a multiparty system but a constructive opposition. Is it even worth paying attention to the dozens of diminutive formations fighting among themselves?

[Travkin] This is exactly why we have come into being. It is clear how the registration of small organizations which sometimes do not even have a social base is encouraged. But we are creating, conventionally speaking, a party of a return to common sense which will represent the sum total of movements and full-blooded factions—for instance, the peasant, cooperative, and private enterprise groups. Already-established formations like "Shield" and "April" have already joined us as collective members—they have already given their agreement. Incidentally, they do not lose either their political or their organizational autonomy. In a word, we accept all those—and we count on all those—who agree that the RSFSR's rebirth must take place on the basis of common sense, democracy, competency, enterprise, and economic and political consolidation.

[Peresvet] But does it not seem to you that even this social base is limited?

[Travkin] One of the tasks of our party is education. We cannot arrive at a market without free enterprise. But our society looks at enterprise as though at an enemy. We must explain to people that today precisely this is society's main hope and that thanks to it we will be able to climb out of poverty, and that integration in the world market does not mean the sale of Russia just as the integration of Japan did not mean its sale.

We understand that many critical features will not be understood today—some people speak in favor of personal property, invite capitalists in, and even grant concessions.... Life will tell. And at today's pace, it will tell very soon. [end of interview]

The tricolor Russian flag. A carnation in a fist. "Socialism." "Capitalism." "A side track of world history which our country mistakenly took." Applause.

Perhaps history's smile is mocking, perhaps it is weary: The inaugural congress of the Social Democratic Party goes on in the building of the rayon committee of the Communist Party among the graphs entitled "The Condition of Labor Discipline at the Rayon's Enterprises".... And speeches resound about the bankruptcy of communist ideology, about the "specter of the receding doctrine wandering about Europe" whose "conscience is burdened with the blood of millions of innocent victims." And the programs: "Move from mob rule to democracy," "conduct elections to an inaugural assembly on a multiparty basis," "declare freedom of enterprise and trade," "transfer the capital of the RSFSR to Petrograd," and "carry out denationalization of medium and small enterprises"....

There were many different slogans and different people at the inaugural congress of the Social Democratic Party of the Russian Federation which just took place. Different speeches. But three points seemed to be shared by all 209 delegates from 74 local organizations: "The insolvency of Marxism-Leninism," "democracy," and "freedom and personal rights."

By the way, the programs of the majority of the parties forming today share these points. Consequently it should be a question of tactics for achieving these goals. The leaders of the Social Democrats are rather specific: The route of consistent radical reform and the evolutionary transformation of society should be assured through a struggle for power between a parliamentary faction of the party and the party itself—of course only through peaceful methods. It seems that an instrument is ready as well: In his speech USSR People's Deputy A.M. Obolenskiy mentioned the interregional deputies group which is preparing, in his words, to play the role of a direct opposition in parliament....

Draft CPSU Rules, Regulations Critiqued

90UN1660A Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 11 Apr 90 p 2

[Article by V. Kalashnikov, member of the party committee of the Leningrad Electrotechnical Institute imeni V.I. Ulyanov (Lenin) under the rubric "We Are Discussing the Draft of the CPSU Rules": "Reinforcing the Democratic Principles"]

[Text] In my opinion the main problem with the draft of the CPSU Rules is that an undemocratic interpretation of the principle of democratic centralism is preserved. Paragraph 13 includes a provision to the effect that "rulings of the party organs are binding on subordinate organizations." Inasmuch as the sphere of the competence of the party organs is not defined, this paragraph effectively allows the party organ (for instance the obkom [oblast party committee] and even the bureau of the obkom) to adopt any ruling, which then will be binding on all the oblast's organizations. That the authors of the draft specifically intended this paragraph to be used this way is demonstrated by paragraph 31, according to which a few people—the Central Committee Presidium—"sends rulings to the party organizations to be implemented in its name." In this fashion the party retains the administrative and command system of ruling from the top downward inasmuch as the Presidium, that is to say the executive organ of the Central Committee, has the right to hand out instructions which must be fulfilled by all of the party's organizations.

It is clear that these paragraphs contradict paragraph 6, which talks about self-management in the party and the authority of the party's masses.

Paragraph 7, which talks about the independence of the party organizations in their activities, could become a partial defense against the command system. However it is sharply weakened by the reference to the fact that the rulings of the party organizations must not run counter to the norms of the Rules, that is to say the norm according to which the rulings of a superior organ are binding upon a subordinate organization. Such dual authority and lack of clarity in the treatment of the most important norms of party life open up a broad opportunity to preserve bureaucratic centralism, not democratic centralism.

How should this problem be resolved? I propose the following methods:

take out the provision to the effect that rulings of the party organs are binding upon the party organs;

insert into the Rules a provision to the effect that the decisions of party forums (meetings, organs, and congresses) are binding on the organizations that are represented at them.

insert into the Rules a provision to the effect that the task of the party organs is to coordinate and organize implementation of the rulings adopted at the forums; all rulings adopted by the party organs in the course of this work will be treated by the subordinate organizations as recommendations, the implementation of which the party organ achieves by means of persuasion and not command. The real authority of the party organ will be the pledge of the efficiency of such a mechanism.

With the goal of reinforcing democratic principles in the work of the party, I propose several more amendments to the draft of the Rules:

1. In paragraph 1: Elect all the secretaries at the conferences, not just the first secretaries. This measure is more democratic not only from the point of view of forming the Secretariat but also of guaranteeing a great degree of collectivity in its work, because it increases the degree of independence of all the members of the Secretariat with regard to the first secretary.

2. Conduct direct elections of the party organs up to the level of the party obkom. This measure will rule out the possibility that communists who have not received the support of the rank-and-file members of the party will be elected to the party organs.

3. Elect three-fourths of the members of the Central Committee at oblast conferences according to a quota which corresponds to the size of the membership in the oblast organization. And elect one-fourth of the members of the Central Committee directly at the congress. This measure is necessary in order to end the practice whereby the old staff of the Central Committee Secretariat, as it prepares for the congress, effectively puts together the staff of the new Central Committee by proposing that the delegates to the congress vote for the candidacies of people they do not know. In addition, the

practice of electing members of the Central Committee at the congress makes them independent of the local organizations inasmuch as a delegate who is elected at the congress may not be recalled by the decision, for instance, of the oblast conference.

4. All the delegates and members of the electoral organs have an obligatory order, that is to say that they are obligated to express the position of the Communists who elected them. In the opposite event a delegate or member of an electoral organ may be recalled by decision of the majority of the communists whom he represents.

5. Change paragraph 16 in the following fashion: The chief editor of the party publication is elected by the party forum instead of being approved by the appropriate party committee.

It is also necessary to supplement this paragraph with a provision to the effect that the party press is obligated to inform the communists about all points of view held in the party concerning issues of party life and policy. In addition, the central organs are obligated to publish the addresses, statements, and platforms of all the party organizations at the oblast level, and the oblast press is obligated to publish the corresponding documents of the local party organizations. To protect the interests of the communists who are associated with party clubs and other horizontal structures, it is advisable to include in the Rules a provision to the effect that the local party press is obligated to publish statements reflecting the position of not less than 500 members of the party, and the central press—4,000 members.

6. Reformulate the paragraphs concerning raising and distributing the party's budget: No less than 50 percent of the total party dues remains at the disposal of the local party organization, and the rest of the resources are transferred to the funds of the raykom [rayon party committee], gorkom [city party committee], or obkom [oblast party committee]. The procedure for expenditure of resources is approved at the rayon, city, and oblast conferences accordingly, on the basis of the budgets that are presented. The Central Committee finances its activities at the expense of part of the income received from the central party press. The remaining portion is sent to support local organizations in need of financial help. Insert in the Rules a provision to the effect that the rayon and oblast organizations may, by decision of their plenums, transfer part of their resources for implementing specific special programs on a regional or party-wide scale.

In paragraph 37, remove the clause to the effect that the Central Committee Plenum approves the norms for deductions from the local party organizations.

Set the size of party dues from workers at a level of one percent of real (net) income, that is to say minus any type of tax.

7. All elective members of the party organs and workers of the apparat must be on the party register in the local party organizations which nominated them for party work.

In proposing these amendments I would like to focus the attention of all communists and especially delegates to the upcoming party forums on the fact that in the political situation that is taking shape unity of the party and its role in society will depend greatly upon the ability of the 28th CPSU Congress to pass a genuinely democratic Rules.

'All Moscow' Reference Year Book Published

PM1505130190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 May 90 Morning Edition p 3

[V. Belikov report: "'All Moscow' in Moscow"]

[Text] The "All Moscow" [Vsya Moskva] year book, brought out in a new edition after a 53-year break, was presented to Soviet and foreign journalists at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center.

The book was prepared by the "All Moscow" joint Soviet-West German enterprise whose president, D. Yevdokimov, told the press conference that all 200,000 copies of the reference book in Russian, plus 10,000 copies in English, had been shipped at the beginning of May from Nuremberg, where the major "Maul Belzer" Printing House is located.

Considering the length of time required for publication, the current edition of "All Moscow" is dated 1990-91. The next edition (already being advertised, incidentally, on the last pages of the new book) will therefore also be a "biennial year book." Work on this edition is already under way with the latest information and reference databank being updated and supplemented.

Answering the IZVESTIYA correspondent's question as to whether the next edition of the "All Moscow" yearbook will include information on newly formed political parties, associations, unions, and other social organizations, D. Yevdokimov replied in the affirmative. For this purpose the necessary data must be placed at the disposal of the collectively used computer center of Moscow's reference and information services. Its personnel are compiling the relevant sections of the new edition. The published book gives data as of 1 October last year.

The yearbook's relatively high price—R27.50—is due to the large sums spent on publishing it abroad. In the publishers' opinion, the reference book is primarily intended for use in institutions, organizations, official libraries, and information departments, although it will certainly be of interest also to lovers of Moscow's history, culture, and way of life. After all, it is a chronicle of our country's capital today.

Nationalists Pickets Kabardino-Balkar Soviet

PM1405160390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 May 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Dispatch by correspondent Ali Kazikhanov under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Pickets Outside the House of Soviets"]

[Text] Nalchik—The registered national-patriotic movement "Adyge Khase" organized a picket outside the building of the House of Soviets, where the third sitting of the Kabardino-Balkar ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet first session, which will form the autonomous republic's government, began 10 May.

Back in February, alarmed by the mass uncontested nomination of party and soviet leaders of the republic and its rayons and the unconcealed interference by party organs in the elections of people's deputies, "Adyge Khase" held a rally in Nalchik which was attended by several thousand persons. The participants in the rally stipulated the following in their resolution: Resignation of the obkom [oblast party committee] bureau, deferment of the elections in uncontested okrugs [national district] by one or two months in order to hold genuine democratic elections on a contested basis, replacement of all leadership officials in the government apparatus and enterprises who are guilty of worsening the working people's living conditions, and so on, and so forth. If the conditions were not met before 1 March, the participants in the rally decided, it would be necessary to gather again in Lenin Square.

A few days later, republican television showed a televised dialogue between leaders of "Adyge Khase" and the obkom, where it was stated that the question will be studied and measures will be adopted....

On 8 March, "Adyge Khase" announced to the thousands of participants in a sanctioned rally in Nalchik: Not a single one of the February conditions had been met by the republic's leaders. The rally now demanded that the formation of the government be carried out in conditions of glasnost with the opinions of the public and the labor collectives taken into account, that the government be 80 percent renewed, that the question of transferring the republic mass media under the Kabardino-Balkar ASSR Supreme Soviet be resolved, that strict legal proceedings for interference in the affairs of electoral commissions and violation of party ethics be instituted against CPSU Obkom Secretary V. Zakharchenko and CPSU Rayon Committee Secretaries S. Abrokov, Yu. Bednev, and N. Boziev; that the following be dismissed from their duties for unsatisfactory work: V. Popovich, general director of "Kabbalkproyektstroy" Association; Kh. Kaufov, chairman of the Kabardino-Balkar ASSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting; and M. Dokshokov, chairman of the Kabardino-Balkar ASSR Central Electoral Commission; and that a commission be created to analyze the political activity of T. Malbakhov, former obkom first secretary....

The pickets outside the House of the Soviets building are a warning measure, as "Adyge Khase" representatives told me, and if the demands that have been handed to the republic Supreme Soviet deputies are ignored, the movement will continue its protest rally with appeals for a mass recall of Kabardino-Balkar ASSR Supreme Soviet deputies who won uncontested election and have failed to prove worthy of the trust.

Western Republics

Separation of Belorussian Leading Posts Supported

PM1405161990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 May 90 Second Edition p 2

[Report by PRAVDA correspondents A. Simurov and A. Ulitenok: "Plenum Held"]

[Text] Minsk, 12 May—A Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee plenum has been held here to discuss questions connected with the work of the upcoming Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet session. Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee First Secretary Ye.Ye. Sokolov delivered a report at the plenum.

It was decided to submit at the session an initiative on the Belorussian Communist Party's behalf on amending and amplifying Articles 6 and 7 of the republic's Constitution and also on the inadvisability of combining the posts of Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee first secretary and Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet chairman.

Belorussian-Lithuanian Border Change Viewed

90UN1771A Moscow TRUD in Russian 4 May 90 p 2

[Interview with Ivan Frolovich Klimov, member of the Provisional Government of Vilno and Vilno Voivod in 1939 and first secretary of Vilno Obkom 1940-41, by ZVYAZDA correspondent V. Zhdanko: "How Were the Borders Revised?"]

[Text] **The Belorussian Republic newspaper ZVYAZDA published an interview by its correspondent V. Zhdanko with Ivan Frolovich Klimov, who in September to October 1939, after the entry of our troops into western Belorussia, became one of the managers of the provisional government of Vilno [pre-1939 name for Vilnius] and Vilno Voivod appointed by the government of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR]. In 1940-1941 he worked as the first secretary of the obkom [oblast party committee] of Vilno Oblast, which bordered on Lithuania. It was at this time that significant changes occurred in the territorial outline of Belorussia. Below we publish the text of the interview translated from Belorussian.**

[Zhdanko] Ivan Frolovich, judging by the fact that similar organs of authority, which included all those who sympathized with Soviet authority, were organized on all of the territory liberated in 1939, including the Vilno region, the question of the transfer of Vilno and Vilno Oblast to the Lithuanian Republic was not raised initially?

[Klimov] Actually we, the members of the Provisional Government, did not even think that such a problem could arise. The size of the Lithuanian population in Vilno at that time was insignificant, and it was not comparable at all to the Polish- speaking majority. The Lithuanian cultural association, if I am not mistaken, had a total of about 5,000 members.

And the majority of the population of Vilno and the Vilno Voivod did not think that such a decision would be made. We were asked the same questions at numerous meetings and rallies: "What will Soviet authority give to the people? What kinds of changes can the peasants expect from it? Will teachers be left to work in their own jobs"?

I recall that on the last day before newspapers published the "Treaty Concerning the Transfer of the City of Vilno and Vilno Oblast to the Lithuanian Republic and Mutual Assistance between the Soviet Union and Lithuania" (10 October 1939), I spoke at Vilno University. As always, I explained about the establishment of Soviet authority in the kray, and about whose interests it will protect. There were numerous questions. The conversation turned out to be keen and interesting. I admit that I was even taken aback when they presented me a bouquet of wonderful roses at the end of the meeting. The time was such that other "gifts" could also be counted on—underhanded shots and provocations.

And then the day after the speech—the report that the city and rayon are going to Lithuania. Meeting with me, participants of the assembly at the university asked me with bewilderment: "How can this be? Why did you not tell us the truth?" What could I tell them?...

[Zhdanko] Apparently this treaty was a surprise even to the Belorussian SSR leadership. Incidentally, the recent Declaration of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium indicates that it was concluded "without the notification and concurrence of the Belorussian SSR."

[Klimov] Apparently that is the case—the leadership of the republic had absolutely different plans. As far as I know, serious work was going on—party and soviet personnel were being selected for Vilno and Vilno Oblast. B. Baykachov, an employee of the organizational department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Belorussia, was nominated as a candidate for the post of first secretary of the Vilno Obkom, and I was recommended for nomination to the post of first secretary of the gorkom [city party committee].

The oblast newspaper VILENSKAYA PRAVDA began to be published in Vilno (afterwards it began to come out in Vileyka as SYALYANSKAYA GAZETA).

It is understandable that Moscow's decision bewildered many of us. But no one dared to express this openly—it was not the time. Any directive from the center was the law, truth of the highest instance.

[Zhdanko] Probably, according to this same plan, the second "repartition" of Belorussian land was also being carried out in favor of Lithuania?

[Klimov] No, in 1940, after the admission of Lithuania into the USSR structure, the situation changed. True, Moscow decided the fate of substantial territories of the republic at this time as well. But instructions from there no longer listed specific rayons which were to go to the Lithuanian SSR. We were ordered to transfer to neighbors territories in which a majority of the population were Lithuanians.

At the end of 1940 and the beginning of 1941 Antanas Snechkus, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), and I drove around dozens of villages—we met and talked with the people and pondered how we could fulfill the important instructions.

There were no misunderstandings or conflicts between myself and Snechkus. We treated each other in a very friendly and sincere way. Territorial questions to us, party managers at that time, were not among those of utmost importance by far, and we reasoned thus: What difference does it make if a rayon will be Belorussian or Lithuanian, if it remains Soviet in any case. We looked at all of this from internationalist positions and, understandably, we could not even think that a situation could arise such as today's.

[Zhdanko] Did considerable territory go to Lithuania during this repartition? How was a determination made of the proportions of the national composition of the population in the rayons that were to be transferred to the Lithuanian SSR?

[Klimov] After this revision of the borders Vilno Oblast, where I was the obkom first secretary, was reduced approximately to 2,500-3,000 square kilometers. It was decided to transfer Sventsyanskiy Rayon to Lithuania, and also parts of the territory of Godutishkovskiy, Ostrovetskiy, and Vidzovskiy Rayons. Neighboring Belostok Oblast also became smaller.

How did we determine the national composition of the rayons? The calculations were approximate. There could not be any question at that time of some kind of serious research, a census, or a population poll. I repeat: Everything proceeded from the fact that Lithuania became Soviet, and it was not the borders of the USSR that were being revised but it was only an administrative-territorial division.

Therefore, I fully agree with the Declaration of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium: Since the matter has gone this far, it is well worth looking into the past with different eyes.

Moldavian Supreme Soviet Continues Work

LD1205224290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 12 May 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A plenum of the Communist Party of Moldavia Central Committee opened today in Kishinev in a difficult sociopolitical atmosphere. Those participating have to determine the role and the place of the party in the acute—and at times dramatic—events that are unfolding in the republic.

Meanwhile, the session of the republic's Supreme Soviet is continuing with its work.

[Plotnikov] Almost a month after the session opened, the formation of the leading bodies of the republic's Supreme Soviet has—by and large—been completed. The list of documents that have yet to be adopted includes bills on sovereignty and citizenship of the Moldavian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], on the principles of its social and economic independence, on guaranteeing the rights of ethnic groups resident in Moldavia, and others. So far, there has been virtually no discussion of these aside from the election and confirmation of the leading bodies of the Supreme Soviet, the issue of the republic's new state flag has been resolved. Most deputies voted for amendments to the Moldavian Constitution, under which the blue-yellow-red tricolor is approved. According to a special commission attached to the republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium, it is in keeping with the traditions of Moldavia and reflects its aspirations for for genuine sovereignty and national independence. These constitutional amendments have not been accepted by the Tiraspol and Bendery town soviets, or by the Rybnitsa town and rayon soviets.

The session is to continue with its work on 21 May. In the intervening period, the 17th Congress of the Communist Party of Moldavia is to be held in Kishinev. [Video shows a crowd gathered outside an unidentified building; groups of people seated at desks; the new flag fluttering gently in the breeze; a large hall filled with people]

Caucasus

Protesters Demand Dissolution of Georgian Komsomol

LD1405223390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2019 GMT 14 May 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] [Announcer] First of all, Georgia. A conflict is raging there, the details of which you will hear from Nana Gongadze:

[Gongadze] The Georgian Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] has found itself in a troubled situation. Passions have been high outside the Central Committee building for a week now. Representatives from four political organizations in Georgia are holding constant rallies here: To be specific, the Monarchist Conservative Party, the Helsinki Alliance, and the Georgian "Saint Ilia the Righteous" and "Merab Kostava" societies. The basic demand of those at the rallies is the immediate self-dissolution of the Komsomol. It has been stressed that the action is not aimed at taking over the building of the Georgian Komsomol Central Committee.

The recent extraordinary plenum of the republic's Komsomol, which elected a new first secretary, has exacerbated the situation. [Video cuts to show gongadze interviewing an unidentified militiaman]

[Gongadze] Tell me, how many days have you been on duty here?

[Militiaman] For five days now.

[Gongadze] Have there been any attempts to take over the Komsomol Central Committee building?

[Militiaman] No, not so far.

[Gongadze] And how are those at the rally behaving? Aggressively?

[Militiaman] No, not aggressively. Calmly.

[N. Molodiashvili, identified by caption, one of the demonstrators, speaks in Georgian translated by Gongadze] According to the latest data, there are 747,000 Komsomol members in Georgia, although the concept of Komsomol member per se has virtually disappeared, and only 4,000 functionaries remain who are stubbornly holding on to their privileged power and positions. Although they have changed their banner and title like a chameleon, they want to rule in the old way without changing their essence and substance. [video shows demonstrators carrying Georgian national flag, banner with a slogan about the Komsomol, and a placard with a crossed-out star]

'View' Program on Georgian Independence

LD1405171190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1830 GMT 11 May in its "Vzglyad" (View) program, presented by Aleksandr Lyubimov and Viktor Listyev carries an 18-minute report on the debate over Georgian independence.

Announcer Aleksandr Lyubimov says that Soviet people were once said to be devoid of "ethnic orientations," but now, "ethnic self-consciousness is growing, and, as a consequence, we have the crisis of the totalitarian system. First there was East Europe, now it's the Baltic." Lyubimov says there is no need to get excited about the legal status of Lithuania, since "lands, like peoples, don't migrate: They remain where they were and will always exist." The rest is up to the politicians.

The video shows a Stalin speech rapturously applauded; Brezhnev reading an address; Gorbachev at a congress; glimpse of Jaruzelski; Baltic demonstration; street interviews with no sound; shots of Gorbachev, Bush, Thatcher.

Lyubimov continues: "Let us try to get our bearings on a subject that remains as yet on the periphery of public interest and is therefore not colored by emotion: Georgia. He says the Georgian Declaration of Independence dates from 1917. "Everyone now agrees that Georgia needs independent status, but heated debate continues as to where it should go, and whether it should go together with its elder brother."

Nodar Natadze, "chairman of National Front," says its aim is to have a wider choicer of parties. If a party wants to rebuild lost national status from scratch, "its position can only be a centralist one." An extract from the film "Awakening" ("probuzhdeniye") is shown, recalling the Soviet-Georgain treaty of 1920.

Badri Machavariani, of the Christian-Democratic Association, is asked how Christian Democracy will differ from Soviet democracy if it comes to power. He replies that so far, he sees only glimmers of the latter. He is against civil war. Another extract from 'Awakening" is shown, dealing with the question of the invasion of Georgia in 1921.

Lyubimov says: "the events of 9 April last year considerably radicalized public opinion. Today, withdrawal from the USSR is being demanded. No one expects anything good from the central authorities, for innocent blood was spilt, and then there was a coverup of the use of spades and gas. Even after a commission of the Congress of Workers' Deputies has reached its conclusions, the lies still continue today—for example, in the pages of the central press. The events in Lithuania have only increased the radicalism. They are saying here: Lithuania is taking the parliamentary path, and it is not being allowed; we must demand the maximum and not compromise, and then we may get somewhere."

Georgiya Chanturiya, "chairman of National Democratic Party" says; "What we do doesn't always depend on us; sometimes we react to what the Kremlin does. A so-called parliament must not "assume nonparliamentary forms." We hope to achieve our goals by civil disobedience.

Lyubimov says it's to be hoped that "more soberminded" politicians will emerge. "There is no anti-Russian feeling here, and therefore no 'inter' movement, despite rumors. The term 'federation' intimidates, yet is an independent state possible "after so many years under one roof?" Meanwhile, the communists are blamed for inactivity.

Givi Gumbaridze, first secretary of Communist Party of Georgia, says it's easy to blame the communists for everything. Ways should always be found to prevent confrontation, division, and "tragic consequences." He denies that Georgia is dragging its heels over the holding of elections.

Lyubimov asks: "What kind of coup are you afraid of?"

Gumbaridze responds: "Only a reactionary one. And a coup can only be reactionary."

Lyubimov says: "Today, they are looking to the central authorities for an easing of the pressure. They are looking for support from their allies in the firm of the national liberation movements. In the absence of experience of freedom, the realistic choice is to rely upon constitutional processes in the republics. The more loyal is the center, the more constructive is the natural process of the quest for real self-government. Meanwhile, Georgia will always be Georgia. Don't be in a hurry to erect frontiers in your mind."

[Video shows pictures of a Georgian organ-grinder; shots of candles being lit for the dead, armored vehicles in streets, a demonstration by marchers carrying banners and flags, a canister of "Cheremukha 6" gas being shown at what appears to be a press conference; Shevardnadze at a meeting; a central newspaper, possibly SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA; a meeting in Lithuania, perhaps of Supreme Soviet; street interviews with no sound]

State, Stance of Georgian Party Overviewed

PM1505083790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
14 May 90 Second Edition p 3

[Interview with G.G. Gumbaridze, first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee, by special correspondents N. Kozhanov and G. Lebanidze; date unspecified; under the rubric "Discussion Pamphlet No. 32": "On the Road to Agreement. Georgia's Communists in Run-Up to Congress"; first two paragraphs are an introduction]

[Text] Tbilisi—The Georgian Communist Party Congress, which will open 15 May, will outline ways of renewing the republic's social and political life and will define communists' role and place in its social, national, and state rebirth. The work of this forum and its results will, naturally, be an important stage in the preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress.

The political atmosphere in the republic on the eve of the congress and the key problems facing communists were the subject of discussion between PRAVDA correspondents and G.G. Gumbaridze, first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee.

[Gumbaridze] The republic's life today is exceptionally complex. In these conditions, the forthcoming 28th congress of Georgian communists should in no way be classed as an ordinary, traditional forum. It is no exaggeration to say that the nature of the political orientation of our future life will depend considerably on its results. I have already said that the main content of the process currently being experienced by the republic's Communist Party is to choose whether it will be able to retain and express in its policy the full creative essence of the ideas of perestroyka and consolidate society on this basis, or whether it will be forced to make concessions in the struggle for hearts and minds to other parties and movements trying to find an alternative outside the objective course of history. The second option, you will recall, is unacceptable to us. So, in this situation the republic's communists should be firmly convinced that the party to which they belong is not avoiding the struggle or circling the wagons but is adopting clear-cut positions on all issues of concern to society and is acting on the basis of the people's interests for the sake of Georgia's future sovereignty.

[PRAVDA] But surely if you listen to the current political opponents of the republic's Communist Party, they too are guided exclusively by the people's interests and also advocate sovereignty and independence.

[Gumbaridze] There is a difference—and it is very substantive. Unlike other parties and movements which have emerged on the crest of the sharp politicization of social life, we see the republic's way toward gaining genuine autonomy and creating an economically secure life for our people as being to build a new and genuinely democratic society—without abandoning what has been achieved—and to utilize everything positive in the republic's history. Naturally, we unconditionally condemn and irrevocably reject everything that contradicted the principles of socialism and civilization in general in the past.

[PRAVDA] Judging from your opponents' statements and people's sentiments, many people are doubtful about this "irrevocability," basing their doubts on past experience and holding the party fully responsible for the crisis in the republic's life.

[Gumbaridze] But neither is the party shirking its responsibility—although, of course, many factors have played a part in this. These include factors that go beyond the bounds of the republic. In the context of the current lack of coordination, of disorder, vacillation, and polarization of various population groups' interests and positions, it is extremely important to retain the political initiative. Our party can only maintain its prestige by operating on a qualitatively new basis. Namely—by organically absorbing and accumulating national and social ideals and interests, conducting an extensive, respectful, and constructive dialogue with various sociopolitical forces, and invariably confirming through its specific actions that it is capable of successfully resolving even the most acute political, ethnic, and social problems.

As for "irrevocability"—it has been "voted for" by our entire preceding path. We need not delve very far into history—we need only recall the 9 April tragedy, which utterly laid bare the political crisis, became a watershed in our thinking and awareness, and, as it were, overturned customary concepts and ideas at the cost of immense moral trials and losses. It taught us, and not only us, severe object lessons, one of which was that it is impossible to talk with the people while hiding behind tanks and armored personnel carriers, that constant contact with the public is needed, that its interests must be taken into account, and that in any event there must be a desire to understand each other and to find points of contact.

Today we are all sincerely concerned and alarmed about the exacerbation of interethnic relations in the country. Not least among our closest neighbors. It is well known that we have experienced this in our republic too. The case is well known: People who had for centuries lived side by side on the same land suddenly became hostile and were excited by irresponsible elements. It was these elements that provoked the incidents in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Kvemo Kartli. In this regard I would particularly like to emphasize that the republic's Communist Party will continue to be the main force uniting all the nations and ethnic groups living in Georgia. Moreover, an honest, clear-cut, objective, and principled policy should be pursued more vigorously on the nationalities issue and everything should be done to maintain the unshakable traditions—typical of my people since time immemorial—of fraternal friendship and mutual respect for other nations, their customs, and way of life.

In short, we need to consolidate social forces on a constructive platform taking account of the entire range of economic, social, and ethnic problems. It was for the sake of this consolidation that the Communist Party came up with a detailed concept for national development in the course of its preparations for the congress.

[PRAVDA] Briefly, what is the essence of that concept?

[Gumbaridze] It is a kind of action program geared to the short- and longer-term. Its main provisions take account of the interests of all nations and ethnic groups living in Georgia, and the problems of language and history. Its aim is for the republic to achieve real national state sovereignty, which should ensure further progress in Georgia's prosperity, its political and cultural growth, and the moral recovery of society. The concept reflects issues connected with regulating the status of citizenship in the republic and the force of Union laws within it. The republic is autonomously elaborating and implementing the policy of its economic, social, ecological, and demographic development. At the same time, our concept is intended to show everyone that Georgia will never permit discrimination against anyone's rights on ethnic or any other grounds.

[PRAVDA] As we can see, Givi Grigoryevich, this concept is aimed at the long term but, judging by the current situation in the republic, forces striving to oust the Communist Party from the forefront of the political scene and openly embarking on the path of confrontation are becoming increasingly active.

[Gumbaridze] Yes, trends which, if not stopped, could seriously disrupt the democratization process have been gathering strength recently. And this needs to be bluntly stated. The attempts to gamble on strong-arm methods have not stopped and various corrupt elements have stepped up their activities. Hiding behind national ideas and social movements, they are actually discrediting them.

Some people are straining for power in an attempt to attract the public with raucous "ultrapatriotic" slogans and appeals for "independence today," demanding an immediate political and economic break with the USSR and the fraternal republics. These hasty, superficial, and amateurish assessments are dangerous in that they could create entirely unsubstantiated political illusions in some members of the population.

Yes, Georgia is a rich country with considerable economic potential—it can ultimately supply everything it needs. But can we forget that our economy today requires fundamental modernization? We need major analysis in this area, we need to have a clear idea of how to do all this in a balanced fashion, of what could lie in store for us tomorrow and the day after.

In short, political boldness and political adventurism are entirely different and mutually exclusive categories. Yet some people keep forgetting this, just as they forget that it was the Communist Party's healthy forces which stopped the country's slide into disaster and gave the green light to perestroyka processes. It was these forces which developed the new political thinking and paved the way to renewal, cleansing, glasnost, and democratization, thanks to which, indeed, they won freedom of action for opposition forces.

Incidentally, we do not in any way rule out cooperation with parties and social movements in resolving common national political and economic tasks and problems. We will willingly espouse anything valuable that they propose.

[PRAVDA] Can it be claimed that serious opposition to the current course of perestroyka pursued by the Georgian Communist Party is being felt only from the so-called "ultraradical" forces?

[Gumbaridze] Not quite. Attempts, admittedly camouflaged attempts, to set the party against the processes of renewal are sometimes observed on the right too—among certain leadership officials who find it hard to come to terms with the loss of their customary privileges. Some people still hanker after the administrative edict system, under which they could simply bang their fist on the table. And we even hear people claiming that the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee is showing passivity, dragging its feet, and failing to take resolute measures against "troublemakers." Incidentally, I think that such sentiments are evident not only in Georgia and, as the saying goes, God forbid that they should prevail. It is hard to even imagine the trials that civic peace and harmony could face in the country.

[PRAVDA] Recently we have encountered quite a few cases of people leaving the party. Among the commonly cited causes are "disenchantment about ideals," the mistakes and distortions of the past, or—on the contrary—suspicions about "betrayal of the socialist cause" and so forth. What is the current state of affairs in this regard in Georgia?

[Gumbaridze] I will make no secret of the fact that we have experienced such cases too. And, in general, the same kinds of reasons are given. But I would also attribute this to mistakes committed during admission to the party. Let us make no bones about it, we also admitted people on the "quota system" and people joined us for the sake of their careers—"to get a position," as Lenin put it. Yes, quite honestly, promotion at work often did depend on whether people had a party card.

If we are talking about the number of people leaving the party in the republic, I can cite the following figures. Over the past year and in the first quarter of this year around 1,660 people have left the party. During the same period more than 7,600 people have joined. I do not know how things will continue, but currently this is a ray of hope in this complex situation. It is not timid people, you understand, who join the party.

[PRAVDA] What can you say about the course of the precongress discussion in party organizations? How active have primary party links been in this area?

[Gumbaridze] The discussion, judging by my own personal impressions and by reports from local level, has been conducted very actively. The commission to prepare congress documents has received lots of proposals and criticisms. The draft basic provisions for the program and organizational structure of the Georgian Communist Party have been worked out with effective participation by local party committees and congress delegates, working on the basis of several alternative options. Most of the precongress meetings and conferences have been held in an acute and businesslike fashion. In recent months (these can probably be compared with years in terms of the intensity of their renewal processes) all cadre issues in city and rayon committees have been decided at the discretion of the communists themselves. Virtually all secretaries and many other leadership officials at city and rayon committees have been elected on a contested basis. The forms and methods of party work have been substantially renewed, and there is more confidence in unusual solutions and initiatives from local level.

[PRAVDA] Does that include the economic sphere?

[Gumbaridze] Why not? While rejecting its economic administration functions, the party has no right to shirk its responsibility for the generally unsatisfactory state of affairs in the economy. Who are better placed than communists to provide timely support for bold initiatives, reinforced by sober calculation or mold-breaking schemes? There are so many problems connected with the lease system, economic accountability, and curbing the tyranny of central and local departments.

We are only at the beginning of the hard and complex road of implementing radical economic reform. In the towns and in the countryside alike. This year for instance, kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms] which had not been able to get out of debt were closed down, with two exceptions, in six mountain and foothill rayons. Land—or, rather, those tiny stretches of it clinging to mountainsides—has finally been transferred to the peasants in the form of their own personal farms, and the state has avoided the necessity to constantly revive hopelessly loss-making farms which had been artificially created at some point in the past.

Incidentally, in the struggle for economic perestroyka and assimilation of market forms and in the implementation of radical measures in this area with the least losses for the population, the Georgian Communist Party is also prepared for effective cooperation with other parties and social movements.

[PRAVDA] The CPSU Central Committee open letter raised for communists the issue of consolidation on a principled basis. How have people in the republic's party organizations reacted to this appeal?

[Gumbaridze] To be blunt, the letter got a mixed reception at local level. Although the overall thrust of it did not, as a rule, give rise to doubts among communists, certain—and in my view inadequately considered—formulas on demarcation and the demand to "investigate matters" met with a clearly negative reaction. Such recommendations have been too easily exploited by certain people to get rid of dissidence, and if this turned into a political campaign could you imagine the state in which the CPSU would arrive at the congress?!

At the same time I would like to reiterate that consolidation in the party is a guarantee of success. I hope and believe that the coming congress of Georgian communists will be an important landmark along that road.

Central Asia

Report on Kazakh Supreme Soviet Proceedings

LD1405204490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] The first session of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] resumed work today. A decision was taken to postpone until the second sesssion consideration of a package of laws relating to the activities of local soviets. Elections of the members of the Supreme Court of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic and judges of oblast courts and of Alma-Ata City Court was also postponed until later. The list of candidates recommended for posts in Kazakhstan's judicial bodies will be published in the republican press. The deputies confirmed the first deputy chairmen and deputy chairmen of the republican Council of Ministers. Appointment of ministers and chairmen of state committees of the Kazakh SSR has begun. In the ensuing days the deputies will examine a number of draft laws, including drafts on land, on ownership, and on peasant farms in the Kazakh SSR.

Discusses Nuclear Tests

LD1405124490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1130 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] Our country, as is evident from reports, is experiencing a tense parliamentary life and here is one more piece of news. Today, after a two-day intermission, the first session of the Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet has resumed work. There is a mass of complex issues on the agenda, from the discussion of the candidacies recommended for membership of the republican government to the issue of the cessation of tests on the nuclear testing ground at Semipalatinsk.

Committee Chairmen Elected

LD1405131190

[Editorial Report] Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA on 2 May, page 3 publishes a decision by the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet electing the chairmen of standing commissions and committees. They are as follows:

Committee on Issues of the Work of Soviets of People's Deputies and Development of Government and Self-Government, Chairman—Yuriy Alekseyevich Klochkov;

Committee on Issues of Legislation, Legality and Law and Order, Chairman—Nikolay Il'ich Akuyev;

Committee on Issues of the Economic Reform, Budget and Finance, Chairman—Sauk Temirbayevich Takezhanov;

Commission on Nationalities Policy and Development of Culture and Language, Chairman—Abish Kekilbayev;

Committee on Agrarian Issues and Food, Chairman—Yuriy Mikhaylovich Il'yashenko;

Committee on People's Health Care and Social Protection, Chairman—Tanirbergen Tokhtarovich Tokhtarov;

Committee on Youth Affairs, Chairman Byrganym Sariyevna Aytimova;

Committee on Issues of Ecology and Rational Utilization of Natural Resources, Chairman—Marash Mukhamediyevich Nurtazin;

Committee on Issues of the Development of Industry, Transport, and Communications, Chairman—Khristian Davidovich Driller;

Committee on Issues of the Development of Science and People's Education, Chairman—Orazaly Sabdenovich Sabdenov;

Committee on Consumer Goods, Trade and Services, Chairman- Vladimir Grigor'yevich Manankov;

Committee on Issues of Construction and Architecture, Chairman—Anet Imanakyshevich Bektemisov;

Committee on Affairs of Women, Family Care, Motherhood and Children, Chairman—Altynshash Kairzhanovna Dzhaganova;

Committee on Affairs of Veterans, Invalids, and Service Personnel, Chairman—Sagadat Kozhakhmetovich Nurmagambetov.

The decision is signed by Ye. Asanbayev, chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet and dated Alma Ata, 27 April 1990.

Oblast Party Conference Held in Kazakhstan

LD1405082490 Alma-Ata Domestic Service in Kazakh 0100 GMT 13 May 90

[Excerpts] Party conferences have been held in E. Kazakhstan, Guryev, Dzhambul, Kokchetav, Pavloldar, Semipalatinsk, and Ural Oblasts between 11 and 12 May. The delegates examined the important issues, heard reports of the oblasts party committees and the control commissions, and expressed their views. The basic tasks of the oblast party organizations in deepening the restructuring were defined. They discussed the draft platforms of the CPSU Central Committee and the Communist Party of Kazakhstan Central Committee for the party congress and the new CPSU rules, and submitted proposals. The first secretaries of the oblast party committee and members of the communist party of Kazakhstan Central Committee and of control commissions have been elected. [passage omitted]

Tutevol was elected first secretary of E. Kazakhstan Oblast Party Committee;

(Aldamdzharov), who had been working as secretary of the Guryev Oblast was elected as first secretary of Guryev Oblast Party Committee.

Baydzhanov was elected first secretary of Dzhambul Oblast Party Committee;

(Abutalipov) who had been working as secretary of the Tselinograd Oblast Party Committee, was elected as first secretary of Kokchetav Oblast Party Committee.

Meshcheryakov was elected first secretary of Semipalatinsk Oblast Party Committee.

Boztayev was elected first secretary of Semipalatinsk Oblast Party Committee.

Iskaliyev was elected first secretary of Ural Oblast Party Committee.

Elections of first secretaries in Guryev and Kokchetav were held on an alternative basis with three candidates.

Taking part in the conference work in Kokchetav was Nazarbayev, president of the Kazakhstan Soviet Socialist Republic and first secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan Central Committee. [passage omitted]

Kazakh Oblasts Elect First Secretaries

PM1405162990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 May 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS "Official report": "Oblast Party Conferences"]

[Text] Oblast party conferences ended yesterday in Semipalatinsk, Dzhambul, Uralsk, Ust-Kamenogorsk, Pavlodar, Kokchetav, and Guryev. They examined the oblast committees' accountability reports and their tasks in the conditions of perestroyka and elected leading party organs and delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and 17th Kazakh Communist Party Congress.

The following party obkom first secretaries were elected: K.B. Boztayev—Semipalatinsk Oblast; S.M. Bayzhanov—Dzhambul Oblast; N. Iskaliyev—Uralsk Oblast; I.N. Tutevol—East Kazakhstan Oblast; Yu.A. Meshcheryakov—Pavlodar Oblast; Ch.M. Abutalipov—Kokchetav Oblast; G.K. Aldamzharov—Guryev Oblast.

Earthquake in Kazakhstan; No Destruction Reported

LD1405114790 Moscow TASS in English 1131 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] Alma-Ata May 14 TASS—An earthquake occurred in Kazakhstan at 21 hours 40 minutes on Sunday. According to the Alma-Ata central seismic station, it reached force 6.5 at the epicentre, which was 250 kilometres to the north-east of the republic's capital and 70 kilometres to the south-east of Taldy-Kurgan. The tremors in Alma-Ata equalled to force 2-3. There are no victims or destructions.